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ANIMAL SUBJECTIVITY 
A STUDY INTO PHILOSOPHY AND THEORY 
OF A N I M A L E X P E R I E N C E 
Susanne Lijmbach 
STELLINGEN 
1. De analogieredenering op grond waarvan men tot ervaringen bij dieren concludeert, 
legt een relatie tussen de wereld van objectieve dingen en gebeurtenissen en de wereld 
van subjectieve ervaringen. 
2. De benaming "humanities" voor de geesteswetenschappen is terecht aangezien deze 
wetenschappen zich beperken tot mensen; om recht te doen aan dieren als subjecten, 
zou men ook moeten spreken van "animalities". 
3. De betekenis van Descartes' uitspraak "Cogito ergo sum" wordt bij Plessner en 
Merleau-Ponty dubbelzinnig. 
4. In het hedendaags onderzoek naar ervaringen bij dieren is de dierpsychologie van 
Buytendijk zeker geen gepasseerd station. 
5. "Vermoedelijk is voor ons van al het zijnde dat is, het levend wezen het moeilijkst te 
denken, omdat het enerzijds in zekere zin het dichtst bij ons staat en anderzijds toch 
tegelijk door een afgrond van ons ek-sistente wezen gescheiden is." (Heidegger, "Brief 
Über den Humanismus", 1949). 
6. "Er is echter geen weg naar de niet-menselijke Umwelten." (Plessner, "Mensch und 
Tier", 1946). 
7. De pil en het condoom hebben seksualiteit ontkoppeld van het krijgen van kinderen; 
kunstmatige inseminatie en in vitro fertilisatie hebben het krijgen van kinderen 
ontkoppeld van seksualiteit. 
8. Als burger is iedere consument ook verantwoordelijk voor de produktiewijze van wat 
hij of zij koopt. 
9. Het marktdenken heeft in de universitaire wereld wel tot een hoge omzet maar nog niet 
tot winst geleid. 
10. In het licht van de promotie van regionale produkten geeft het te denken dat Wagenings 
kruidenbitter in Harderwijk wordt geproduceerd. 
11. Nu coupés in forenzentreinen de sociale functie van agora, forum en markt hebben 
overgenomen, is de zorg voor publieke ruimtes van een stedenbouwkundige kwestie 
ook een vervoerskundige kwestie geworden. 
12. De aanduiding "het dier" ontkent niet alleen de geslachtelijkheid maar ook de 
subjectiviteit van dieren. 
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PREFACE 
While writing this book I used the phrase "From stop making sense to Trying to make sense" 
as its working title. This phrase expresses the thread of this book: neither natural-scientific 
ethology nor hermeneutics can make sense of animal behaviour, that is, see animal behaviour 
as a subjective phenomenon. By using a view based on philosophies of the animal body as 
an experiencing body I try to make sense of animal behaviour. 
Another reason for using this working title was that it expresses the two parts of my life. 
"Stop making sense" is the title of a song by David Byrne. His songs and music express my 
private life, namely the way of living and loving of middle-aged, modern and urban people. 
"Trying to make sense" is the title of a book by Peter Winch. He was the first one who 
opened up my natural-scientific eyes for another way of viewing human behaviour. From that 
moment on, the idea of an animal science based on such a view became the drive of my 
professional life. 
Under the heads of these two titles, I wish to thank all the persons in my private and 
professional life for their support. 
I thank all my former and present colleagues at the Applied Philosophy Group of 
Wageningen Agricultural University for their more or less daily support. Some of them I 
wish to mention by name, namely my promoter Michiel Korthals and co-promotor Jozef 
Keulartz; Henk van den Belt for revising the English text, and Bea Prijn for her personal and 
computer support. I also wish to thank Carol Crow for giving the finishing touch to the 
English text; all the students who passed by for reminding me weekly to my main task of 
teaching; all the persons working at other departments of my university, especially the 
Department of Animal Sciences, at animal protection organizations, ministeries or wherever 
else for keeping alive my philosophy as applied philosphy, and all my colleagues of other 
universities, especially one of my promoters Jan Grommers, for their sometimes harsh but 
always friendly criticism. I wish to thank by name too Jos de Mul, Ben Vedder, Douwe 
Tiemersma, Petran Kockelkoren and Wim Dekkers for their ciritical reading of the drafts of 
chapters of this book, and Joseph Kockelmans who took care for me in State College, 
Pennsylvania, while I was quietly working there for three months. 
Under the head of "Stop making sense", I wish to thank the members of my still 
extending family and my friends, especially the females, for my deceased father's attitude: 
"Whatever she does, she is my daughter " One of them, my "grundsätzlicher 
Lebensgefährte" Jaap de Vierter, may give me back my own words and continue the 
songline: "Stop making sense. We just want someone to love..." 

CHAPTER I 
THE QUESTION OF ANIMAL SUBJECTIVITY 
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1. Scientific and philosophical problems of animal subjectivity 
This book tries to give an answer to the theoretical-scientific and philosophical problems 
regarding the conceptualization and the method to gain knowledge of animal experiences. 
These problems are called the problems of animal subjectivity, because the capacity to 
experience is seen as the criterion for speaking about subjects instead of objects or things. 
(See, for example, the title of a Dutch book about this question Animal or thing. 
Objectivation of animals, 1988.) 
Thinking of animal subjectivity brings to mind the relation between human and animal 
subjectivity. An obvious way to conceptualize animals as subjects seems to be to argue that 
animals are in the same way subjects as humans. Contemporary animal ethologists and 
animal ethicists sometimes follow this path. For instance, Griffin, an ethologist, goes to great 
lengths to demonstrate that animals have capacities that we normally restrict to humans. And 
the animal ethicist Regan says that all mammals of at least one year or older meet the criteria 
of being a subject-of-a-life. These criteria include the capacity to have beliefs, desires, 
perceptions, memory, to experience welfare, etc.; in short, all the capacities human subjects 
have. This egalitarian view would imply ethical egalitarianism too, which states that animals 
ought to be treated in the same way as humans. 
This way of conceptualizing animal subjectivity often leads to inconsistencies. In order 
to demonstrate that animals are subjects like humans, ethologists mostly conceptualize human 
and animal experiences in a natural-scientific way. An example is the comparison that Griffin 
and Rollin make between the concept 'animal experience' and theoretical physical concepts 
such as 'quark' that refer to unobservable entities as causes of observable phenomena 
(Griffin, 1976/1981, pp. 115-116; Rollin, 1996, p.9). This contradicts its intention: it sees 
animals and animal experiences, like physical phenomena, as objects or things. 
Also Regan's egalitarian view on humans and animals leads to an - ethical -
inconsistency. He concludes from a discussion of a few so-called "lifeboat examples" that 
humans are allowed to throw a dog overboard to prevent their own death by drowning. This 
conclusion is clearly in contradiction with the equality of animals and humans. (See Rivas 
(1997) for the discussion of this inconsistency in Regan's animal ethics.) In this book I will 
follow another way to justify our speaking of animal subjects. Rather than trying to 
demonstrate that animals are subjects like human subjects, I will develop a concept of 
animals as experiencing subjects and a method for knowing their experiences by discussing 
various theoretical and philosophical views on animals and humans as subjects. 
Saying that animals are subjects is criticizing the traditional dualism of non-human 
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objects and human subjects. This criticism leads one to a dispute with animal ethologists as 
well as with scientists of humans. Within animal ethology (the scientific discipline that 
nowadays studies animal experiences), speaking of animals as subjects was anathema from 
about 1950s. The ideas of Niko Tinbergen of ethology had triumphed. In On aims and 
methods of ethology (1963), Tinbergen defended an objectivistic ethology that aims at causal 
explanations of animal behaviour. He considered the natural-scientific, empirical-analytical 
method of research the appropriate one to do this. This method sees animal behaviour, and 
therefore animals, as any other object in science. Hence, Tinbergen said ethology must be 
the same as any other scientific discipline and should not allow subjective phenomena such 
as experiences or feelings be causes of observable phenomena. By means of this view, 
Tinbergen criticized the ideas of ethologists like Lorenz and Huxley, and especially those of 
animal psychologists such as Buytendijk, Bierens de Haan and Portielje, who all 
acknowledged animal experience (Burkhardt, 1997; Röell, 1996). 
Tinbergen's view is still influential in animal ethology, including that part which studies 
animal welfare. Some animal welfare scientists fully agree with Tinbergen's view and say 
that, although animals may have subjective feelings of welfare, these feelings cannot be 
studied scientifically. Animal ethology and all animal sciences have to restrict themselves to 
causal and functional, physical explanations. Other animal welfare scientists partly agree with 
Tinbergen's view. Ethologists like Wiepkema and Toates also causally explain animal 
behaviour by means of the natural-scientific method,of research. But, unlike Tinbergen, they 
accept animal experiences as causes of animal behaviour. This seems to be contradictory: to 
follow Tinbergen's method of ethology, which aims at the removal of animal experiences 
from ethology, to investigate animal experiences. ík the dispute with animal ethologists it will 
be argued that it is possible to investigate subjective animal experiences, albeit not in a 
natural-scientific way. 
Speaking of animal subjects also leads to a dispute with scientists within the humanities 
such as cultural anthropologists and historians, who hold onto the subjective character of 
experience. However, these scientific disciplines usually restrict experience to human 
experience. These disciplines have a dualistic view on the world: the world is made up of 
natural-objects on the one hand and human subjects on the other. A dualism concerning 
methods of research reflects this dualistic view on the world. The method of the natural 
sciences is held to be appropriate for studying non-living things, plants, animals and the 
physical aspects of humans such as their bodies. With regard to their subjective aspects, 
humans are held to be studied in an understanding way, for example hermeneutically or 
phenomenologically. Against this dualistic world view within the humanities it will be argued 
that animals can be the subject matter of an understanding investigation, although they are 
another type of subjects than human beings. 
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2. Background of this study 
From about the 1960s many problems regarding the treatment of animals are seen as animal 
welfare problems. Admittedly, before that time, laws and other regulations with regard to 
animals existed - at least in western countries. However, not the protection of animals but 
the protection of human interests was the aim of these laws and regulations. For instance, 
the argument for accepting anti-cruelty laws at the end of the 19th Century was that 
permitting cruelty to animals could easily lead to cruelty to humans. And the Dutch Livestock 
Diseases Act, the forerunner of the present Animal Health and Welfare Act, only concerned 
animal diseases with negative consequences for the owners of the animals, the livestock 
population or the export of animals and animal products. The emergence of the concept of 
animal welfare implied the view that animals ought to be cared for because of their own 
interests (Gezondheids- en welzijnswet voor dieren, 1994, p.XX). Animal welfare is such an 
interest, especially because many people define this by experiences of feeling well or badly. 
Usually, the capacity to experience is seen as the same as being a subject. So, speaking of 
animal welfare brought animals as subjects upon the stage. 
The general rule of the Dutch Animal Health and Welfare Act is that the degree to which 
animal welfare is affected ought to be weighed against the importance of the use of animals 
for human ends. This seems to be a clear rule, but it is not. One of the problems with the 
implementation of this rule is the human assessment of the harm to the animals' welfare. This 
problem showed up when the Dutch Animal Protection Movement and the Fur for Animals 
Foundation started a campaign to prohibit keeping mink for their fur. These organizations 
claimed that the welfare of the mink animals under the current farming circumstances was 
too poor to legitimize the goal of the production of fur. The question whether and how much 
the welfare of farm mink is harmed turned out to raise scientific and philosophical problems. 
These became clear at a meeting in 1995 of Dutch scientists and philosophers about animal 
welfare and the method to assess it. One of the participants of the meeting was Françoise 
Wemelsfelder. She had just written a thesis in which she criticized the usual ethological view 
on animal experience and the method used to investigate them (Wemelsfelder, 1993). Rather 
than seeing animal experiences as something inside animals that causes animal behaviour, she 
sees animal behaviour as a direct expression of their experiences. Instead of the objectivating 
and quantitative method of research, she proposed a subjectivating and qualitative method. 
The aim of the present book is to continue this scientific and philosophical discussion about 
animal subjectivity as a subject matter for animal science. The central questions are how we 
can conceptualize animal experiences and by which methods we can know them} 
The different meanings of 'science' in different languages raises a problem for using this word. In 
English, 'science' is usually restricted to the natural sciences. In Dutch, 'science' always includes 
the natural as well as the human sciences. In German, the human sciences which use a method of 
research different from the natural scientific method are called the Geisteswissenschaften or the 
hermeneutical sciences. Like the Germans, I prefer to call every systematic and controllable way of 
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acquiring knowledge "science". But doing this in a book written in English might be confusing. 
Therefore, most of the time I will use an adjective in order to prevent any misunderstanding, for 
example natural science or hermeneutical science. When I just write about science, I hope it will be 
clear from the context what the intended meaning is. 
3 . Outline of the book 
This book contains two parts. In the first part, I will discuss two different approaches to 
experience in general and animal experience in particular. In the second part, the idea of 
bodily and environmentally bound animal experience will be elaborated conceptually and 
methodically, and translated to contemporary scientific and philosophical debates about 
animal welfare. 
The two approaches to experience are, on the one hand, two ethological animal welfare 
theories and, on the other hand, two philosophical hermeneutical views on animal experience. 
Both approaches are not adequate to conceptualize animal experience, albeit for different 
reasons. 
The two ethological theories, namely that of Wiepkema and Toates (chapter U) and that 
of Dawkins (chapter HI), are examples of natural-scientific animal welfare theories. I largely 
agree with Wemelsfelder's analysis of most ethological animal welfare theories, namely that 
these theories see animal experiences as internal and unobservable causes of behaviour 
(Wemelsfelder, 1993). Seen as such causes, animal experiences are mere theoretical concepts 
or designations that are similar to concepts such as 'quark'. Ethologists of animal welfare, 
however, say that these theoretical concepts refer to subjective animal experiences. Here they 
use the argument from analogy. This argument assumes, rather than demonstrates, that 
animals are similar to humans with regard to experiences. Ethological animal welfare theories 
intend to inform us about subjective animal experiences of good or poor welfare. In fact, they 
do not contain an explicit concept of animal welfare as subjective experience because of their 
natural-scientific character. 
In my search for a concept of and method for knowing subjective animal experiences, 
I make a leap to a totally different domain of science, namely to hermeneutics. This is a 
philosophy and science within the humanities that holds onto human experience as subjective 
experience. I will discuss two founders of 20th Century hermeneutics, namely Dilthey 
(chapter IV) and Gadamer (chapter V). Especially their conceptual and methodical view on 
experience in general and animal experience in particular will be analyzed. The views of 
these philosophers are also not adequate to conceptualize subjective animal experience 
because they largely use a classical hermeneutical line of reasoning. This line of reasoning 
consists of taking typically human experiences as examples of experiences in general and then 
founding the capacity to experience on a way of being that is typical human. Here I agree 
with Petran Kockelkoren who says that hermeneutics excludes meaningful animal expressions 
and experiences because it sees experience, expression and meaning as always cultural and 
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historical (Kockelkoren, 1992). However, Gadamer's view on human experiences of health 
and sickness as founded on the human bodily way of being opens up a way of seeing animal 
experience as bodily experience. 
In the second part of the book, I will explore this point, which can be seen as a 
continuation of the research started by Kockelkoren and Wemelsfelder. Kockelkoren also 
emphasizes the bodily aspect of animal experience. Like me, he derives this aspect from the 
philosopher Plessner. Kockelkoren, however, neglects the distinction that Plessner makes 
between animal and human experience (Lijmbach, 1992). I will emphasize this distinction, 
and say that animal experience, unlike human experience, is impersonal, bodily bound, here-
and-now experience. In order to gain knowledge of animal experiences, a method is needed 
that holds onto their subjective character, namely that experiences are lived by the animals 
in question. As said, Wemelsfelder proposes a subjectivating method, namely one that sees 
animal behaviour as a direct expression of experiences. I fully agree with her intention, but 
not with her elaboration. Wemelsfelder does not want to go beyond the limits of natural 
science; she thinks that a natural-scientific ethology can do this job (Lijmbach, 1993). I will 
argue that, in order to study animal experiences, an interpretative method is needed. 
Speaking of bodily experiences within philosophy immediately brings to mind the name 
of Merleau-Ponty (chapter VI). All his writings are about the human body as an experiencing 
body, which he sees as the origin of reflective experiences. He opposes the Descartes' view 
on humans, which says that humans are made up of a physical body and a mind. Merleau-
Ponty, by contrast, sees the human body as ambiguous: an mtertwining of physical and 
experiencing body. With regard to animals, however, Merleau-Ponty is not very specific. On 
the one hand, it is possible to apply Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the human body to 
animals except that only humans possess the capacity to have reflective experiences. On the 
other hand, Merleau-Ponty is not clear about the question whether and how animals as non-
reflective organisms differ from other non-human organisms to which we do not ascribe 
experiences. 
Plessner has given an answer to this question (chapter VU). He has developed a 
philosophy of life in which he distinguishes different kinds of bodily being. Plessner clearly 
states that only animals, beside humans, are experiencing beings. He says too, however, that 
animal experiences as pre-reflective and "here-and-now" experiences differ from reflective 
human experiences because animals only have a bodily-bound self. Plessner's concept of 
animal experiences as bodily-bound, here-and-now experiences can be seen as an answer to 
the first question of this book, namely that of a proper conceptualization of subjective animal 
experiences. 
The Dutch animal psychologist Buytendijk has made concrete Plessner's philosophical 
concept of animal experience (chapter VIII). Buytendijk belonged to the Utrecht School of 
Psychology. This School opposed the dominant natural-scientific views on humans and 
psychology. The members of this School saw humans as individual persons within a 
meaningful situation, and psychology as aimed at understanding such persons. Buytendijk 
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transposed this alternative view of psychology to the study of animals. He held that animal 
behaviour too is not merely the causal effect of bodily and environmental processes, but is 
meaningful behaviour, though different in character from meaningful human behaviour. In 
experiments of his own and in discussions of experiments done by other animal scientists, 
Buytendijk saw and interpreted animal behaviour as expressing meaningful experiences. He 
saw animal experiences as bound to the present Umwelt and bodily possibilities of the 
animals involved. Three examples of such interpretations will be described, namely habit 
formation in toads, intelligence of chimpanzees and animal pain. 
By a reconstruction of'Buytendijk's method I will develop an interpretative method for 
studying animal behaviour (chapter IX). This can be seen as an answer to the second question 
of this book, namely that of a method to know subjective animal experiences. This method 
will be developed by comparing it with the understanding method of hermeneutics and the 
Utrecht School. This comparison consists of four issues: the subject matter (respectively 
animal and human experiences), the context of understanding (respectively the species-
specific and personal, cultural and historical way of life), the hermeneutical circle (i.e., going 
to and fro between the assumed meaning of particular expressions and its assumed context 
of understanding), and the issue of single and double hermeneutics (i.e., whether we are able 
to understand animals as they understand themselves). Then I will discuss the relationship 
between the developed interpretative method for investigating animal behaviour and various 
natural-scientific methods for studying animal behaviour. At the end of this chapter, four 
principles of an interpretative approach to animal welfare will be formulated. 
In order to show the need for and possibility of an interpretative approach to animal 
welfare, in addition to the natural-scientific approach, I will critically discuss two 
contemporary debates within animal welfare science (chapter X). The first debate is about 
the concept of animal welfare and the method for knowing animal feelings of welfare. This 
debate took place at a conference about welfare of domestic animals in 1994. Especially the 
issue of how to acquire knowledge of animal feelings of welfare, shows the insufficiency of 
natural-scientific approaches. Many animal welfare scientists say that measurements of 
adrenal activity or heart rate indirectly refer to animal feelings of welfare. Such 
measurements, however, are only indicative of physical states and processes that we call 
good or poor welfare. As one of the participants of this conference said: if animal feelings 
are a fundamental aspect of animal welfare, then a method to know animal feelings has to 
be developed. 
The second debate is about the welfare of farm mink. This debate took place in the 
Netherlands a few years ago. The different participants in this debate disagreed upon the 
question of whether particular behaviours of farm mink counted as expressions of poor 
welfare. This debate shows that it is impossible to reach such an agreement by a natural-
scientific approach alone. The, implicit interpretations of animal behaviour that are present 
in this approach have to be made explicit, so that they can become amenable to a systematic 
and methodical discussion. 
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At the end of this book (chapter XI), I will return to the four previously formulated 
principles of an interpretative approach to animal welfare. I hope to show their fruitfulness 
by means of examples derived from the two contemporary animal welfare debates. 

PART ONE 
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CHAPTER II 
WIEPKEMA AND TOATES: ANIMALS AS EMOTIONAL SYSTEMS 
Piet Wiepkema, now Professor Emeritus at the Department of Animal Husbandry-Ethology 
of Wageningen Agricultural University, was one of the first university ethologists in the 
Netherlands to study welfare of, mainly, domestic animals. At that time, about 20 years ago, 
only a few ethologists did applied research on animal welfare problems (for example, on the 
relationship between housing systems and the welfare of farm animals). Wiepkema gave such 
research a theoretical basis. Most of the other ethologists at that time adopted Tiribergen's 
view and thought that speaking of animal emotions such as welfare was nonsense or 
sentimental, unscientific talk (see the previous chapter). During the symposium held in 
Wageningen on the occasion of Wiepkema's farewell, the British ethologist Frederick Toates 
confessed that he had been among those ethologists. He described his subsequent adoption 
of Wiepkema's ethological ideas about animal welfare as no less than a paradigm shift, a 
revolutionary change of belief. After this change he became a staunch advocate of 
Wiepkema's animal welfare theory. 
Wiepkema and Toates conceive of animal welfare as emotions of animals. Therefore, 
their animal welfare theory takes the form of a general theory of animal and human 
emotions. In this chapter I will first present their theory of emotions (II. 1); then I will 
discuss the problem of the relation between this theory and subjective animal experiences 
such as welfare (II.2), and finally I will offer my criticism of their animal welfare theory 
(JJ.3). 
1. An explanatory theory of emotions 
Wiepkema and Toates' theory of emotions is a cognitive as well as cybernetic theory. 
Cognitive theories in psychology and ethology explain observable human and animal 
behaviour, but also computer performances, as the effects of informational structures and 
processes in, for instance, human and animal brains or electronic hardware. Chomsky's 
theory of language and Dennett's theory of consciousness are the most well known examples 
of cognitive theories. Most cognitive scientists hold that their theories only concern non-
conscious mental phenomena and do not indicate anything about conscious phenomena. 
Chomsky, for instance, does not consider grammatically correct speaking a conscious 
phenomenon but an unconscious process caused by an innate, universal grammatical structure 
and ditto rules. In the same way, cognitive ethologists explain animal behaviour as caused 
by informational structures and processes. Griffin's cognitive research on animals is a case 
in point: it does not indicate anything about subjective animal experience, according to some 
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cognitive ethologists (see Burghardt, 1991). Later we will see how Wiepkema and Toates 
relate their cognitive view on animal welfare to subjective animal experiences of welfare. 
Cybernetic theories are a special type of system theory. System theories explain the 
organization of open systems in a changing environment. The maintenance of a particular 
organization is seen as the goal of the processes in these systems. This goal is called the 
"homeostatic state". Cybernetic systems maintain or restore a homeostatic state by means of 
positive or negative feedback processes. These processes consist of a monitor, which records 
the deviation from the homeostatic state and stimulates or stops the ongoing processes, 
depending on whether this deviation becomes smaller or larger. A well-known example of 
a cybernetic system is a central heating system with a thermostat (Von Bertalanffy, 
1968/1972). 
Motivational systems 
Wiepkema and Toates start with a simple theoretical model of animals that, in the course of 
their elaboration, becomes more complex.1 They begin by conceiving of animals as systems 
which 'strive' to maintain or restore a homeostatic state in relation to their environment. 
'Striving' should not be understood as consciously trying to realize a goal, but simply as a 
tendency to realize the same goal under various environmental conditions. Wiepkema and 
Toates conceptualize homeostatic states as states in which there is no difference between 
Sollwerte (should-values or set-points) and Istwerte (factual values) regarding the 
environment. 
At this stage of the analysis, there is no difference between regulation of the temperature by 
central heating systems and regulation of body temperature by animals (Toates, 1987, p. 165). 
The first difference between artificial and living systems concerns the origin of 
Sollwerte. In artificial systems, humans determine, set and change these. Residents determine 
the desired temperature in their houses. In animals, Sollwerte are not human ends but are set 
evolutionarily, ontogenetically or by learning processes (see, for instance, Wiepkema, 1987). 
Evolutionarily set Sollwerte are genetically fixed and are, therefore, irreversible and 
unchangeable by individual animals. Ontogenetically set Sollwerte are set during a specified 
period in the animal's life called the "critical period". These are irreversibly imprinted into 
their brains and are therefore unchangeable. A famous example of this type of Sollwerte is 
provided by young birds of many species who follow the first living being they see after 
hatching. Most of the time this will be their mother, but readers of this book will probably 
have seen pictures of young geese following the ethologist Lorenz. He was the first living 
being they saw after hatching. Sollwerte that are planted into animal brains as a result of 
learning processes are reversible and changeable through new learning processes. 
For the sake of the readability of this text and because also Wiepkema and Toates themselves are 
writing about only animals, I leave humans aside here, although their theory actually concerns 
human emotions too. 
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One might object that are also learning machines, which in a similar way seem to change 
their own set-points. In machines, however, the learning processes are pre-programmed and 
therefore inflexible, while animal learning processes are flexible, albeit within limits. 
Machines can only adopt new Sollwerte if these are written down in their programme by 
humans beforehand. Learning by animals, on the other hand, is flexible and not pre-
programmed (Buytendijk & Christian, 1963, pp. 102-103). For example, many domestic 
animals learn to adapt themselves to regular times for feeding. Such a a new Sollwert has not 
been installed beforehand by their owners. In summary, the difference between Sollwerte of 
artificial systems and those of animals is that the former are determined and pre-programmed 
by humans, while the latter are set evolutionarily, ontogenetically or by learning processes. 
As soon as a factual environmental value differs from the set-point, artificial as well as 
living systems will strive to reduce this difference. Wiepkema and Toates call this striving 
"motivation" (Toates, 1987, pp. 164-166; Toates, 1988, pp. 13-15; Wiepkema, 1987, pp. 120-
121). The exact meaning of this concept is not clear, however. Generally, a motivation is a 
tendency to reduce a difference between Istwert and Sollwert. It is not clear whether any 
reduction of such a difference and in any cybernetic system involves a motivation. Toates 
seems to restrict motivations to learning processes in animals. Inflexible behaviour such as 
a reflex does not need a mediating motivation because genes and the environment fully 
determine this behaviour, he says (Toates, 1995, pp. 17-18). learning by animals indeed 
requires a mediation between the environment, possible forms of behaviour and the animals' 
memory. However, also in learning machines there must be some kind of mediation between 
the environment, the machine's memory and possible pre-programmed motions of the 
machine. Although we may not be inclined to speak of the motivation of a robot because this 
concept already refers to some kind of subjectivity, there is no theoretical reason to restrict 
motivations to learning animals. In the following chapter, we will see that in Dawkins' 
animal welfare theory this question is more urgent because she claims to be able to measure 
the animals' motivation. Below we will see that this same question, but now concerning 
emotions, also emerges in the theory of Wiepkema and Toates. 
Emotional systems 
As already stated, Wiepkema and Toates conceive of animals as cybernetic systems whose 
behaviour is regulated by feedback mechanisms. Animal emotions are part of these feedback 
mechanisms, namely as recorders of trials to reduce differences between Istwerte and 
Sollwerte and as controllers of motivations and behaviour. If an animal fails to reduce a 
difference between an Istwert and a Sollwert, then this is recorded as a negative emotion 
which, in its turn, stops the particular form of behaviour and activates the motivation to 
another form of behaviour. A successful trial is recorded as a positive emotion that stimulates 
the behaviour in question to continue (Toates, 1988, p.22; Toates, 1995, pp. 15-32; 
Wiepkema, 1987, pp. 128-129). 
Emotions are normal recorders and controllers of animal behaviour. Negative emotions 
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do not always imply poor welfare. Wiepkema and Toates see poor welfare as a long lasting 
negative emotion. This emotion occurs when the animal involved is not able to change the 
factual value of an environmental factor into its corresponding Sollwert (adjustment of the 
environment), or is not able to change a Sollwert (adjustment to the environment). Long 
lasting negative emotions are expressed in disturbed animal behaviour such as stress, 
stereotypies or apathetic behaviour, and in bodily injuries such as ulcers (Toates, 1987, 
p. 182; Wiepkema, 1981b, pp.302-304; Wiepkema, 1987). 
Like with regard to motivations, the question is whether emotions only occur in animals 
or whether they can occur in machines too. We are strongly inclined to say that in machines 
the registration and control of the motions are not emotional but purely mechanical or 
informational. It seems that emotions are special kinds of recorders and controllers which are 
only present in humans and animals. In this case too, Wiepkema and Toates do not offer any 
theoretical argument to exclude emotions in machines. 
The explanatory status of the theory of emotions 
However, Wiepkema and Toates' theory of emotions is not a free-floating theory that is 
applicable to any cybernetic system. They claim that their theory explains the occurrence of 
affective states (emotions) in animals (Toates, 1988, p.4). Their theory only explains animal 
behaviour that is assumed to be an expression of emotions (see the following section). 
Because we do not see the motions of a machine as emotional expressions, my question of 
whether such motions could be caused by emotions is stupid. Just as the theory of 
photosynthesis only explains the growth of plants with chlorophyll, the theory of emotions 
only explains what we see as emotional behaviour in humans and animals. 
From a theoretical point of view, this reasoning is legitimate. Cybernetic theories are 
abstract theories that allow for different kinds of feedback mechanisms: for example, 
mechanical, electronic and emotional. Wiepkema and Toates see animals as cybernetic 
systems with feedback mechanisms regulated by emotions. However, this only shifts the 
problem to the empirical level, namely to the question of why Wiepkema and Toates see 
animal behaviour as an expression of emotions. Their answer to this question will be 
examined in the next section. 
2. The argument from analogy 
Both in ethology and the philosophy of animals, the argument from analogy is a widely used 
argument to support the thesis that animals have subjective experiences. This argument is 
based on similarities between human and animal nervous systems, physiological and 
behavioural processes, and on the fact that humans say they have experiences. From these 
premises one concludes that animals also have experiences. Ethologists and philosophers use 
the argument from analogy on two different levels. One level can lead to a conclusion 
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regarding particular animal experiences similar to human experiences under similar 
circumstances. A second level can lead to the general conclusion that animals, like humans, 
are experiencing beings. 
Wiepkema and Toates use the argument in the latter way. Wiepkema says that one can 
better speak of the argument from homology because the analogy argument is actually based 
on a homology between human and animal biological structures. In biology 'homology' and 
'analogy' have a rather specific meaning. Homologous structures are morphologically similar 
biological structures in different species because of a common descent, for example, the 
wings of birds and the arms of humans. 'Analogy', by contrast, refers to convergent 
evolutionary developments. For example, the wings of birds and insects are the outcomes of 
independent developments that have resulted in a comparable function, although birds and 
insects do not share a common ancestor with that function. As Wiepkema correctly says, the 
argument from analogy supposes a homology between humans and animals, regarding their 
neural structures for instance. However, people who use the argument from analogy do not 
refer to the aforementioned biological meaning of 'analogy'. They do not state that a 
comparable function, in this case the capacity for subjective experience, has been developed 
in different species without a common descent. On the contrary, they often refer to a 
common descent of humans and particular animals. In the argument from analogy, the 
concept 'analogy' has a more common-sense meaning. The argument states that it is plausible 
that homologous behavioural, physiological and brain structures in humans and animals have 
the same function, namely to generate or express subjective experience. Also Wiepkema 
implicitly uses this common-sense meaning of 'analogy' in what he calls "the argument from 
homology". On the basis of the homology between human and vertebrate animal behavioural 
patterns and their underlying information processing feedback mechanisms, he claims that 
it is very likely that non-human vertebrates also have experiences (Wiepkema, 1985, p.291; 
1987, p. 127; 1997, pp.94-95). 
Thus, both the usual argument from analogy and Wiepkema's argument from homology 
simply assume that homologous structures in humans and vertebrate animals have the same 
function, namely to generate and express subjective experiences. That this is a mere 
assumption can be seen from the example of the arms of humans and wings of birds. Though 
being homologous structures, they do not have the same function. Likewise, the homologous 
information processing mechanisms in animals and humans can have different functions, 
which have to be established independently (Tschanz, 1997, pp. 16-19). Even in humans these 
mechanisms do not always generate subjective experiences (Bermond, 1997). From a 
scientific point of view, the argument from analogy is a disputable argument. 
Wiepkema also admits that his argument from homology is not scientifically or logically 
valid. He concedes that the assumption that vertebrate animals are experiencing beings might 
be rather naive (Wiepkema, 1987, p. 126). Toates strengthens the argument from homology 
by also mentioning the sympathy we feel with animals. This is a further argument for 
concluding that vertebrate animals are experiencing beings. However, both arguments do not 
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provide "hard evidence" for the existence of animal emotions, he admits (Toates, 1988, p.4). 
The assumptive and scientifically controversial character of the argument from analogy has 
a quite dramatic implication for Wiepkema and Toates' theory of animal emotions. It implies 
that their whole theory of animal emotions is based on the assumption rather than 
demonstration that vertebrate animals are experiencing beings. If this assumption were not 
true, the theoretical explanation of animal behaviour by means of emotions would be as silly 
as the explanation of machine motions by means of emotions. Besides this thread on which 
their theory hangs, I have more comments on their theory itself. 
3 . Natural-scientific ethology and animal experience 
In chapter one I said that it is amazing that many contemporary ethologists speak of animal 
experiences, but at the same time stick to Tinbergen's aims and methods of ethology that 
forbid speaking of animal experiences. Do Wiepkema and Toates violate Tinbergen's 
precepts? 
In a certain respect they do. Tinbergen's precepts aim at the removal from ethology of 
any concept that refers to subjective animal phenomena as causes of animal behaviour. 
Ethology must explain animal behaviour as the effect of (neuro)physiological causes and 
environmental factors (Tinbergen, 1965). In positioning animal emotions as part of the causal 
basis of animal behaviour, Wiepkema and Toates reject this aim of ethology. 
In another respect, however, they do not oppose Tinbergen's view on ethology. 
Tinbergen wanted ethology to be a natural-science, by which he meant that ethology should 
develop causal-explanatory theories on the basis of observations and experiments (Tinbergen, 
1965). Wiepkema and Toates adopt this method. Although they claim that their theory 
explains animal emotions, actually it explains animal behaviour which they assume to be 
emotional behaviour. It explains, for example, disturbed behaviour as caused by the 
experience of poor welfare. This explanation can be evaluated by testing the relationship 
between the presumed causes of this experience and the resulting disturbed behaviour (for 
example, by comparing different housing systems). Such experimental animal welfare 
research is quite common. In such research, however, animal experiences themselves are not 
studied but only their causes and effects. So, with regard to the method used, Wiepkema and 
Toates' theory of animal emotions is in accordance with Tinbergen's natural-scientific view 
on ethology. 
The main difference is that Tinbergen does not admit concepts such as "emotion" within 
the realm of ethology because such subjectivating concepts do not refer to observable states 
or processes (Tinbergen, 1965, p.413). However, the way in which Wiepkema and Toates 
theoretically conceptualize animal emotions is not subjectivating at all. On the contrary. 
Wiepkema, Toates and many other ethologists admit that speaking of animal emotions in 
ethology is problematic because emotions refer to unobservable mental states or processes. 
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We cannot ask animals to confirm the presence of such states or processes. Griffin and Rollin 
(two proponents of research into animal experiences), notice, however, that in many other 
natural-scientific disciplines, unobservable entities are not seen as problematic. Before anyone 
had observed chromosomes and their structure, geneticists used the concept of "genes" 
without problems. At that time, genes were unobservable, purely theoretical entities that 
geneticists used to explain the observed heredity of properties of organisms (Griffin, 
1976/1981, pp.115-116). Also physicists speak without any problem of unobservable entities 
such as quarks (Rollin, 1996, p.9). Wiepkema, in following Griffin, concludes that the 
impossibility of observing animal experiences does not seem to be an obstacle to admitting 
them within a natural-scientific discipline (Wiepkema, 1981a, p.822). Whether or not animal 
emotions can actually ever be observed as genes finally were, viewed in this way they are 
comparable with unobservable, purely theoretical entities in physics. 
In the first section of this chapter, we saw that Wiepkema and Toates use the concept 
of emotion in such a way. As an element of feedback mechanisms, animal emotion is only 
a hypothetico-theoretical concept intended for explaining particular forms of animal behaviour 
and physiological states. But, as Wemelsfelder says, why should we call these unobservable 
entities or states "emotion", a word with so many other than scientific-theoretical 
connotations (Wemelsfelder, 1993, p.47). One can also say that the feedback mechanisms 
of animals contain as yet unknown and possibly never observable monitors and controllers 
of behaviour. The reason why Wiepkema, Toates and other ethologists use the word 
"emotion" is that they assume that the behaviour and physiological states of animals are 
emotional behaviour and states. However, as Toates recognizes, there is indeed no hard, 
natural-scientific evidence for this assumption. 
Wemelsfelder criticizes Wiepkema and Toates' conception of animal emotions because 
of its mechanistic character, i.e., because it sees emotions as unobservable, internal causes 
of animal behaviour (Wemelsfelder, 1993, pp.44-58). I fully agree with this criticism. In 
seeing animal emotions as causes of animal behaviour, one misses an important element of 
their meaning, namely that they contain what matters to animals. This subjective 
characteristic of animal experiences disappears when they are viewed in a natural-scientific, 
mechanistic way. The primary characteristic of natural-science is that it sees its subject 
matter as law-governed things, of which it is denied that what happens to them matters to 
them. I call this an "objectivating view" on the subject matter. To say that only natural-
scientific evidence is hard evidence for the existence of animal experiences, implies that one 
can never get this evidence because that is exactly what an objectivating view precludes. So, 
Wiepkema and Toates seem to confront themselves with a dilemma. Either they adopt a 
natural-scientific view and thereby have to admit that the scientific part of their animal 
welfare theory does not concern animal welfare as a subjective experience, or they hold onto 
the subjective character of animal experiences of welfare and thereby have to moderate the 
natural-scientific view. 

CHAPTER m 
DAWKINS: "FROM THE ANIMAL'S POINT OF VIEW" 
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In 1980 Marian Dawkins published the book Animal suffering with the subtitle The science 
of animal welfare. The central thesis of this book is that it is possible to obtain knowledge 
of subjective animal experiences without violating the criteria of science (Dawkins, 1980, 
p.vii). The book starts with a criticism of behaviouristic ethologists and psychologists who 
hold that scientific research into animal and human subjective experiences is impossible 
because these experiences are private and unobservable. Dawkins also sees subjective 
experiences as private and unobservable, but she holds that this does not preclude that it is 
possible to study them scientifically (Dawkins, 1980, p. 11). 
In her book Dawkins discusses several criteria used by other ethologists to ascertain the 
particular animal experience of suffering, such as illness, unnatural behaviour or 
physiological parameters. Her conclusion is that each of these criteria is inadequate but that 
together they can provide sufficient grounds for the statement that animals suffer under 
particular circumstances (Dawkins, 1980, p. 108). In her later work Dawkins focuses on one 
method to assess animal suffering, namely by means of preference tests. Especially in her 
book Through our eyes only (1993), it seems to be her considered view that this method 
alone is sufficient for concluding that animals suffer in particular circumstances. 
In this chapter I will first expound Dawkins' method to measure animal suffering by 
means of preference tests (IH.l); then two reconstructions of the theoretical background of 
this method will be given, namely a logical behaviouristic one and one in accordance with 
Wiepkema and Toates' animal welfare theory (HI. 2), and finally I will give my comments 
on Dawkins' concept of animal suffering and her method of research for studying it (IU.3). 
1. Suffering and welfare from the animals' point of view 
Dawkins did not develop an explanatory theory of animal suffering, as Toates and Wiepkema 
did with regard to animal welfare, but only a method to measure it. 
Long-term and short-term animal needs 
Dawkins writes in terms of animal needs, which imply behavioural motivations. Against 
those animal welfare investigators who use the survival value of behaviour as a criterion of 
animal welfare, Dawkins argues that animal welfare does not depend on long-term but on 
short-term needs. Long-term needs are needs that, when not fulfilled, will jeopardize the 
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chance of survival or reproduction.1 Short-term needs, on the other hand, do not concern 
the distant future but the actual situation. Not a future effect of their behaviour but an 
unfulfilled proximate need is the cause of animal suffering, she says (Dawkins, 1983, p. 1197; 
1990a, p.3). For example, a battery hen who tries to perform dustbathing behaviour on a 
grid floor suffers because she cannot fulfil her need to dustbath. The long-term effect that 
the energy used turns out to be wasted energy is not the cause of her actual suffering, 
Dawkins would say. 
In animals in the free nature, the long-term and short-term needs mostly coincide. But 
especially when we consider domestic animals, the distinction between long-term and short-
term needs appears quite clear. For example, in free migratory birds the short-term need to 
move in a particular period coincides with the survival value of migrating behaviour. In 
caged migratory birds, however, the short-term need to move, which expresses itself in 
escape behaviour, does not coincide with the survival value of this behaviour. On the 
contrary, probably their chance of survival in a cage is much better than that of their free 
conspecifics who are able to migrate. The need of caged migratory birds to move is, under 
the given circumstances, merely an innate short-term need without any survival value under 
the current circumstances (Dawkins, 1983, p. 1197; 1990a, p.3). 
Motivational basis of suffering 
Needs imply motivations to perform particular behaviour. The need of migratory birds to 
move implies the motivation to fly away. Dawkins states that a motivation to perform 
behaviour that is inhibited is the cause of animal suffering. Not every inability to perform 
motivated behaviour causes animal suffering, however, but only the inability to perform 
behaviour for which the motivation is high (Dawkins, 1990a, p.4). The question is how to 
measure the intensity of animal motivations, and at which intensity the animals suffer. 
Measuring animal motivations 
Dawkins' method to measure the intensity of animal motivations comes down to the 
application of an economic theory to animals (Dawkins, 1983, pp. 1198-1200; 1990a, pp.5-7). 
This economic theory states that the price people are willing to pay for a particular 
commodity is a measure of their motivation to get that commodity. The ratio of the increase 
in price and the in demand is a measure of the intensity of the motivation to get that 
commodity. If, for instance, the price increases and the demand does not change, then people 
have a high motivation to get that commodity. Such a commodity is called "inelastic". 
Examples of inelastic commodities are food and drink. 
Dawkins applies this economic theory to animals by offering them different environments 
Basicly Dawkins says that long-term needs are not needs at all. She states that the survival value of 
behaviour is an objective function of behaviour that can only be established by biologists (Dawkins, 
1990a, pp.2-3). 
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(like human consumers are offered different commodities) for which they have to spend an 
increasing amount of energy or time to attain or avoid them (like human consumers have to 
pay more or less for commodities). By using such so-called "preference tests" it is possible 
to measure the intensity of the animals' motivation to attain or avoid certain environments. 
Dawkins considers the intensity of the animal's motivation to attain food or water the 
benchmark of suffering. Only if a motivation to try to attain or avoid something else is as 
high or higher, animals are held to suffer. For example, the motivation of pigs to get food 
was higher than their motivation to have social contact with other pigs (Dawkins, 1993, 
pp. 157-159). From these research results one must conclude that pigs do not suffer when 
housed in isolation from other pigs. 
2. Two theoretical backgrounds 
Although the economic theory and Dawkins' application of it to animals are very clear, 
Dawkins also uses some terms that do not fit in this economic theory. She also seems to refer 
to a theory about suffering which is more in line with that of Wiepkema and Toates. Let me 
first explain Dawkins' other theoretical background, namely her use of economic theory. 
Different kinds of behaviourism 
Behaviourism is the great theoretical scapegoat in animal welfare science because it is held 
responsible for the extrusion of animal experiences from ethological science. Dawkins also 
criticizes behaviourism for this reason. Dawkins discerns two kinds of behaviourism: the 
variety that says that subjective experiences might exist but are not scientifically accessible 
because of their private and unobservable character, and the variety that says that, because 
subjective experiences are not accessible for scientific research, they do not exist (Dawkins, 
1980, p. 12). Indeed, in these two kinds of behaviouristic science, speaking of animal 
suffering and animal welfare is anathema. 
There is a third kind of behaviourism, however, in which speaking in these terms is not 
anathema. This kind allows subjectivating terms, provided that one can define these terms 
in observable entities or processes, for example behaviour. 'Define' has to be taken in its 
literal sense: terms such as motivation and emotion are nothing more than the name given 
to a particular behaviour. The meaning of such terms is similar to that of the term growth 
rate in physiological theories, which is just a name that refers to the increase of organic 
material per time unit. This kind of behaviourism is called "logical-behaviourism" because 
of its emphasis on definitions. According to this kind of behaviourism, it is possible to do 
scientific research into animal experiences, provided that this term does not refer to the 
subjective experience of its subject matter but only to their behaviour. (See for a critical 
review of this kind of behaviourism Holzkamp, 1985, p.21.) In her criticism of 
behaviourism, Dawkins does not recognize this kind of behaviourism and even worse. Her 
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own method to measure animal suffering can be construed as an example of this particular 
variety of behaviourism. 
From the behaviourist's point of view 
Although Dawkins criticizes behaviouristic ethologists because they exclude subjective 
experiences from science, the economic theory she herself applies to animals is a 
behaviouristic theory also (see Jamieson, 1990, p.25; Segal, 1990, p.36). In this theory the 
consumers' motivation to get a commodity is defined in terms of their observable buying 
behaviour when prices increase. Dawkins applies this definition of motivation to animals. She 
defines 'animal motivation' as the observable amount of operant behaviour to attain or avoid 
particular environmental conditions. In the economic theory under consideration, however, 
motivations are just words that refer to consumers' buying behaviour while prices increase. 
Just as growth rates are only concepts in the minds of physiologists, so motivations are only 
concepts in the minds of economists. Consumers just exhibit buying behaviour. Applying this 
theory to animals, implies that animal motivations are simply concepts in the heads of 
ethologists, not something in the animals' heads. 
The same can be said of animal suffering. Dawkins' definition of 'suffering' is that 
animals suffer when their motivation to try to perform a particular behaviour is as high as, 
or higher than, their motivation to get food or water. This is an arbitrary line between 
suffering and not suffering, which Dawkins alone postulates, not the animals themselves. It 
can also be said that animals suffer extremely when they cannot get water, and that a lower 
motivation than that for water implies suffering too, albeit less. Viewed in this way, animal 
suffering is nothing more than particular animal behaviour exhibited in preference tests, 
which Dawkins calls "suffering". This contradicts her statement that animal suffering implies 
an animal's point of view (Dawkins, 1990a, p.l). 
Here we meet the same problem as in Wiepkema and Toates concerning their concepts 
of motivation and emotion. In the previous chapter, I also raised the question of whether 
'motivation' is just a name for a difference between Sollwert and Istwert, so that also 
machines can be said to have motivations. Viewed in a scientific light, Wiepkema and 
Toates' concept of emotion is also just a theoretical concept in their, not the animals', heads. 
Natural-scientific theory of emotions 
Dawkins also uses a terminology that refers to another theoretical background and which 
looks more like that of Wiepkema and Toates. Repeatedly she speaks of animal motivations 
and emotions as causes of animal behaviour (Dawkins, 1990a, p.3; 1993, pp. 167-168). Like 
Griffin, Rollin and Wiepkema, she also compares animal emotions withunobservable entities 
in physics (Dawkins, 1993, p.167-168). However, Dawkins is less clear about the status of 
emotions than Wiepkema and Toates. On the one hand she says, like Wiepkema and Toates, 
that both animal motivations and emotions are causes of behaviour (Dawkins, 1993, p. 142) 
and on the other hand she says that only animal motivations are causes of behaviour 
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(Dawkins, 1990a, p.4; 1993, p. 163-164). In the latter case animal emotions seem to be 
epiphenomena of motivations or behaviour. This terminology refers to a natural-scientific 
theory about animal motivations and emotions instead of a logical-behaviouristic one. Now 
concepts like 'motivation' and 'emotion' are not just abbreviations of particular forms of 
animal behaviour; they refer to unobservable entities that cause observable animal behaviour. 
3 . The argument from analogy again 
The aim of Dawkins' method for measuring the intensity of animal motivations is to say 
something about the subjective animal experience of suffering. In the given reconstructions 
of the theoretical background of this method, suffering as a subjective experience did not 
show up. In the logical-behaviouristic reconstruction, suffering is just a name for a particular 
animal behaviour. In the natural-scientific reconstruction, emotions such as suffering are just 
theoretical concepts comparable to theoretical concepts in physics. Hence, Dawkins also uses 
the argument from analogy to support her claim that animals subjectively experience their 
situation (Dawkins, 1990a, p.4; 1993, pp. 12-13 and pp. 163-164). Like Wiepkema and 
Toates, she admits that the argument from analogy is not hard scientific evidence for animal 
emotions but an assumption, as testified by the next quote: 
"But if we had prior evidence that an animal had strong motivation to escape or to obtain something and 
was prevented from doing so we could assume that this condition was accompanied by an unpleasant 
experience, as it would be in the case of a human being." (Dawkins, 1990a, p.4). 
Dawkins repeatedly says that she demonstrates that animal emotions are accessible to 
scientific research (Dawkins, 1990a, p.l; 1993, pp.177-178). My conclusion is that her 
scientific method to measure animal suffering, as derived from either a logical-behaviouristic 
or a natural-scientific theory, does not indicate anything at all about subjective animal 
experiences. In order to say something about subjective animal experiences (such as 
suffering), Dawkins also needs the questionable argument from analogy. By using the 
argument from analogy, Dawkins' scientific method to measure animal suffering hangs by the 
same thread as Toates and Wiepkema's theory. 

INTERMEDIATE REFLECTIONS 1 
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In the last two chapters, I have discussed two ethological theories about animal welfare. Of 
course there are more such theories, but I think that most of them raise the same 
philosophical problems as discussed here and that, therefore, the following comments will 
apply to them as well. In chapter X, which deals with two contemporary animal welfare 
debates, we will see that the ones discussed are very common in animal welfare science. 
The problem with these kinds of ethological animal welfare theories is that there is a 
friction between their initial purpose and their result. They want to indicate something about 
subjective animal experiences, but in the end they conceive of these as objective things or 
processes. This conflict is due to the ethologists' sticking to the natural-scientific approach. 
Because ethologists see the model of physics as the only model of science, they can only 
conceive of animal experiences as law-governed phenomena, that is as objects. The most 
extreme example is the comparison that both Wiepkema and Dawkins make between animal 
experiences and theoretical entities in natural science. Stafleu and others write about "the 
erosion of a moral concept". With this phrase they refer to the loss of the morally relevant, 
common-sense meaning of animal welfare in the scientific conception, namely that it involves 
animal experiences (Stafleu, et al., 1996). In the foregoing chapters we saw that in a natural-
scientific view on animal experience the common-sense meaning of experiences gets lost, 
namely that they are subjectively lived. 
As we saw, there are at least two ways to objectify animal experiences. The most 
common way is that of Toates and Wiepkema. They conceive of animal experiences as 
internal causes of animal behaviour. This way is in accordance with the natural-scientific 
view on theories: to explain observed phenomena as being caused by sometimes initially and 
sometimes forever unobservable entities, structures or processes. A less common way is the 
logical-behaviouristic way. Logical-behaviourists also conceive of animal experiences, for 
instance suffering, as law-governed phenomena. These laws relate observable animal 
behaviour to observable environmental conditions. Particular forms of behaviour under 
particular conditions are called "suffering", "welfare", and so on. For some reason or other, 
ethologists and philosophers of animals, even those who criticize behaviourism, have a 
tendency to overlook logical-behaviourism. This may even result in an unintended and 
unavowed defence of logical-behaviourism, as happens with Dawkins.1 Because the way used 
by Wiepkema and Toates to objectify animal experiences is most common, I will from now 
on leave aside logical-behaviourism. 
The same is true for Wemelsfelder who even refers to Ryle, the founder of logical-behaviourism, 
for justifying her own conceptualization of subjective animal experiences (Wemelsfelder, 1993, 
p.74-76). 
26 
The natural-scientific approach confronts ethologists with the problem of how to relate animal 
experiences conceived of as mere theoretical concepts to subjective experiences of animals. 
Usually they do this by the argument from analogy. As Toates, Wiepkema and Dawkins 
admit, this argument is not scientific but "a rather naive assumption" (Wiepkema). This 
implies that natural-scientific ethological theories depend on a mere assumption for reaching 
their aim to indicate something about subjective animal experiences. 
Because of the assumption that makes up the argument from analogy, it is correct that 
Toates speaks of the change of his belief in subjective animal experiences. Rollin also speaks 
in terms of a change of belief. The adoption of the belief in animal experiences has led to 
a new paradigm in ethology, he says, of which he designates Griffin as the founder (Rollin, 
1989). / agree that the recognition of subjective animal experiences in ethology implied a 
paradigmatic change. But I think this change was not profound enough. The only thing that 
has changed in ethological science is that concepts such as animal welfare and animal 
suffering are no longer anathema. Most ethologists, however, incorporate these concepts in 
the old ethological paradigm advocated by Tinbergen. This paradigm states that ethology, as 
a natural science, must causally explain observed ariimal behaviour. Given their acceptance 
of Tinbergen's precepts for ethology, animal welfare scientists conceive of animal 
experiences as internal, unobservable causes of observable animal behaviour.2 In this sense 
the meaning of 'animal experience' is purely theoretical, because experiences have not been 
observed. (Perhaps Tinbergen would have had less objection to concepts such as suffering 
in this restricted sense.) As a purely theoretical concept, 'animal experience' does not need 
to refer to what we normally call experience. In order to relate their theories to subjective 
animal experiences, ethologists use the argument from analogy. They acknowledge that this 
argument remains an assumption as long as a direct access to animal experiences is 
impossible. / believe that, in order to obtain this access, ethologists should give up their 
natural-scientific view on animal experiences as the only legitimate view. 
For most ethologists, however, giving up the natural-scientific model of science is the 
same as giving up science itself. They may recognize more kinds of knowledge, at least in 
ordinary life, but they hold onto natural-scientific knowledge as the only kind of real, true 
or provable knowledge. This is also Dawkins' answer to some of her critics who refer to 
non-natural-scientific conceptions of subjective experiences, such as those of Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: "Although I sympathise in some ways with their view of 
animals, I feel that it is important to attempt to put the study of animal welfare on a scientific 
footing." (Dawkins, 1990b, p.49). Undoubtedly Dawkins equates science with natural 
science. Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, however, belong to a tradition that 
This conception of animal experiences is even more Cartesian than that of Descartes, who is so 
much detested by the same ethologists. Descartes saw experiences as another substance (res 
cogitans) than physical bodies and things (res externa). Only physical bodies and things can be 
causally explained, he held. 
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states that experiences cannot be studied in a natural-scientific way. 
Within the human sciences such as sociology, psychology, or cultural anthropology there 
is more than one view on scientific knowledge of human experiences. On the one hand there 
is the view that studies human experience in a natural-scientific way, of which the 
aforementioned economic theory is an example. On the other hand there are various views 
that all want to preserve in their concepts and method the character of human experience as 
subjective experience, for instance the view of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
The most well known of the second category of views on human experience is the 
hermeneutic view, as adopted by, for example, the cultural anthropologist Geertz. DawMns' 
reply to her critics quoted above makes clear that ethologists not only have to give up their 
natural-scientific view on animal experiences but also their scientism. They have to give up 
their belief that natural-scientific knowledge is the only sound knowledge. 
Because the conceptualization of animal experiences seems to be the primary problem 
of animal welfare science, I will turn my thoughts to the side that is opposite to natural 
science. In the following two chapters, I will explore the hermeneutic concept of subjective 
experience, its method of knowing experience, and whether this concept and method can be 
applied to animals. I choose to discuss the hermeneutic view on these issues because it is the 
most comprehensive one. It consists of a philosophical concept of experiences and a 
methodology for understanding experiences based on this concept. Thus, hermeneutics 
perhaps can provide me with a fruitful model of research into subjective animal experiences. 
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References to Dilthey's works will be given by referring to pages in the volumes of his collected 
writings (GS). Regarding the used edition, see the list of references at the end of this book. 
In this book 'meaning' is the - understandable - meaning of experiences as well as expressions, in 
the sense of the meaning of expressed experiences. 
CHAPTER IV 
DILTHEY: "WE EXPLAIN NATURE, AND UNDERSTAND LIFE" 
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was one of the founding fathers of 20th Century hermeneutics, 
which distinguishes the method of scientific explanation from the method of understanding. 
The latter method claims to do more justice to the subjective aspects of experiences than the 
discussed natural-scientific method of ethology for instance. Generally, hermeneutics aims 
at understanding the meaning of behaviour, statements, texts, artefacts, etc. For this book 
about understanding animal experiences, hermeneutics is only relevant as far as it concerns 
the understanding of behavioural and other bodily expressions of experiences. The 
hermeneutic concept of subjective experiences (as opposed to objective things and 
occurrences) and its method of understanding behaviour (as opposed to causal explanations 
of behaviour) will be discussed. 
In this chapter I shall give Dilthey's view on both matters; and in the following chapter 
I shall give Gadamer's view. The main question to ask both founding fathers of 20th Century 
hermeneutics is, of course, what they say about animal experiences, and the way to gain 
knowledge of these experiences. I will argue firstly that, especially with regard to animal 
experiences, it is useful to distinguish between Dilthey's early writings (up until about 1907) 
and the ones he wrote during the last years of his life (IV. 1). I will then give the views of 
the early and the later Dilthey on experiences and knowledge of experiences, in particular 
animal experiences (IV.2 and IV.3 respectively). Finally, some problems concerning the 
understanding of animal experiences will be formulated in light of the distinction between the 
early and the later Dilthey (IV.4). 
1. Psychology and hermeneutics in Dilthey 
The most widely accepted interpretation of Dilthey's statement (GS V, p. 144) that I used as 
the title of this chapter is that 'life' means human life.1 According to this interpretation, non-
human nature can only be explained causally and only humans can be understood as 
expressing meanings.2 Dilthey is believed to have said that animals belong to the nature that 
we can only explain causally (see, for instance, Kockelkoren, 1992, pp.39-40). Although 
Dilthey himself later equates life with human life (GS VH, pp.228-229), this conclusion is 
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certainly wrong with regard to his early writings.3 In philosophy it is common practice to 
speak about the early "psychologistic" and the later "hermeneutic" Dilthey. The early 
Dilthey is called "psychologistic" because of the emphasis he lays on the psychological basis 
of the understanding sciences. In Dilthey's early writings, understanding is the same as 
understanding the psychic lives of others (see IV. 2). 4 Later Dilthey broadens this 
psychological basis into a philosophical hermeneutical basis, which clarifies the connection 
between experiences, expressions and understanding. He sees this connection as culturally 
and historically acquired. Hence, understanding is the understanding of the cultural and 
historical meaning of expressions, including expressed experiences. 
Some authors stress that it is wrong to speak of a rupture between the early and the later 
Dilthey. They say that the difference in Dilthey's writings is a matter of emphasis (Keulartz, 
1994, p.40; Rodi, 1987, p. 113). In his later writings, Dilthey has incorporated the concept 
of psychic life into his philosophical hermeneutics, they say he still mentions the general 
structure of psychic life as described and analyzed in his early works; experiences are still 
of the same general structure, although the connection between experiences, expressions and 
understanding is cultural and historical (Keulartz, 1994, p.33). Because the later Dilthey 
embeds his former psychological basis of hermeneutics in a broader basis, the above authors 
conclude that the difference between the early and the later Dilthey is a matter of emphasis. 
Whether a matter of rupture or emphasis, especially with regard to understanding animal 
experiences, it is useful to make the distinction between the early and the later Dilthey. 
In his early writings, in which Dilthey describes and analyzes psychic lives, he explicitly 
says that higher animals have a psychic life too. We humans actually understand the 
behaviour of these animals as if they were an expression of experiences. We do so by 
reliving these experiences as our own experiences. For example, we understand the scream 
of a piglet being castrated without anaesthesia as an expression of pain because we ourselves 
almost feel the pain when treated that way (see IV.2). So, higher animals do not seem to 
belong to nature that we can only explain causally. This is contrary to the usual interpretation 
of Dilthey's statement that "we explain nature and understand life." In his later works, 
Dilthey only writes about understanding culturally and historically mediated experiences and 
expressions which are based on reciprocal understanding. Since reciprocal understanding and 
A possible reason for this misinterpretation of Dilthey's statement is that the German term 
Seelenleben, which Dilthey himself often uses, is translated by many authors as 'life' (see also 
below). 
Dilthey often abbreviates "Seelenleben", the word which he often uses in the original German 
texts, into Leben. This is confusing with regard to plants and animals. All plants and animals are 
living beings, but, as we will see, not all of them have a Seelenleben too. De Mul and Hodges 
translate the rather anachronistic term Seelenleben into "psychic life" (De Mul, 1993; Hodges, 
1952). This is a good translation, especially for Dilthey's early writings, provided that 'psychic' is 
not understood as concerning only feelings and emotions. Another good translation of Seelenleben 
that is used sometimes, for example by Hodges, is "mental life". In this chapter, I will use psychic 
life, or just experiences which make up psychic lives. 
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therefore culture and history are missing between animals and humans, this would appear to 
rule out both the existence and understanding of animal experiences (see IV.3).5 This is in 
accordance with Dilthey's equation of life with human life. It also confirms the usual 
interpretation of Dilthey's statement, namely that we can only understand human life. 
2. The psychic life of humans and higher animals 
In Dilthey's early writings, the basis of the understanding sciences consists of what he calls 
a "descriptive and analytical psychology". This psychology describes and analyzes psychic 
lives on lived experiences (Erlebnisse) as these happen to us. (Dilthey writes about lived 
experiences as given to us.) 
The structure of psychic lives 
Dilthey states that all psychic lives are of the same general structure. The first characteristic 
of psychic lives is that their general structure consists of a connection between representations 
(Vorstellungen), drives and feelings (Gefuhls- und Triebleben) and intentions 
(Willenstatigkeiten) (GS V, pp.201-207). Drives and feelings are the central components of 
a psychic life because they imply a valuation of representations and because they are the 
origin of intentions. A feeling of pain, for instance, is a negative valuation of a particular 
bodily situation, and is the origin of the intention to escape from this situation. Particular 
experiences differ because of different emphases on the components of the psychic life (GS 
V, pp. 177-180). While solving a mathematical problem, feelings are less important than 
while in pain. 
The second characteristic of psychic lives is that they possess an immanent, subjective 
purposefulness (GS V, pp.207-208). The purposefulness of psychic lives means that 
representations, drives, feelings and intentions are connected in such a way that they in a 
purposive way constitute the interactions with the environment. This purposefulness is 
subjective because it is a connection of the components of lived experiences. Especially 
feelings, as components of psychic lives, account for this subjective purposefulness because 
feelings are experiences of representations and intentions. This subjective purposefulness is 
immanent because it is given with psychic lives, not imposed on them. Dilthey says that we 
can verify these statements about the general structure of psychic life by means of 
introspection, that is by 'looking at' our own lived experiences as these occur (GS V, p. 152). 
This cannot be said for sure, because not all of Dilthey's late work has been published yet. 
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Human and animal experiences 
Taking a closer look at the structure of lived experiences, let us start with human 
experiences, which Dilthey sees as mediated by biological and spiritual {geistige) drives.6 
Biological drives serve the survival of the individual or the species in a physical environment. 
Dilthey mentions three biological drives namely: feeding, sexual intercourse and care for 
offspring, and protection (GS V, p.209); Spiritual drives serve the survival of social 
relationships and structures, for instance the drives for power, property, community and 
friendship. Not biological survival in a physical environment, but social survival in a social 
environment is the immanent purpose of spiritual drives (GS V, pp.209-210). Therefore, 
human experience consists of a subjective and immanent purposive connection between 
representations, biological and spiritual drives, associated feelings, and intentions. 
In animal life Dilthey recognizes an immanent and subjectively experienced 
purposefulness too, although mediated by biological drives only. In the philosophy of biology, 
purposefulness of organisms is problematic because purposes are thought to presuppose a 
conscious mind that formulates them. Dilthey also contends with this problem. He asks 
himself how the structure of animal psychic life can be purposive without presupposing 
intelligence (Krausser, 1968, p. 134). In 1888 he solves this problem by means of what 
Krausser calls "the cunning of nature". Instead of knowledge of what is useful or harmful 
for their survival, nature has given feelings of pleasure and pain to living beings (GS V, 
pp.207-208). With regard to feeding for instance, Dilthey says: 
"... die Nahrungsaufname, welche Auswahl und Bezitzergreifung fordert, vollzieht sich durch einen 
bewusten Trieb, welcher von den typischen Gefühlen des Hungers, des Nahrungsgenusses und der 
Sättigung begleitet und der Auswahl fähig ist. Die Natur hat hier eine bittere Strafe auf die schädliche 
Nahrangsenthaltung in einem heftigen Unlustgefühl gesetzt. Sie setzte eine Prämie auf die richtige 
Nahrungsaufnahme in Lustgefühlen. So hat sie Tiere und Menschen gezwungen, auch unter den 
schwierigsten Umständen nützliche Nahrung zu wählen und Besitz von ihr zu ergreifen." (GS V, p.209).7 
Let us take the example of feeding to explain the cunning of nature. If humans and animals 
were to eat everything that came along their way, they would not live for long because many 
edible plants and animals are not good for their survival (for example, if they contain toxic 
substances). One can imagine that humans and animals have knowledge of which food is 
useful or harmful for them so that they can choose the right food. However, this would 
Dilthey himself calls biological drives "physical". Since these drives are directed at survival, I 
prefer to call them "biological drives". 
... food intake, which requires choice and appropriation, occurs through a conscious drive which is 
associated with particular feelings of hunger, joy of feeding and satisfaction, and which is capable 
of choice. Nature has imposed a bitter punishment on the harmful abstinence of food through an 
intense feeling of displeasure. She put a premium on useful food intake through feelings of 
pleasure. So she has urged animals and humans to choose and take useful food, even under the 
most difficult circumstances. 
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require that they be virtually all-knowing. Dilthey states that nature has solved this problem 
by giving feelings of pleasure and displeasure to living beings, which replace this knowledge. 
However, bodily feelings alone cannot do this job, Dilthey continues. The taste of food does 
not tell us anything about its possible harm. In humans and animals who are able to learn, 
mental (geistige) feelings of future pain or pleasure take over the purposefulness of bodily 
feelings. But, we all know that even the prospect of probably becoming ill in the future does 
not stop some of us from eating unhealthy food. Now the cunning of nature shows up, 
namely the biological feeding drive and associated feelings that are stronger than other 
considerations to eat certain food (GS V, pp.208-209). Thus, not intelligence or knowledge 
of the suvival value of food, but the force of biological drives and associated feelings form 
the basis of the purposefulness of experiences. 
In the above quoted passage, Dilthey writes about animals as well as humans. With 
regard to eating by humans, we know that this is not always purposive in the sense of 
functional for their survival. Humans do not always dislike unhealthy food. They sometimes 
eat it despite the prospect of probably becoming ill from it. Regarding humans, the biological 
drives and associated feelings seemingly are not always that strong. In an explanation of 
animal experiences, however, the question of whether or not biological drives are stronger 
than other considerations is not relevant, because animal experiences are only mediated by 
biological drives and associated feelings. Whether or not Dilthey's cunning of nature is true 
regarding humans, in the case of animals the cunning of nature seems to be that a good or 
bad taste is a sign for the survival of the animal. By means of feelings, nature has put a 
punishment or reward on animal behaviour that is dysfunctional or functional for their 
survival. 
This description and analysis of animal experiences looks very similar to Wiepkema and 
Toates' theory of animal emotions as discussed in chapter n . What Krausser calls "the 
cunning of nature" is similar to the evolutionary explanation of animal emotions as given by 
many efhologists, including Wiepkema and Toates. Many ethologists conceive of animal 
emotions as evolutionary adaptations because of their influence on the animals' survival. 
Emotions influence the animals' survival by means of their influence on animal behaviour. 
According to the emotion theory of Wiepkema and Toates, an increase in the difference 
between the Istwert and Sollwert is the cause of a negative emotion. This emotion stops the 
ongoing form of behaviour and motivates another form (see chapter II. 1). The feeling of 
hunger is biologically functional because it stops whatever the ongoing form of behaviour is 
and motivates the behaviour of searching for food. Similarly, feelings of displeasure or pain 
when eating toxic foods have developed evolutionarily. In this way Dilthey's cunning of 
nature, namely that animal emotions are signs of future survival, is explained scientifically. 
Like Dilthey, Wiepkema and Toates too see a connection between representations, feelings 
and intentions. They conceive of emotions as evaluators of comparisons between Sollwerte 
and Istwerte (Dilthey: of representations) and as controllers of motivations (Dilthey: origins 
of intentions) (see chapter U.1). In the theory of Wiepkema and Toates this connection is a 
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causal as well as a purposive one. The connection between comparisons of Sollwerte and 
Istwerte, emotions and motivations is a causally functioning feedback mechanism of a 
purposive system. Wiepkema and Toates also see this purposefulness as immanent, because 
Sollwerte are set genetically, ontogenetically, or via learning processes - in any case not 
imposed (see chapter IJ.l). Thus, it seems that there is no difference between a cybernetic, 
natural-scientific explanation of animal experiences and Dilthey's description and analysis of 
them. 
However, there is one difference between cybernetic explanations of animal emotions 
and animal experiences as described and analyzed by Dilthey, namely their subjective 
purposive character. Cybernetic explanations of animal emotions, such as that given by 
Wiepkema and Toates, indicate nothing about the subjective aspects of emotions. As we saw 
in chapter IJ.2, Wiepkema and Toates assume that emotions are the same in animals as in 
humans. Dilthey, however, claims to describe lived (i.e., subjective) experiences of animals: 
"Zweckmäßigkeit ist gar kein objektiver Naturbegriff, sondern bezeichnet nur die in Trieb, 
Lust und Schmerz erfahrene Art des Lebenszusammenhanges in einen tierischen oder 
menschlichen Wesen." (GS V, p.210).8 The subjectively experienced purposefulness is 
primary, he says. Biologists have transposed this subjective immanent purposefulness into 
an objective purposefulness (GS V, p.207).9 The question is, of course, whether Dilthey's 
claim that he describes the subjective aspect of animal experiences is legitimate or is also an 
assumption based on the subjective character of our own human experiences. Dilthey's 
method for understanding humans and animals gives an answer to this question. 
Understanding the experiences of other humans and animals 
In Dilthey's early writings, understanding the experiences of others means understanding 
individual psychic lives. Not only the components of experiences (for instance, a bad taste 
of food) but also the various experiences of an individual are subjectively and purposively 
connected. A bad taste and the avoidance of a particular food imply that one eats some other 
food, which, in turn, implies new experiences and new food habits, and the whole process 
starts again. The psychic life of an individual person is a particular case (individuation) of 
such a general structure. The Geisteswissenschaften are directed at understanding individual 
persons (GS V, pp.228-236). Therefore, biographies and autobiographies are important 
within Dilthey's hermeneutical sciences. 
We understand the experiences of others by reliving (Nacherleben) their experiences, 
Dilthey says. To relive the experiences of others is to reproduce or imagine them. Dilthey 
calls this process of understanding "transposition": understanding the experiences of others 
8 Purposiveness is not an objective concept of nature at all but only refers to the kind of connection 
of life in an animal or human being which is experienced through drives, pleasures and pain. 
9 Krausser, however, says that Dilthey has derived the subjective purposiveness of psychic lives from 
the biological consept of purposiveness (Krausser, 1968). 
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as if these were our own. Reliving the experiences of others consists of placing the assumed 
revealed meaning of the perceived expressions in the same general structure as that of our 
own experiences. That which we cannot understand in this way remains strange to us. Thus, 
understanding the experiences of others presupposes a common general structure. This 
presupposition is plausible because of a common organic structure and because of the fact 
that we actually understand experiences of others (GS V, pp.198-199 and pp.211-212). In 
the following passage, Dilthey uses our factual understanding of other humans as an 
argument for the plausibility of a common general structure of human experiences: "Es 
spricht sehr für die große innere Verwandtschaft alles menschlichen Seelenlebens unter sich, 
daß ein Verständnis fremden menschlichen Seelenlebens dem Forscher, welcher gewohnt ist, 
um sich zu blicken und die Welt kennt, durchweg möglich ist." (GS V, p. 199).10 
A common organic structure as argument becomes clear in his view on understanding 
animals. In principle, the process of understanding animal experiences is the same as that of 
understanding the experiences of other humans. In understanding animal experiences as if 
they were our own, we assume that we share the general structure of experiences within 
which we place the assumed revealed meaning of the perceived animal expressions. With 
regard to vertebrate animals, the supposed shared structure of experiences is made plausible 
by their similar organic structure as well as by our factual understanding of them: "Unser 
Verständnis der Wirbeltiere, welche dieselbe organische Grundstruktur besitzen, ist natürlich 
das verhältnismäßig beste, welches wir vom tierischen Leben besitzen; zumal für das Studium 
der Triebe und Affektzustände erweist es sich der Psychologie sehr nützlich." (GS V, 
p. 199).11 With regard to ants and bees, by contrast, Dilthey says: 
"... so erschwert uns schon die von der unsrigen außerordentlich verschiedene Organisation derselben die 
Deutung ihrer physischen Lebensäußerungen ungemein; sicher entspricht aber auch dieser ein für uns 
höchst fremdartiges Innenleben. Hier gehen uns also alle Mittel ab, in ein großes seelisches Reich 
einzudringen, das ist für uns eine ganz fremde Welt...." (GS V, p. 199).1 2 
The possibility or impossibility of understanding animals seems to depend on the presence 
of an organic structure that is similar to that of our own. Therfore, we seem to be able to 
A compelling argument for a strong inner mutual affinity of all human psychic lives is that the 
investigator who is used to looking around and who knows the world as a rule is able to understand 
strange human psychic life. 
Our understanding of vertebrate animals, who possess the same organic structure, is of course 
relatively the best we can know of animal life; in psychology it proves very useful especially for 
the study of drives and affections. 
... their organization which differs extremely from ours makes it extraordinarily difficult for us to 
interpret their bodily expressions; undoubtedly these expressions correspond with an inner life that 
is very strange to us. Here all possibilities to enter a large psychic domain therefore fail us; this is 
a totally strange world for us.... 
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understand vertebrate animals and unable to understand ants and bees. However, this is an 
incorrect conclusion from the foregoing quotes. It passes over Dilthey's second argument that 
makes plausible a common structure of experiences, namely our factual understanding of 
animals. This can be seen by taking a closer look at Dilthey's view on the argument from 
analogy. 
The argument from analogy 
Dilthey's account of the process of understanding animal experiences has a great deal in 
common with the argument from analogy that ethologists use in order to say that animals 
have experiences. Dilthey also refers to an organic structure of animals that is similar to that 
of humans (see above). As Toates and Wiepkema refer to homologous behavioural 
mechanisms of humans and animals, Dilthey refers to the phylogenetic kinship between 
humans and animals (GS V, p.211-212). Although Dilthey uses the term "analogy" 
repeatedly with regard to understanding experiences of others, he says that the meaning of 
this term should be distinguished from its meaning in the argument from analogy as used by 
ethologists and many laypeople. In the latter use one reasons from homologous behavioural 
mechanisms to assumed homologous emotional mechanisms and so to animal experiences that 
are similar to human experiences. Dilthey, by contrast, does not derive a similar structure 
of experience from a similar organic structure. A similar organic structure makes it possible 
to see bodily expressions as expressions of experiences of the same structure as that of our 
own experiences. As previously quoted, this possibility is confirmed by our factual 
understanding of other humans and some animals. Therefore, he says that understanding 
other humans and animals is not the conclusion of a logical reasoning; it is the result of a 
spiritual (or psychic) process, namely the process of reliving their experiences. When Dilthey 
writes about the equivalence between the process of reliving experiences and the argument 
from analogy, he means that the latter is a logical formulation of the pyschic process of 
understanding other humans and animals (GS V, pp.110-111 and pp.198-199). In short, 
Dilthey does not see understanding animal experiences as justified by the argument from 
analogy but the other way around: the argument from analogy has to be justified by our 
factual understanding of animal experiences. 
The limits to understanding animals 
Dilthey poses two limits to our understanding of animals, namely a limit to the kind of 
animals we can understand, and a limit to the kind of animal experiences we can understand. 
Regarding the first limit, we just saw that Dilthey says that he is helpless when trying to 
understand insects for instance. Their totally different organic structure makes it hard for us 
to recognize their behaviour as an expression of experiences like our own. If insects should 
have a psychic life, then it will appear totally incomprehensible to us. In the case of 
vertebrate animals, it is much easier to relive their behavioural and bodily expressions as 
expressions of experiences like our own. As I have explained, a common organic structure 
37 
is not decisive for understanding animals; decisive is whether we are able to interpret 
behavioural and bodily expressions as experiences. Because the question pertaining to which 
animals we are able to understand is not a biological question but a question of our ability 
to understand them, Dilthey says: "Endlich haben wir auch keine Hilfsmittel festzustellen, 
wo seelisches Leben endige und organisierte Materie ohne ein solches bestehe." (GS V, 
p.199).1 3 
With regard to the animal experiences that we can understand, their specific structure 
is important. We saw that Dilthey asserts that the psychic life of animals is mediated by only 
biological drives and feelings of pleasure and pain, while the psychic life of humans also 
includes spiritual drives. "The cunning of nature" relates feelings of pleasure and pain in 
animals are related to an increase or reduction of their chances to survive. This should imply 
that we can only understand animal behavioural and bodily expressions as expressions of 
pleasure and pain, if these expressions also increase or reduce the animals' chances of 
survival.14 Whether or not Dilthey would have agreed with this conclusion, it does not mean 
that we may derive animal experiences of pleasure and pain from the biological functionality 
of their behaviour. Understanding animals remains a process of transposition, in this case 
seeing animal behaviour as an expression of experiences like our own. 
The limit regarding the kind of animal experiences we are able to understand raises two 
questions. The first question is why animal experiences only contain feelings of pleasure and 
pain connected with their biological drives and not with spiritual drives as well. Dilthey's 
answer to this question is that animals do not have spiritual drives to maintain a society or 
culture, since animals are not able to understand each other. To understand each other is a 
requirement for speaking about societies and cultures: 
"Derm eben, daß eine wirkliche Transposition stattfinden kann, daß sonach Verwandtschaft, 
Allgemeingültigkeit des Denkens, usw., kurz was man Identität der Vernunft in der spekulativen Schule 
1 3 Ultimately we do not have the means to state where psychic life ends and organized matter without 
it starts. 
1 4 Concerning the biological functionality of animal behaviour, it has to be taken into account that, firstly, 
Dilthey could not know the later developments in evolutionary biology about kin and group selection. 
According to these specific evolutionary theories, functionality is not only related to the chance of 
survival of an individual organism, but can also be related to the chance of survival of families and 
other groups of organisms. It is unknown whether, had he known these theories, Dilthey would still 
have said that feelings of pleasure and pain in animals are related to their individual chance of survival. 
Secondly, it has to be taken into account that Dilthey only wrote about animals in their natural 
environment, and not about domestic animals. In artificial environments, in which humans take 
responsibility for the survival of animals, animals may perform types of behaviour which are functional 
in their natural environment but dysfunctional in their artificial environment, and vice versa (see the 
example of escaping behaviour of caged migratory birds in chapter HI.l). In the last chapter of this 
book about the welfare of domestic animals, more will be said about the relation between the 
functionality of animal behaviour and animal experiences. 
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nannte, hier eine gesellschaftüche-geschichtliche Welt bilden, unterscheidet doch erst diese geistige 
Vorgänge von dem inneren Verlauf tierischen Seelenlebens." (GS V, p.250).1 5 
Many ethologists, philosophers of animals and laypeople will protest against this statement. 
They will say that many animals clearly are able to understand each other and so shape a 
society as well, which they maintain by social relationships of dominancy, friendship, and 
soon. (See, for example, the well-known books by Goodall, De Waal and Cheney & 
Seyfarth.) Most ethological studies that support this protest demonstrate that animals are able 
to learn to react to perceptions of each other's behaviour in former encounters. However, in 
order to speak of reciprocal understanding in the sense of Dilthey, they should demonstrate 
that this animal understanding is based on reliving each other's experiences. This is the 
difference between speaking of a common society and culture in the sense of Dilthey and 
social behaviour of animals in the usual ethological sense. Summarized in more modern 
terms, one should demonstrate that these animals do not communicate with each other by 
means of signs but that they reciprocally understand each other. 
The second question is how humans, whose experiences are also mediated by spiritual 
drives, can understand animal experiences that include only biological drives to survive. In 
the example of feeding we saw that Dilthey says that in humans the biological drive for 
feeding is stronger than some spiritual drive that might restrain them from feeding. But we 
know that human feeding behaviour is not always functional for their survival. Some humans 
eat food that is not good for their health; others go on a hunger strike. Human eating is not 
only the expression of a biological drive but is also a social and cultural expression. Our 
satisfaction while eating is partly bodily, partly cultural. This issue becomes more urgent in 
Dilthey's late writings, in which he emphasizes the cultural and historical meaning of 
understandable experiences. 
Even if these last two questions remain unanswered, the early Dilthey provides me with 
a philosophical conceptualization of animal experiences, and a method to understand them. 
However, the richness of Dilthey's early writings regarding understanding animal experiences 
contrasts with what he says about the same subject in his later published writings, namely 
almost nothing. Thus, the following section can be much shorter. All that needs to be 
explained is why the later Dilthey hardly says anything about understanding animal 
experiences. 
l s Precisely the fact that a real transposition can happen, that thus kinship, common legitimation of 
thoughts, etcetera - in short what in speculative philosophy is called identity of reason - shape a 
social-historical world, distinguishes spiritual processes from the inner process of animal pyschic 
life. 
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3 . The cultural and historical horizon of experiences 
In Dilthey's early writings, human and animal psychic life consists of subjective experiences, 
which are a connection of representations, drives, feelings, and intentions. In his later 
writings, subjective experiences are just one component in the connection of life 
(Lebenszusammenhang), which further consists of expressions and understanding. As said in 
a previous section, this is not a matter of a rupture but of emphasis. In Dilthey's later 
writings, descriptive and analytical psychology is still part of the philosophical hermeneutical 
foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften. 
The connection of life 
In Dilfheys early writings, experiences are unobservable but expressed in behaviour, 
statements, artefacts, etc. We understand these expressions as expressions of experiences. So, 
there is already a connection between experiences, expressions and understanding in Dilthey's 
early writings. The later Dilthey broadens this connection into a cultural and historical 
connection. Now culture and history constitute the connection between experiences, 
expressions and understanding. (This is why the later Dilthey is called "hermeneutical", and 
the early Dilthey is called "psychologistic".) This cultural and historical aspect can readily 
be seen if we consider the understanding of a book. When trying to understand a book, we 
do not relive the experiences the author had when he wrote the book. We see most books as 
having a meaning that is independent of the psyche of the author. We interpret what we read 
within our own context and within the assumed cultural and historical context of the book. 
Dilthey calls this process of understanding "the broadening of our cultural and historical 
horizon". Understanding a book can be evaluated according to common requirements. 
Because of this common background knowledge, understanding a book can be quite objective 
in the sense of intersubjective (GS VIT, pp.205-206; De Mul, 1993, pp.320-340). For 
instance, it is commonly seen as wrong to understand the concept of nature in Aristotle as 
referring to causal and mechanic states or processes. 
This cultural and historical character of experiences, expressions and understanding does 
not contradict Dilthey's earlier view. In his early writings, Dilthey does not deny that 
individual experiences have a cultural and historical character. His description and analysis 
of experiences does not preclude that they are cultural and historical. Dilthey later only 
emphasizes the understanding of texts and artefacts, the common, cultural and historical 
meaning of which is more important than the meaning their producers attributed to them. The 
question is whether the same holds true if we consider another type of expression, namely 
emotional expression. 
Understanding emotional expression 
Contrary to understanding a book, understanding emotional expressions such as those of pain 
or joy is mostly directed at understanding the subjective experiences of the person involved. 
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Trying to understand a person's emotional expressions is primarily trying to understand a 
person, not the cultural and historical meaning of his expressions. The later Dilfhey will 
agree with this view; in his later writings he still speaks about understanding emotional 
expressions by reliving them (GS VII, pp.214-216). For the very reason that understanding 
emotional expression aims at understanding the experiences of a person, this understanding 
can be richer and broader than understanding books or other artefacts, he says. But because 
the role of common background knowledge is smaller, understanding emotional expressions 
is less objective than understanding a book (GS VTI, pp.206-211; De Mul, 1993, pp.320-
340). This less objective way of understanding is what the early Dilthey called reliving the 
experiences of another. 
Nevertheless, the later Dilthey says that even the connection between emotional 
experiences, their expressions and understanding is of a cultural and historical character. He 
sees individual persons as individuations of what he calls "the objective mind" (GS VII, 
p.195). In the previous section, I already mentioned the concept of individuation. InDilthey's 
early writings, 'individuation' means the differentiation of the general structure of psychic 
lives. All individual persons and vertebrate animals share this structure. Particular 
experiences and individuals differ in the content of this structure and the emphasis on specific 
components. Later, Dilthey broadens the connection of life from psychic life into cultural and 
historical life. Humans share a cultural and historical life that is laid down in language, 
books, works of art, tools, etc. These make up the objective mind. Now, individual persons 
are differentiations of a particular and common cultural and historical way of life. The 
understandable meanings of particular expressions are differentations of this common way 
of life (GS VTI, pp. 141-145). Even the meanings of emotional experiences and expressions 
such as those of pain and pleasure are cultural and historical. Personal greetings, for 
instance, also have a cultural form and meaning. 
I would say that, by broadening the connection between experiences, expressions and 
understanding, Dilthey makes the foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften a two-stage rocket: 
the general structure of psychic lives differentiates itself always into cultural and historical 
ways of life, of which in turn particular artefacts and persons are differentiations. The 
difference between understanding artefacts and understanding emotional expressions is a 
matter of emphasis either on the common or on the particular aspect of their meaning. Both 
the meaning of artefacts and the meaning of emotional expressions have a historically cultural 
as well as a personal, producer's aspect. Concerning artefacts, the historically cultural aspect 
is the most important. If, for instance, an archaeologist tries to understand the meaning of 
a found tool, he does not try to understand the personal intention of the producer. He 
compares the form of the tool with that of other, known tools. If an archaeologist does not 
succeed in understanding a tool in this way, he can try to imagine what the mostly unknown 
producer could have intended it for. In emotional expressions the personal aspect is the most 
important, but there are also cultural and historical aspects. If we try to understand the 
meaning of a person's greeting, we try to understand the personal touch of it. Also, the 
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method of reliving another person's emotional experiences does not differ fundamentally 
from gaining a hermeneutic understanding of artefacts. In both methods one tries to 
understand particular expressions as differentiations, be they more or less personal, of a 
common culture and history. 
Animals lost 
As said in the previous section, Dilthey holds that animals are incapable of transposition. 
Because of this inability, he does not mention understanding animal experiences any more 
in his later writings. Reciprocal understanding, based on transposition, is the basis of 
common cultures and histories, embodied in objects such as books, tools, works of art, and 
also gestures. Thanks to a common culture and history, particular expressions are 
understandable as differentiations of it. This foundation of the hermeneutical sciences is 
specific for humans (GS VTI, pp.85-86). Therefore, it is not astonishing that Dilthey does not 
mention understanding animal experiences any more in his later writings. 
4. Animals regained 
Although one can agree with Dilthey about the cultural and historical character of human 
experiences, expressions and understanding, I think this is no reason to exclude animal 
experiences. In his early writings, Dilthey mentions our factual understanding of animal 
experiences and elaborates a philosophy of the structure of animal experiences. Our factual 
understanding of animal experiences has disappeared in his later writings. Nevertheless, he 
still says that the distinction between physical and psychic phenomena is based on our 
different experiences (GS VU, pp.80-81). I assume that even the later Dilthey, like 
everybody else in daily life, still experiences the scream of a beaten dog as an expression of 
pain. This experience would be the basis of saying that these animals are psychic, 
experiencing beings. I admit that it is hard to conceptualize animal experiences in light of the 
philosophy of the later Dilthey. But this is no reason to deny them. Perhaps this philosophy 
is not articulated enough for comprehending what Dilthey calls the spiritual fact that we 
humans understand some animals as expressing experiences. 
Another reason why I do not want to exclude animal experiences is the fact that the gap 
between humans and nature becomes wider. By viewing animals in the same way as micro-
organisms or even non-living things, the dualism of experiencing humans and non-
experiencing non-human nature is hard to comprehend. Although the early Dilthey only could 
explain animal experiences by invoking what is called "the cunning of nature", he sees 
animals as between non-experiencing beings and humans. In his later writings, the gap 
between cultural and historical human experiences and causally and functionally explainable 
non-human nature is much more difficult to bridge - philosophically and scientifically. 
These comments on Dilthey's later writings remind us of the early Dilthey's thoughts 
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about animals. However, Dilthey's earlier thinking about understanding animal experiences 
also raises some problems, to which I will also return in the following chapters. The first is 
the aforementioned problem of the conceptualization of animal experiences. The only kinds 
of experiences we know are our own, culturally and historically mediated, experiences. As 
animals are not cultural and historical beings, the question is how to conceptualize these non-
cultural and non-historical animal experiences. Ethologists and philosophers of animals call 
this problem "the problem of anthropomorphism'': how to prevent ourselves pom ascribing 
typically human experiences to animals? 
Every answer to this question raises the second problem of the non-reciprocity of 
understanding animal experiences. As Dilthey says in his early writings, animals are 
incapable of transposition. They are unable to relive our human experiences like their own, 
also because our human experiences are always cultural and historical. Humans and animals 
do not share a common background knowledge that would enable us to see human 
understanding of animal experiences as intersubjective understanding. Hermeneutical 
scientists would say that between humans and animals a double hermeneutics is missing, that 
our understanding of animal experiences is always a matter of one-way communication. 
The third and last problem that rises is that of the relationship between an understanding 
view and biological views on animal experiences, particularly such as those held by 
Wiepkema and Toates. This problem concerns the purposefulness of animal experiences. 
According to early Dilthey, we project the subjective purposefulness of our own inner 
experiences onto non-human nature. Biologists objectify this subjective purposefulness into 
functionality in the light of the organism's survival, he says. This would imply that the 
projection of our own inner experiences onto animals is primary to the objectivation of animal 
experiences as elements of a biologically functional system. Hence, Dilthey puts the burden 
of proof of animal experiences on hermeneutic understanding of them. 
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CHAPTER V 
(rADAMER: "BEING THAT CAN BE UNDERSTOOD IS LANGUAGE' 
This statement of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900) is a criticism on the position taken by his 
teacher Martin Heidegger concerning the ontological foundation of human being (WM, 
p.478).1 Heidegger held that time and temporality (i.e., being bound to past, present and 
future) are the necessary presuppositions of the human way of being. Gadamer, by contrast, 
asserts that this role accrues to language. In his view, language is the foundation of human 
understanding and of the human way of being in the world. 
In his main book Wahrheit und Methode [Truth and Method] (1960), Gadamer rejects 
the monopoly of the scientific concept of truth that states that true knowledge is methodically 
demonstrable knowledge. Gadamer holds that this concept of truth is inadequate for our 
understanding of the meaning of behaviour, texts, artefacts, and also of non-human nature. 
Unlike Dilthey, Gadamer does not develop a methodical basis for the Geisteswissenschaften. 
He elaborates systematically the non-methodical truth of understanding on which every form 
of knowledge, even scientific knowledge, is based (Weinsheimer, 1985, pp.33-36). 
In this chapter, I will first summarize Gadamer's concept of experience in relation to 
language and understanding as expounded in Wahrheit und Methode. I will further show that, 
in his book, Gadamer seems to exclude animals as experiencing beings because he considers 
them not open to the world (V.I.). In a book of essays about health and sickness, however, 
Gadamer relaxes his philosophical view regarding the open character of experience. In that 
book, he emphasizes that human experiences of health and sickness are tied to the body, and 
he argues that this state belongs to the foundation of the human way of being (V.2). This 
opens up the possibility of ascribing bodily-bound experiences to animals (V.3). 
1. Understanding, experience, and language 
Wahrheit und Methode provides us with a philosophy of human understanding and expe-
rience. The first half of the book is a philosophical analysis of aesthetic and historical under-
standing and experience. The second half contains Gadamer's theory about the hermeneutical 
character of human understanding and experience in general. 
References to Wahrheit und Methode will be given by WM, followed by the page(s). Regarding the 
used edition, see the reference list at the end of this book. 
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Limitation and openness of understanding and experiences 
Gadamer conceives of understanding and experiences as one and the same. Experiencing a 
work of art or landscape is at the same time understanding them in a certain way, for instan-
ce as repulsive or beautiful. Conversely, having understood a book means having experienced 
it in a particular way. In his discussion of Kant's philosophical aesthetics, Gadamer criticizes 
the formal or empty character of Kant's notion of aesthetic experience (WM, chapter 1.2 and 
3). Gadamer asserts that aesthetic experiences, and experiences in general, always are mea-
ningful experiences of the world, because we always experience the world in a particular 
way. Therefore, experiences are inherently limited. We always experience the world in one 
way or another, never in more ways at the same time. However, experiences also are open-
ended; new experiences can deny them. For example, realizing that Duchamp's urinal is a 
piece of art changes the prior experience of it as just an urinal. Actually, only new negative 
experiences are real experiences, Gadamer says, because they show us the limitation as well 
as the openness of experiences (WM, pp.357-359). 
Language as the ontological foundation of understanding and experience 
The main thesis of Gadamer's theory is that language is the ontological foundation of expe-
rience. By virtue of their linguistic character, experiences of the world are limited as well 
as open, he states. One may be inclined to think that the relation between experiences and 
language is the other way around, that we first have non-linguistic experiences, which we 
subsequently put onto words. This implies a view on language as a tool, as if we have a bag 
full of words, which we can glue on our experiences. Gadamer opposes this view on langua-
ge. Language is not a means with which we can express or articulate experiences, but the 
medium of experiences, he says. Like fish in water, humans are living in a "Sprachwelt" 
(world of speech) (WM, p.450). 
That language is the foundation of experience does not mean that only linguistically 
articulated experiences are experiences, or that only adult, speaking people are able to 
experience the world. It means that it is possible to articulate experiences of the world in 
language, although this might be factually impossible under some circumstances. For 
example, sometimes people cannot find the right words, cannot speak yet, or have lost their 
capacity of speech. Despite such factual impossibilities, their experiences are still limited as 
well as open. Hence, they still refer to language. This is what Gadamer means by saying that 
language forms the ontological basis of experiences. It is the logically, not factually, 
45 
necessary presupposition of experience.2 Experience presupposes linguistic being rather than 
the factual capacity to speak or express experiences in words. 
Language as the nature of the matter 
The appeal to "the nature of the matter" normally occurs when it is held that a given form 
of understanding does not do justice to the character of things in the world. This phrase 
questions the relation between our understanding of things and the things themselves. One 
of the reasons to bring up this phrase is that, by means of language, humans understand the 
world in a conventional or arbitrary way, or in a way that subjects matters and things to 
language. Therefore, our understanding is never complete. The phrase "the nature of the 
matter" expresses this limitation of our human understanding.3 
Gadamer has explained his view on this question in his essay Die Natur der Sache und 
die Sprache der Dinge [The nature of the matter and the language of things] (1960). Here 
Gadamer says that only language provides a solution to the problem of the gap between the 
world and our understanding of it (Gadamer, 1960/1986, p.71). He disagrees with the 
limitation of our linguistic understanding as usually brought forward with the phrase "the 
nature of the matter". The view on language as conventional, arbitrary and subjecting 
presupposes a distinction between language and things; it considers language a means to 
understand things. As said, Gadamer does not see language as a tool for understanding. 
Language always has matters or things as its content, he says. Only artificial languages, for 
instance computer languages, have no content, and for this reason they can be used as tools. 
Gadamer goes one step further when he says that matters and things are not only the content 
of language, but that they even need language to appear to us. Therefore, he says, perhaps 
'language' means less the language of humans than the language of things (Gadamer, 
1986/1990, pp.72-73). That matters and things need language to appear to us, is the same 
as saying that they need language to be understood and experienced by us. This is similar to 
Gadamer's statement that language is the ontological foundation of understanding and 
experiences. 
Gadamer agrees with the usual view that a linguistic understanding can never be 
complete because of the limitation of language. To say that the aforementioned urinal is just 
an urinal is excluding it from the world of art. However, language is not only limited but 
also open, unlimited, Gadamer says. It is still possible to see the urinal as a work of art. We 
I fully agree with people who say that one can as well say that the limitation and openness of lan-
guage is ontologically based on the limitation and openness of experience. The philosophers who 
will be discussed in the following chapters are - indeed - turning Gadamer's reasoning upside 
down. And, in the next section we will see that Gadamer, in some sense, does the same, namely: 
by saying that a linguistically based openness to the world is based on the (hidden) experience of 
health. 
Also with regard to animals, the nature of animals sometimes is put forward to refer to our limited, 
philosophical and scientific knowledge of animals (Zwart, 1995). 
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are able to understand one and the same, undetermined matter in infinitely different ways, 
although not at the same moment. Language does not only subject the world, but also does 
justice to the undetermined world. In this sense, language provides a solution to the problem 
of the gap between the undetermined world and our limited understanding of it. It is this 
limited as well as open character of language that is the foundation of the limited as well as 
open character of our understanding and experiences of the world. 
Animals as understanding and experiencing 
Like everything else in the world, animals can be the subject matter of human experiences 
and understanding. We can understand chickens as living beings or as moving egg producers. 
In this sense, humans and human artefacts are not the only subject matter for an 
understanding approach. This book, however, concerns animals as a special subject matter 
of understanding, namely as expressing experiences. 
In daily life most people experience animals as beings who can feel well or badly, who 
can have pain and pleasure. Gadamer is one of those people, as testified by his positive 
reference to Aristotle's view on animals: "Die Tiere haben die Möglichkeit, sich 
miteindander zu verständigen, indem sie einander anzeigen, was ihre Lust erregt, so daß sie 
es suchen, und was ihnen weh tut, so daß sie es fliehen.'' (Gadamer, 1966/1960, p.146).4 
Animal pleasure and pain imply a capacity to experience the world. However, such an animal 
capacity contradicts Gadamer's more extensive statements about the way of being of animals 
in Wahrheit und Methode. Gadamer himself stated the difference between the animal and 
human way of being in the world very clearly: 
"Erhebung über die Umwelt hat hier von vornherein einen menschlichen und das heißt einen sprachlichen 
Sinn. Tiere können ihre Umwelt verlassen und die ganze Erde durchwandern, ohne daß sie damit ihre 
Umweltgebundenheit sprengen. Erhebung über die Umwelt dagegen ist für den Menschen Erhebung zur 
Welt und bedeutet nicht ein Verlassen der Umwelt, sondern eine andere Stellung zu ihr, ein freies, 
distanziertes Verhalten, dessen Vollzug jeweils ein sprachlicher ist." (WM, p.448).5 
Immediately he adds that only humans are living in a world of language (Sprachweli); the 
animal Umwelt is not a world of language: 
Animals are able to communicate with each other because they display to each other what arouses 
their pleasure, so that they can look for it, and what is painful, so that they can flee from it. 
To rise above the habitat has from the outset a human, ie a linguistic significance. Animals can 
leave their habitat and move over the whole earth without severing their environmental dependence. 
For man, however, to rise above the habitat means to rise to the 'world' itself, to true 
environment. This does not mean that he leaves his habitat, but that he has another attitude towards 
it, a free, distanced attitude, which is always realised in language (p.403). (Translations of 
quotations from Wahrheit und Méthode are derived from the English translation, see the reference 
list at the end of this book.) 
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"Eine Sprache der Tiere gibt es nur per aequivocationem. Denn Sprache is eine in ihren Gebrauch freie 
und variabele Möglichkeit des Menschen Die Verständigungsmöglichkeiten zwischen Tieren kennen 
eine solche Variabilität nicht. Das bedeutet ontologisch, daß sie sich zwar miteinander verständigen, aber 
nicht über Sachverhalte als solche verständigen deren Inbegriff die Welt ist." (WM, pp.448-449).6 ,7 
A possible objection to the stated invariability of animal behaviour might be that almost all 
animals do, in fact, closely attune their behaviour to the current properties of the 
environment. Many animals are able to learn to adjust themselves to a changing environment. 
The outcome of these learning processes is not programmed beforehand, so the conclusion 
might be that animal behaviour is variable too. 
In one of the passages just quoted, Gadamer says that animals can dwell all over the 
earth, and -1 would add - can live in different environments. In this sense Gadamar admits 
that animal behaviour is variable. However, he does not have this type of variability in mind. 
For him 'variability' means the possibility to take up different positions to one and the same, 
undetermined environment. Animals just behave - although unpredictably - in one way or 
another. Their variability is a biologically explainable phenomenon and is not based on a 
capacity to take up different attitudes towards the environment. The latter capacity is 
restricted to humans, thanks to their linguistic way of being. The conclusion seems to be that, 
because animals are not linguistic, they are not open to the world. Because of this lack of 
openness, animals are not able to experience the world. 
2. Bodily-bound experiences 
In his book Über die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit (1993) (translated as The enigma of 
healthf, Gadamer discusses the limits of human medicine. His main statement is that we 
cannot conceive of human medicine as a scientifically based technique because perfect human 
health is not an end that we can realize in a technical way. Health is an experience which 
6 Animals have a language only per aequivocationem, for language is a human possibility that is free 
and variable in its use Animals do not have this variability when making themselves 
understood to one another. This means, ontologically, that they make themselves understood, but 
not about objective situations, the epitome of which is the world (p.403). 
7 These statements can be seen as a criticism of ethologists and philosophers on animals who say that 
animal sounds, smells, and behaviours should also be conceived of as language. See, for instance, 
Griffin about the dance of honeybees as their language (Griffin, 1976/1981, pp.42-47). Ironically, 
the argument with which Griffin defends that honeybees are linguistic, namely constant relations 
between the place of the food, the form of the dance of the honeybees and the reacting behaviour of 
the other bees, is the same as Gadamer's argument for saying that animals are not linguistic. 
8 I consider the English translation of the title inappropriate. The original, German title indicates the 
very character of health as analyzed by Gadamer, namely that health, contrary to sickness, is 
normally unnoticed, hidden (yerborgen). 
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cannot be objectified, Gadamer says.9 In some essays, Gadamer analyzes human experiences 
of health and sickness. Searching for a philosophical concept for animal experience, we must 
pay attention to this analysis because it restricts the openness of experiences as previously 
stated in Wahrheit und Methode. 
The reflective moment of health and sickness experiences 
In most modern philosophies, 'reflection' is considered taking a distance from and freely 
turning towards oneself, one's body or the external world. (See also the quote in the 
foregoing section, in which Gadamer says that the human relation to the world is a free and 
distanced one.) Gadamer questions this model of reflection in Uber die Verborgenheit der 
Gesundheit. He illustrates his own view with the reflective moment of experiences of health 
and sickness. 
According to the usual view on reflection, insight into health or sickness is seen as 
knowledge of the state of one's body, which can be true or false. This view corresponds with 
the scientific medical view on health and sickness. This view does not correspond with the 
reflective moment of human experiences of health and sickness, Gadamer asserts. The 
awareness of being ill is not free and distanced knowledge about one's body, but is always 
bound to one's life situation. As we shall see, experiences of health and sickness are not 
bound because health and sickness concern bodily states and processes, but because they are 
bound to a bodily as well a personal life situation. 
Gadamer's own analysis of health and sickness is the following. In a healthy condition, 
bodily life events consist of fluctuations around balances. Small disturbances are absorbed 
in a natural way. For example, small fluctuations of body temperature do not put a person 
out of balance. Normally we do not experience health. Therefore, the title of Gadamer's 
book: the hiddenness of health. Only after having been ill, for example, do we feel healthy 
again. Although health is ontologically primary, because it is the given state of being, 
sickness is methodically primary. Thanks to experiences of sickness, we realize that the 
healthy situation is normal (Gadamer, 1993, p.99). The reflective moment of experiences of 
sickness consists of an awareness of a disturbance that is not absorbed in a natural way, and 
of a tendency towards restoration of this disturbed balance. This awareness does not contain 
knowledge of which bodily balance exactly is disturbed. We just know something is wrong 
because of a disturbance of normal life events, sleeping badly for example. This disturbance 
clearly does not affect only one's body, but one's whole personal situation. While sleeping 
badly because of a disease, our daily rhythm of working is also disturbed. Gadamer says that 
the experience of sickness is a matter of not going along with normal bodily and personal life 
events (Gadamer, 1993, pp.73-76 and pp. 105-108). In summary: "Deshalb stellt 
Krankheitseinsicht ein Lebensproblem dar, das die Gesamtperson betrifft, und keineswegs 
It must be mentioned that Gadamer only writes about human health and sickness, not about animal 
health and sickness. 
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einen freien Akt der Intelligenz, die Distanz zu sich selber nimmt und sich auf sich selbst und 
die erfahrene Störung vergegenständlichend wendet." (Gadamer, 1993, p.78). 1 0 Thus, health 
and sickness are not only bound to bodily balances, but to the balance of the whole person 
in his life situation. Experiences of sickness disturb this life situation, but not in a principally 
open way in accordance with the openness of language. Experiences of sickness are also 
bound because these are experiences of a disturbed normal situation. The conclusion of this 
analysis of human experiences of health and sickness is that their reflective character is a 
bound, instead of a distanced and free one. They are always experiences within the context 
of a bodily and personal situation. 
A new model of reflection 
The model of a bound human situation, and - therefore - of bound reflection, is not only a 
model of the bodily human situation, but also the fundamental model of the human situation 
in its totality. "Das scheint mir das Modell, nach dem alle Selbstreflexion, inbesondere auch 
die in der eigenen Krankheitseinsicht betätigte, gesehen werden muß." (Gadamer, 1993, 
p.77). n And: "Dieses Modell scheint mir geradezu das Urmodell unserer menschlichen 
leiblichen und wohl nicht nur leiblichen Daseinsweise zu sein." (Gadamer, 1993, p.105).1 2 
Here Gadamer says that not only experiences of health and sickness but all experiences are 
bound to a bodily and personal life situation. All experiences are tied to the bodily aspect of 
a life situation in the sense that humans, by virtue of their unexperienced healthy liveliness, 
are open to the world (Gadamer, 1993. pp. 105-108 and pp. 143-144). This openness (thanks 
to health) shows up when being sick. In sickness the only thing that matters is our body; we 
are less or not at all interested in other things. Experiences are tied to the personal aspect of 
a life situation in the sense that they fit into or disturb a normal life. Let me recall also 
Gadamer's concept of new experiences as real experiences: new experiences are disturbances 
of expectations within a situation. As in experiences of health and sickness, going along with 
life events is ontologically primary; disturbances are methodically primary. So, the whole 
human way of being is directed at going along with life events, and at restoring disturbances 
of it. All experiences, and their reflectivity, are experiences within and bound to a life 
situation (Gadamer, 1993, pp.75-76). 
1 0 It is for this reason that awareness of ill-health represents a problem which affects someone's life as 
a whole and which concerns the whole person. Such awareness is by no means a free act of 
intelligence, the adoption of a critical distance and the objectification of oneself and the experiences 
disturbance (p.55). (Translations of quotations from Ûber der Verborgenheit der Gesundheit are 
derived from the English translation, see the reference list at the end of this book.) 
1 1 I consider this to be the model through which all self-reflection must be understood, especially that 
form of reflection which is involved in the awareness of one's own ill-health (p.54). 
1 2 This seems to me to be the fundamental model for our bodily, and not merely bodily, existence as 
human beings (p.78). 
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Gadamer's own conclusion concerning the concept of 'reflection' is that reflection does not 
presuppose free and distanced human beings, but the other way around. What we call free 
and distanced reflection remains tied to the entire life situation: 
"Mann kann nicht Einsicht in das, was ist, als eine freie Möglichkeit des Menschen voraussetzen, in der 
sein eigentliches Wesen bestehe, und zu der er sich in überlegener Distanznahme jederzeit erheben könne, 
ohne in einen naiven Dogmatismus zu verfallen. Einsicht und Distanzmöglichkeit solcher Art bleiben 
vielmehr auf schwer beschreibbare Weise an die Person im ganzen ihrer Lebenssituation gebunden." 
(Gadamer, 1993, p.75). 1 3 
This view on tied, reflective experience weakens Gadamer's earlier view on their openness. 
Previously, as reported in the foregoing section, Gadamer presented experience as being 
totally open, as if humans were totally free concerning the way in which they experience the 
undetermined world. The concept of experiences as tied to a situation restricts this freedom. 
This restriction does not mean that the life situation prescribes the content of experiences. 
It means that the content of experiences is related to one's life situation, either in accordance 
with expectations, or as disturbances of them. Even the experience of a disturbance is always 
tied to a life situation in the sense that it is the experience of a disturbance of the normally 
balanced life situation. This view on experiences as bound experiences questions their 
linguistic foundation. Either linguistic openness is not the ontological foundation of 
experiences, or language is not that open after all. In any case, this view weakens openness 
as the ontological foundation of experiences, which in Wahrheit und Methode was the reason 
to exclude animal experiences. 
3 . Animal experiences revisited 
In Wahrheit und Methode, Gadamer sees the inability of animals to have a free and distanced 
position towards their Umwelt as the reason for stating that animals do not have a world 
which they are able to experience in different ways. In Über der Verborgenheit der 
Gesundheit, however, he says that human experiences are not that free and distanced either 
because they remain tied to a life situation. Apparently, to be bound is not an impediment for 
experiences. 
Animals are also bound to their body and environment. Their life is also a matter of 
balances concerning their body and environment. If, for instance, the environment changes, 
1 3 If we are not to fall into a form of dogmatism, we cannot simply presuppose that insight into what 
exists is an open possibility for human beings, that this is an essential determining characteristic of 
their being, a stand-point of critical distance to which they can at all times raise themselves. In 
ways that are difficult to describe, the capacity to gain insight and to acquire critical distance 
remains bound up with the individual person in the totality of their life situation (p.53). 
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then animals also tend to restore disturbed balances. They do this either by adjusting 
themselves to a new environment or by adjusting a new environment to themselves. In this 
sense animal life is also a matter of going along with life events. 
However, it is not allowed to turn Gadamer's way of reasoning upside down. Gadamer 
bases his statements about the foundation of the human way of being on an ontological way 
of reasoning. He starts with human experiences (of works of art and history, and of health 
and sickness), and asks himself what they presuppose in the logically necessary sense. In 
Wahrheit und Methode his conclusion is that human experience presupposes language and a 
linguistic way of being. In Uber die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit he concludes that human 
experience presupposes going along with a life situation. It would be incorrect to turn this 
ontological way of reasoning upside down by saying that animals are also experiencing 
beings because they are also bound to a life situation. That it is incorrect to do this, shows 
up when we consider plants. Plants also are living within a life situation. Plants also tend to 
restore disturbed balances with their environment. Yet, most people would not say that plants 
are experiencing beings. We seem to make distinctions between different types of living in 
a life situation: some types imply experiences, others do not. 
The life situation of humans and animals 
In one of the previously quoted passages, Gadamer says that the medical-scientific, distancing 
view on human health and sickness remains bound to the person in his whole life situation 
"in a way that is hard to describe". Elsewhere he writes that health and sickness cannot be 
objectified, because they depend on many unsurveyable factors (Gadamer, 1993, p.57 and 
pp.61-63). It seems that animal ethology and animal ecology try to overcome this problem. 
They try to describe the many factors that contribute to the balance between animals and the 
environment in which they live. However, it is incorrect to see Gadamer's concept of a life 
situation, and the many factors involved, in this etiological and ecological way. 
Unlike ethologists and ecologists, Gadamer does not write about humans as members of 
a biological species located within a certain environment, but about persons in a life 
situation. As we saw before, a person's life situation is not only a bodily but also a personal 
situation. From Wahrheit und Methode we know that human beings are living within a 
cultural and historical horizon. As regards health and sickness, this is clear. A discipline like 
medical anthropology shows that when and why people experience their situation as one of 
sickness differs in different cultures. Hence, the many factors on which a life situation 
depends are not mere natural or environmental factors. They also comprise social and 
cultural factors insofar as they constitute the meaning of the whole life situation for a person. 
What factors constitute the meaning of a life situation is not a matter of analyzing a given 
situation as is done in ethology and ecology. This depends on the situation as experienced 
by the persons involved. For example, for some teachers the harsh daily rhythm of giving 
lessons is more sickening than for others. A diagnosis made by, mostly, a family doctor 
starts by understanding the patients' situation. He asks for their problems, which are 
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mtertwinings of bodily and life-problems. A doctor does not tacitly analyze the patients' 
situation and does not test for the presence of possible factors, but he asks bis patients what 
matters to them. He does so in order to reach a view on the patient's situation, within which 
he has to look for and diagnose a disease in the medical sense. It is not on many 
unsurveyable factors that a medical view depends, but on the experienced and understood 
situation of the patient. This situation cannot be described in objectivating terms; it can only 
be understood and described in terms of personal, meaningful experiences. However, seeing 
experiences of health and sickness as personal and, therefore, historically cultural experiences 
does not totally solve the problem of describing these experiences. Health and sickness also 
have a bodily aspect. It is this bodily aspect and its intertwining with the personal aspect of 
experiences of health and sickness that remains hard to describe. 
With regard to animal experiences, the same problem rises as with Dilthey. Gadamer also 
says that animals have no culture and history, because he considers culture the result of 
understanding, and history a matter of ongoing understanding. Animals are living in an 
Umwelt rather than a historical culture, he says. The question is whether the Umwelt of 
animals should be seen as a mere physical environment as ethologists and ecologists do, or 
whether this is a meaningfully experienced Umwelt. In the latter case, a further question is 
that to the character of animal experiences, if this is not cultural and historical. This question 
is partly similar to that concerning the bodily aspect of human experiences of health and 
sickness. It is hard to described this in cultural and historical terms only, but neither can it 
be described in objectivating, physical terms only. 
The two philosophers who will be discussed in the chapters to follow provide us with 
an answer to these questions. Merleau-Ponty has clarified the bodily aspect of human 
experiences; Plessner wrote about the animal body as the basis of experiences. Before 
discussing them, I will draw some conclusions concerning the views of the two discussed 
founding fathers of 20fh Century hermeneutics on animals as expressing experiences. 
INTERMEDIATE REFLECTIONS 2 
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In Intermediate Reflections 1,1 cherished the hope that hermeneutics would provide me with 
a fruitful model for research into subjective animal experience because this philosophy 
conceptually and methodically holds onto experiences as subjective experiences. Alas, the 
core of hermeneutics concerns human experiences, the conceptualization and understanding 
of which sometimes can but more often cannot cover animal experiences as well. The main 
line of reasoning within philosophical hermeneutics seems to start with typically human 
experiences, take these as examples of experiences in general, and derive from them a 
philosophical concept of experience and method for understanding. This line of reasoning is 
explicitly present in Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode. Gadamer starts his book with an 
analysis of aesthetic and historical experiences on which he bases his philosophy of 
experience and understanding. His conclusion, obtained by this line of reasoning, is that 
language is the ontological presupposition of experiences. Since Gadamer does not consider 
animals linguistic, he precludes animals as experiencing beings. 
One can accuse Dilthey of the same kind of reasoning because he emphasizes the 
cultural-historical character of experiences, expressions and understanding.1 This accusation 
is confirmed by the title of Dilthey's unfinished project: Kritik der historischen Vernunft. As 
Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft developed an epistemological foundation for the causal-
explanatory natural sciences, Dilthey wanted to develop a foundation for the interpretative 
historical sciences. It seems that Dilthey equates culturally acquired, human experiences with 
experiences in general. 
Heidegger, another founder of 20th Century hermeneutics, whose philosophy regarding 
animal experiences I have explored elsewhere, follows the same line of reasoning. Heidegger 
conceives of understanding and experience as understanding and experience of the world that 
is made up of other beings. He restricts this capacity to humans because only humans are 
able to understand beings as beings (Heidegger, 1929-1930/1983; Blans & Lijmbach, 1996; 
Lijmbach, 1997). 
Thus, the subject matter of the Geisteswissenschaften or hermeneutical sciences seems 
to be the understanding of human experiences only. Hermeneutics see only human behaviour 
- and especially typically human products such as texts, tools, works of art, and other 
artefacts - as expressions of experiences. All non-human nature does not seem to express 
experiences. As far as we understand non-human nature, we understand our own human 
meaning given to it. According to this sense of hermeneutics, "Geisteswissenschaften" is 
correctly translated as "humanities". I call this line of reasoning "classical hermeneutical" 
Kockelkoren for instance, who looks for the possibility of understanding meaning in non-human 
nature, rejects Dilthey for this reason (Kockelkoren, 1992, pp.16-41). 
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because it confirms and carries forward the tradition of hermeneutics to which biblical 
exegesis and philology belong. I agree with this view on hermeneutics as far as it concerns 
human experiences and understanding. Humans are living in a historical and cultural way, 
which includes the way in which they experience the world. But I do not agree with its 
almost a priori restriction of experiences to human experiences. Maybe our speaking of 
animal experiences, for instance in animal welfare debates, is philosophical nonsense. To find 
out whether this is so, we must be aware of a possible incorrect inference from typically 
human experiences to experiences in general. Hence, we must be open to the possibility of 
experience beyond typical human experience. 
Although Gadamer and Dilthey can be construed as classical hermeneuticists, each of them 
offers a possible view on animal experiences. To view Dilthey as a classical hermeneuticist 
is only correct if one does not consider his early writings before 1907. We saw that in these 
writings Dilthey extensively speaks about animal experiences. Some animals do appear to us 
as experiencing beings, he says, and we do understand these animals by reliving their 
experiences as if these were our own (although animal experiences are mediated only by 
biological drives). So, the early Dilthey does not exclude animals as beings who express 
experiences from the domain of hermeneutics. 
For various reasons I do not consider Dilthey's view on animal experiences and their 
understanding satisfactory. Firstly, he only says that animals have experiences involving 
biological drives such as the feeding, but he does not say anything about the animals' 
experience during eating. Dilthey just says that nature has given to animals a good and bad 
taste of food that are signs of the survival value of the food in question (the "cunning of 
nature"). He does not say in which aspects animal experiences, which are mediated only by 
biological drives, differ from human experiences, which are also mediated by spiritual drives. 
Do animals taste food, feel safe or experience sexual intercourse in the same way as humans? 
Secondly, conceiving of animal experiences as different from our own experiences raises the 
methodical problem that we cannot relive animal experiences as if these were our own. Since 
human experiences are mediated by spiritual drives or, as Dilthey later says, culturally 
acquired, animal experiences remain strange to us. A third, also methodical problem, 
especially if one sees animal experiences as different from our own, is that we cannot reach 
an agreement with animals on their experiences as relived or understood by us. In Dilthey's 
later philosophy, agreement between humans is possible because of a common - possibly 
extended - cultural-historical horizon of understanding. Between humans and animals there 
is no such common horizon of understanding. 
Gadamer's conceptualization of human experiences of health and sickness opens up 
another and more promising way to conceptualize animal experiences as intermediate between 
human experience and the complete absence of experience. He states that human experiences 
of health and especially sickness are tied to a bodily and personal life situation, namely 
insofar as they are experiences of a balance or disturbance of this situation. Gadamer says 
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that this bond is hard to describe. But, as far as this situation concerns one's personal 
situation, it is not hard to describe. For Gadamer, who is after all a classical hermeneuticist, 
a personal life situation is that of a person living in a cultural and historical context. Being 
ill is experienced as a disturbance of one's family life and work. What is hard to describe 
is the connection to one's bodily life situation. Medical scientists describe this connection in 
physical, objectivating terms. They conceive of sickness as caused by particular physical 
states of the body. However, this is not experienced when feeling ill, Gadamer says. On the 
contrary, mostly we feel ill and ask the physician for the cause. It is this feeling of illness 
that is tied to our bodily and personal situation in a way that is hard to describe. The bodily-
bound aspect of human experiences of health and sickness suggests the idea of seeing animal 
experiences as bodily-bound experiences as well. Perhaps we can conceptualize and 
understand animal experiences as experience of a balance or disturbance of their bodily life 
in an Umwelt. 
In order to see animal experiences as such, we have to clarify the concept of a bodily-
bound life, and especially that which relates to experiences. We have to do this because all 
living beings are in some sense bodily bound to a life within their own environment. Yet, 
one does not need to jump to the conclusion that, therefore, all living beings have 
experiences. It cannot be excluded that there are different ways in which organisms are 
bodily tied to a situation, of which only one or some ways are the foundation of experiences. 
Maybe it is right to say that all living beings are experiencing beings. Maybe it is only the 
human bodily bond that is the foundation of experiences. 
Speaking of the bodily-bound character of experience evokes the name of Merleau-Ponty. 
Within philosophy he is the one who clarified the bodily origin of human experience. So, let 
us now turn to him in order to see whether the animal's bodily connection to the Umwelt can 
be conceived of as the origin of experiences. 

PART TWO 

CHAPTER VI 
MERLEAU-PONTY: THE AMBIGUOUS HUMAN BODY 
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is called "the philosopher of the body", and rightly so. 
In all his writings the body is the central theme. Like the hermeneuticists Dilthey and 
Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty has worked out a philosophical concept of experience. The 
direction of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical aim, however, is opposite to that of the two 
hermeneuticists. Dilthey and Gadamer need a philosophical concept of experience in order 
to found respectively geisteswissenschaftliches and daily understanding. Merleau-Ponty does 
not want to found understanding by means of experience, but asks for the foundation of 
experience itself. He considers the body this foundation. I have chosen to discuss Merleau-
Ponty because I want to explore whether the body of animals can also be viewed as the 
foundation of experience. In looking for an answer to this question, we run up against a by 
now familiar difficulty, namely that Merleau-Ponty mostly writes about humans. In his most 
cited book, Phénoménologie de la perception [Phenomenology of perception] (1945), he 
hardly mentions animals. Only in La structure du comportement [The structure of behaviour] 
(1942) and his almost unknown La nature. Notes. Cours du Collège de France [Nature. 
Notes. Courses of the College of France] (1995), he writes extensively about animals. The 
latter books are indispensable for exploring his view on the animal body. Another difficulty 
that Merleau-Ponty presents is that the way in which he conceives of philosophy changes 
during his lifetime. Very roughly one may say that he starts as a phenomenologist and ends 
as an ontologist. A sketch of this change will be presented in the first section (VI. 1). In the 
next sections I will discuss Merleau-Ponty's view on the human body as the foundation of 
experiences (VI.2) and his view on the animal body (VI.3). Then, inspired by what Merleau-
Ponty says about the bodily comprehension of humans, I propose a concept of the impersonal 
meaning of animal experiences and expressions (VI.4). Finally, some conclusions concerning 
Merleau-Ponty's contribution to the issue of conceptualizing and understanding animal 
experiences will be formulated (VI.5). 
1. From phenomenology to ontology 
Throughout his lifetime, Merleau-Ponty uses different words for referring to the foundation 
of experiences (Kockelmans, 1982/1993, p. 134; Olkowski, 1982/1993, p.98). These different 
words reflect the above-mentioned change in his conception of philosophy. During his whole 
career Merleau-Ponty conceives of his philosophy as phenomenological ontology. In the 
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preface of Phénoménologie de la perception1, for instance, he writes "Mais la 
phénoménologie, c'est aussi une philosophie qui replace les essences dans l'existence... " (PP, 
p.I). 2 However, in his early books the emphasis is more on the apparent reality and less on 
its essence than in his later books (also Tiemersma, 1988, p. 10). Therefore, I will present 
the change in Merleau-Ponty's conception of philosophy as a change from phenomenology 
to ontology. 
In La structure du comportement, Merleau-Ponty develops a concept of consciousness 
by analyzing the notion of behaviour. He chooses behaviour for doing this because he sees 
the notion of behaviour as neutral with regard to the classical distinction between the physical 
as the outer and the psychic as the inner reality. Merleau-Ponty does not conceive of 
behaviour as belonging to the outer, physical reality and consciousness as its inner, psychic 
cause (as do the ethologists Toates, Wiepkema and Dawkins). Merleau-Ponty conceives of 
consciousness as a matter of behavioural structure (SC, pp.2-3).3 The main statement of La 
structure du comportement is that human behaviour and also some animal behaviour appears 
to us not only as a causal mechanism, but also and equally as an expression of consciousness. 
Therefore, he sees behaviour as a unity of objective bodily processes (as studied by the 
natural sciences) and subjective conscious experiences (as studied by the 
Geisteswissenschafteri). In this view we clearly recognize a phenomenological attitude, one 
namely that aims at articulating the ways in which "things themselves" appear to us. 
The central question of Phénoménologie de la perception is already different from that 
of La structure du comportement; however, the answer is less different. In Phénoménologie 
de la perception Merleau-Ponty reflects upon experiences in order to find out how they 
originate. He sees their origin in the phenomenal body. This is the body thought of both as 
an object, a perceivable body, and as a subject, a perceiving body. Our hands, for instance, 
can both be touched as well as touch. This is similar to his view on behaviour in. La structure 
du comportement, in which he sees behaviour as both a causal mechanism and an expression 
of consciousness. 
Between 1956 and 1960 Merleau-Ponty gave lectures about nature which have been 
edited and published as La nature. Notes. Cours du Collège de France. These lectures are 
clearly ontological in the sense of Merleau-Ponty's view of ontology. In these lectures 
Merleau-Ponty says that the concept of nature is mostly seen as ontological. Usually, 
philosophers conceive of nature as the essence of beings, which is of another reality than 
References to Phénoménologie de la perception will be given by PP. Regarding the used 
translation, see the list of references at the end of this book. 
But phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts essences back into existence,... (p.vii). 
(Translations of quotes from Phénoménologie de la perception are derived from the English 
translation, see the reference list at the end of this book.) 
References to La structure du comportement will be given by SC. For the used edition, see the 
reference list at the end of this book. 
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their apparent reality. A case in point is Heidegger, who writes about the ontological realm 
of being as the ultimate foundation of the ontic realm of particular ways of being. Merleau-
Ponty, however, says that being is not another kind of reality than the apparent reality, but 
is "inside" the apparent reality. The nature or essence of beings is the same as their way of 
being (N, pp.265-267).4 In his lectures about nature, he elaborates this ontological position 
regarding the nature of organisms in general, and animals and humans in particular. He 
argues that this nature belongs to the given, apparent reality, although it is not itself an 
apparent thing or process. Humans and animals are living beings, but life is not something 
beside or behind physico-chemical elements. Life is in between these elements, he says. 
Merleau-Ponty uses the words "tissue" (tissu) and "folds" (plis) to name this "in between" 
area. Like the folds in textile, life is in between physico-chemical elements and consciousness 
in the living body (N, pp.275-280). 
In his last books L'oeil et esprit [Eye and mind] (1961) and Le visible et l'invisible [The 
visible and the invisible] (1964), he calls the mtertwining of body, consciousness and world 
the "flesh" (chair). This is the keyword in these books. The constitution of experiences is 
the central theme again. The flesh is - as the title of his last book says - visible as well as 
invisible. This term refers to the primordial mtertwining that precedes conscious experiences. 
In L'oeil et esprit Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the flesh of the world; in Le visible et l'invisible 
the flesh of the human body. Of the flesh of the human body, he says that this is the abyss 
that divides l'être-en-soi and l'être-pour-soi, the body as perceived and as perceiving (VI, 
p.180).5 Instead of being the apparent mtertwining of perceived and perceiving body, the 
flesh is the inconceivable foundation of both. In the same way the flesh of the world is the 
abyss that divides the world as seen and seeing. More than his other books, these later books 
are ontological. In Le visible et l'invisible Merleau-Ponty calls his own philosophy "super-
réflexion": expressing the tacit contact with the yet unsaid things (VI, p.61). In L'oeil et 
l'esprit it is the art of painting that preserves this tacit contact. In this book he calls the flesh 
of the world "L'Etre" (Being) (Tiemersma, 1988). This is quite ontological in the traditional 
sense, for example in the sense of Heidegger: thinking of being, the incomprehensible 
foundation of the particular ways of being. 
2. The ambiguity of the human body 
The intertwining of physical body, consciousness and world 
Notwithstanding the different philosophical ways in which Merleau-Ponty speaks about the 
References to La nature. Notes. Cours du College de France will be given by N. For the used 
edition, see the reference list at the end of this book. 
References to Le visible et I'invisible will be given by VI. For the used edition, see the reference 
list at the end of this book. 
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human body, the main message of all his writings is that it is an mtertwining of physical 
body and consciousness. Merleau-Ponty calls this mtertwining "phenomenal body" and - later 
- "flesh".6 This does not mean that the human body consists of a physical body and a 
consciousness, between which there is some kind of connection, as Descartes asserted. 
Rather, the body as mtertwining is primary. To speak of the physical body and consciousness 
is our conceptual abstraction of this primordial intertwining. Every statement, including those 
that followers of Descartes make, about the physical body alone, consciousness alone, or 
their relation, is a construed abstraction (VI, pp. 172-200). To speak of the physical human 
body is to abstract it from its conscious aspect, and vice versa. Nor does Merleau-Ponty say 
that the phenomenal body is a third substance that constitutes the physical body and 
consciousness. The phenomenal body is both, ambiguous: physical body as well as 
consciousness. The phenomenal body is inconceivable. We can only conceive of it either as 
physical or as conscious body. The phenomenal body is the body that moves, which includes 
walking as well as touching, seeing, hearing, and so on. Moving, however, is not a matter 
of a conscious subject setting a physical body in motion: 
"Ce n'est jamais notre corps objectif que nous mouvons, mais notre corps phénoménal, et cela sans 
mystère, puisque c'est notre corps déjà, comme puissance de telles et telles régions du monde, qui se levait 
vers les objets à saisir et qui les percevait" (PP, p.123).7 
Taking up a pencil is a bodily action. To take up a pencil does not require looking for and 
raising our hand as part of our body. Our hand just takes up the pencil. For explaining that 
the phenomenal body is inconceivable Merleau-Ponty uses the example of seeing. It is the 
body that sees as well as is seen. We see with our eyes, but not with our eyes as physical 
things. As physical things our eyes do not see anvthing, but can only be seen by other seeing 
eyes. Eyes that are both seeing and seen eyes are inconceivable (PP, p. 123; N, pp.270-272 
and pp.284-286). 
The mtertwining of physical body and consciousness also involves the external world. 
As was stated in the above quoted passage, the phenomenal body is the potentiality of this 
or that part of the world. We do not give our hand the form of the pencil to be grasped. Our 
hand takes this form while grasping a pencil. It is impossible to distinguish between the form 
of the pencil and its perceived form; they are one and the same. Merleau-Ponty calls this an 
"isomorphism" between the thing itself and the perceived thing. This does not mean that two 
things (the thing itself and the perceived thing) have the same form, but that both are 
primarily intertwined (mtertwining of body and world) (PP, pp.376-385; N, pp.341-345). It 
6 To prevent long and incorrect sentences, from now on I will only use the concept of phenomenal 
body and not the more ontological concept of flesh, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
7 It is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body, and there is no mystery in 
that, since our body, as the potentiality of this or that part of the world, surges towards objects to 
be grasped and perceives them (p. 106). 
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The body is the measure of the world, I am open to the world, because I am in it through my 
body. 
[S]pace has its basis in our facticity (p.254). 
is only secondarily that we speak in terms of perceived form and form of the thing itself. 
The bodily-bound openness of experiences 
In chapter V, the difference between Gadamer's Wahrheit und Méthode and his Ûber der 
Verborgenheit der Gesundheit has been described as a shift. In the former book he would 
conceive of experience as open, thanks to language. In the latter he would view experience 
as open but within the boundaries of a bodily and personal life situation. Merleau-Ponty 
asserts that experiences are based on a bond to the body as well as on a bodily openness. 
"[L]e corps est le mesurant du monde, je suis ouvert au monde parce que je suis dedans par 
mon corps." (N, p.279).8 He explains this bodily-tied openness to the world by means of 
various spatial perceptions (PP, pp.281-344). We always perceive space from our own bodily 
position. We never perceive space as physical or geometrical space. Something is far away, 
not because it is five or a hundred metres away, but because we cannot grasp it or have to 
walk to it. We see something upside down because it is upside down in relation to our bodily 
position. We see depth because we focus our eyes on something. The meaning of spatial 
terms and, therefore, all concepts of space are based on the spatiality, mobility and 
temporality of our body: "[Lj'espace est assis sur notre facticité." (PP, p.294).9 These 
examples show us that perceiving - and experiencing in general - is not primarily a question 
of a perceiving subject and a perceived object, but of a relationship between body and world. 
Our body mediates between the world and all our experiences of the world. In this sense all 
our experiences are bound to the body. This is not due to our physical body but to our 
phenomenal body, that is, the mtertwining of physical body and consciousness. When we 
cannot grasp a thing which is far away, it is not only a problem because of the length of our 
arms, but also because it frustrates our desire. 
In the previously cited passage, however, Merleau-Ponty also says that we are open to 
the world because we are in it bodily. The expression 'openness to the world' in Merleau-
Ponty agrees with Gadamer's meaning of it, namely the capacity to experience the world in 
different ways. If we cannot grasp a tiling with our hand, we are able to walk to it and take 
it. This ability is a bodily ability. A thing can be far away or close by, dependent on the 
position and movement of our body. Again, this mobility of the body is not a mere physical 
matter, but a matter of the phenomenal body. Walking is not a mere displacement of our 
physical body, but the bodily act of going somewhere. Seeing something as a box (rather 
than as a flat plane) is possible because of our ability to move our body. It is our phenomenal 
body that makes possible different experiences of the world, because our phenomenal body 
can take up different positions in the world. As Merleau-Ponty says: "Ces éclaircissements 
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nous permettent enfin de comprehendre sans equivoque la motricité comme intentionalité 
origínale. La conscience est originairement non pas un "je pens que", mais un "je peux" " 
(PP, p.160).1 0 
3. The animal body 
Merleau-Ponty sees the phenomenal body not only as primary to the physical body and 
experiences, but also as primary to the world. (See the aforementioned mtertwining of 
physical body, consciousness and world, and the isomorphism between the form of the things 
and the perceived form.) Therefore, Merleau-Ponty also writes about worldly consciousness 
and worldly flesh (N, pp.279-280). This raises the question of whether we can also see the 
perceived world as a subjective world, just as we can see the perceived human body as a 
subjective body (Bernet, 1993). In the aforementioned example of taking up a pencil, there 
would be no reason to deny that pencils are also an mtertwining of physical body, 
consciousness and world. One can say as well that thinking about pencils as mere physical 
objects is as much an abstraction as thinking about human bodies as mere physical objects. 
In L 'oeil et Vesprit Merleau-Ponty's answer to this question is positive. In this book, he says 
that non-living things are seen as well as seeing things. If we touch a thing, we also are 
touched by it. 1 1 This is the "flesh of the world" that some painters want to express and that 
precedes conscious experiences of the world such as scientific observations (Tiemersma, 
1988). In his other books, however, Merleau-Ponty restricts subjectivating concepts such as 
consciousness, perceptions, experiences and meaningfulness to humans and living nature. 
Especially in the books in which he writes about non-human organisms, he develops a 
philosophy of the vital order that, as opposed to the physical order, is characterized by what 
I call "subjectivity". 
The vital order 
Both in La structure du comportement (which from now on win be abbreviated as La 
structure) and La nature. Notes. Cours du College de France (which from now on will be 
abbreviated as La nature), Merleau-Ponty writes about the vital order opposed to the physical 
and the human order. In both books, he conceives of the vital order (or life) as "something" 
between the physico-chemical elements of organisms which presupposes some form of 
consciousness. 
In both books Merleau-Ponty says that the relationships of organisms to their 
These elucidations enable us clearly to understand mobility as basic intentionality. Consciousness is 
in the first place not a matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can' (p. 137). 
Unfortunately Merleau-Ponty uses living entities such as trees and landscapes as examples of 
worldly flesh. 
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environment are relationships of meaning (SC, pp. 174-175; N, pp.229-230). la La nature 
he explains these relationships of meaning by giving a philosophical interpretation of Von 
UexkmTs Umwelt concept (N, pp. 228-234). Von Uexkull said that all living beings are 
living in an Umwelt. Not the whole environment in which they are living influences them, 
but only those portions of it which they are able to perceive and in which they are able to 
act. Von Uexkull called the perceived world the "Merkwelt" (world of notice) and the world 
in which action occurs the "Wirkungswelt" (world of action). Together they make up the 
Umwelt. An activity which Von Uexkull called "subject" or "natural factor" connects the 
perceptions and actions of organisms into functional circles (Von Uexkull, 1920). Merleau-
Ponty considers Von Uexkull's concept of Umwelt a concept that connects two activities 
which are usually seen as disconnected, namely the activity that creates organs and the 
behavioural activity. Both activities imply the unfolding of an Umwelt, he says. For instance, 
during the ontogenetic development of organisms, the sense organs (and, thereby, a future 
Umwelt) develop themselves. This future Umwelt is not the goal of the ontogenetic 
development, because later actions of organisms also influence their perceptions of the 
Umwelt, as is highlighted by the aforementioned concept of functional circle. Like a melody 
in music, the Umwelt is a theme that unfolds itself during the life of organisms. The 
philosophical questions which Merleau-Ponty asks are: what exactly unfolds itself, and from 
where. 
His answer to the first question is that relationships of meaning between organisms and 
their environment unfold themselves. Organisms are directed at and react to ensembles of 
stimuli rather than separate, quantitative stimuli. Organisms do not act in or react to a 
physically conceived environment. They act in and react to a perceived environment, as is 
captured in Von Uexkull's notions of Merkwelt and Wirkungswelt. Organisms can react 
differently even to the same environmental conditions. These relationships between organisms 
and their environment cannot be explained causally, but must be viewed as relationships of 
meaning: "Entre la situation et le mouvement de l'animal, il y a un rapport de sens qui 
traduit l'expression d'Umwelt" (N, pp.229-230).12 Merleau-Ponty's answer to the second 
question is that the source of the unfolding of the Umwelt must be found inside organisms. 
This source is like tissue between the physico-chemical elements of organisms. At this 
moment consciousness shows up: "VUmwelt ne se présente pas devant l'animal comme un 
but, il n'est pas présent comme une idée, mais comme un thème qui hante la conscience." 
(N, p.233).1 3 
In La structure Merleau-Ponty also sets out a concept of life that implies consciousness: 
Between the situation and the movement of the animal there is a relation of meaning, which is 
expressed by the term Umwelt. 
The Umwelt does not appear to the animal as a goal, and is not present as an idea, but as a theme 
that haunts consciousness. 
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"Il n'est pas question, nous l'avons assez dit, de revenir à une forme quelconque de vitalisme ou 
d'animisme, mais simplement de reconnaître que l'objet de la biologie est impensable sans les unités de 
signification qu'une conscience y trouve et voit s'y déployer. "L'esprit de la nature est un esprit caché, 
u ne se produit pas sous la forme même de l'esprit; il est seulement esprit pour l'esprit qui le connaît: il 
est esprit en lui-même, mais non pour soi-même." [quote Hegel - SL] En réalité donc, nous avons déjà 
introduit la conscience et ce que nous avons désigné sous le nom de vie était déjà la conscience de la vie. " 
(SC, pp.174-175).'4 
So, in both books, Merleau-Ponty says that organisms are meaningfully related to their 
Umwelt, which presupposes a consciousness "inside" them. This would lead to the conclusion 
that the bodies of all organisms are phenomenal bodies, namely appearing as a consciousness 
in between their physico-chemical elements. 
Although Merleau-Ponty presents this philosophy as a philosophy of life in general, it 
is unclear whether he is writing about all organisms or about animals only. The aim of La 
structure is to develop a concept of consciousness, which Merleau-Ponty does by analyzing 
behaviour since he sees behaviour as an expression of consciousness. As we will see, 
however, the three kinds of behavioural structures that express consciousness concern only 
animal and human behaviour. Whether micro-organisms and plants are also held to exhibit 
behaviour is unclear. In a footnote in the introduction of his book, Merleau-Ponty says that 
humans and animals (but not acids, electrons, pebbles and clouds) perform behaviour (SC, 
pp.2-3). He does not mention other non-human organisms besides animals. Also in La nature 
Merleau-Ponty never mentions micro-organisms and plants. He tacitly equates organisms with 
animals, as the following quote illustrates. "Le vivant n'opère qu'avec des éléments physico-
chimiques, mais ces forces subordonnées nouent entre elles des relations inédites. On peut, 
à ce moment-là, parler d'un animal." (N, p.232).1 5 
Whatever one thinks about plants, Merleau-Ponty says that at least some animals appear 
to us as consciously and meaningfully related to their Umwelt. This view raises the question 
of whether the mtertwining of physical body, consciousness and world in animals, like in 
humans, is the foundation of meaningful experiences. In order to answer this question, 
Merleau-Ponty's distinction between animals and humans is important. 
The animal and human order 
Both in La structure and La nature, Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between animals and 
As I have already stated several times, we do not have to return to vitalism or animism, but must 
simply recognize that the object of biology is unthinkable without units of meaning, which a 
consciousness finds and sees unfolding in them. "The mind of nature is a hidden mind. It does not 
appear in the proper form of mind; it is only mind for the mind which knows it: it is mind in itself, 
not for itself." So, actually we already have introduced consciousness, and what we have called 
life, already was consciousness of life. 
Life operates only with physico-chemical elements, but these subordinate forces tie between 
themselves new relations. At that moment, one can speak of an animal. 
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humans. La structure is a criticism of two behavioural theories that were current at the time 
of writing, namely the reflex theory and the Gestalt theory. Both theories see behaviour as 
caused by the environment. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, sees behaviour as both a causal and 
a conscious phenomenon. The structure of behaviour is an expression of consciousness, he 
says. In his own theory of behaviour, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes three kinds of behavioural 
structures: a syncretic (which is normally called innate behaviour), a removable (which is 
normally called learnt animal behaviour), and a symbolic (which is normally called cultural 
human behaviour) (SC, pp. 114-138). For explaining the difference between animals and 
humans, only the last two structures are relevant. 
Merleau-Ponty explains this difference by means of an example. A dog is able to learn 
to jump over a chair after the sound of a bell in order to get food. This behaviour is not 
understood properly if conceived of as a causal chain between the sound of the bell, the 
jumping behaviour of the dog, and the availability of food. The dog's jumping is not the 
mere effect of the sound of the bell and the cause of the availability of food. The dog has 
learnt to change the positions and movements of his own body in order to reach a goal. 
Therefore, Merleau-Ponty calls this behaviour "removable behaviour" (SC, p. 127). There 
is a relation between the sound of the bell, the dog's jumping and the availability of food 
which in human language is called a "means-end-relation" (SC, pp. 119-120). 
The qualification "in human language" is important because it designates the difference 
between a removable and symbolic behavioural structure. This difference is that the latter 
structure presupposes a special capacity to learn. In the above-mentioned example this is the 
capacity to learn that the sound and jumping are means to getting food. In other words, a 
symbolic behavioural structure presupposes the capacity to learn the meaning of these 
phenomena. Only humans can learn this, because only humans are able to make a distinction 
between the sound, the jumping and the availability of food as physical and as meaningful 
phenomena. This does not imply that the sound and the dog's jumping behaviour are 
meaningless. For a dog, the sound of the bell and his own jumping behaviour are signals that 
refer to something else, namely the future availability of food. The dog has experienced and 
learnt these empirical relations. To humans, the sound of the bell and their own behaviour 
are not only empirically related, but also intrinsically. The sound of the bell is a command 
to jump, and jumping is a means to get food. This is the meaning of Merleau-Ponty's 
statement: "Ici [concerning humans - SL] le comportement n'a plus seulement une 
signification, il est même signification." (SC, p.133).1 6 So, the two structures of behaviour 
are two different types of meaningful relations to the environment. The behaviour of learning 
animals has an external meaning (the availability of food); human behaviour is in itself 
meaningful (a means to get food). 
In La nature Merleau-Ponty makes a similar distinction between animals and humans, 
Here behaviour does not only have a meaning, it is itself a meaning. 
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although he uses other words. Here, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes with regard to the relations 
to their respective Umwelt between lower and higher animals on the one hand and humans 
on the other. The Umwelt of lower animals (i.e., those without a central nervous system and 
central organization) is pre-established and closed. After their ontogenetic development, the 
environment for which these animals are sensitive does not change any more. Higher 
animals, by contrast, shape their Umwelt during their whole life (N, pp.221-226 and p.283). 
This distinction corresponds with the distinction between a syncretic and a removable 
behavioural structure in La structure. In terms of the Umwelt theory, one can formulate the 
above-mentioned learning process of the dog as the creation of a new functional circle, 
namely between the sound of the bell, his own jumping and the availability of food, earning 
by higher animals is to relate to each other these empirical phenomena in a meaningful way. 
This is what is meant by saying that the dog shapes his own new Umwelt. Although higher 
animals are able to shape their own Umwelt, they do this in another way than humans: 
"De plus il [the human body - SL] est ouvert, transformable; le corps s'arme d'instruments d'observation 
et d'action - Donc non rapport avec le système de déclencheurs préétabli, gangue et rails du 
comportement, extase dans cette mélodie, clôture en elle, mais son "interprétation", son projection de 
système d'équivalence et de discrimination non naturels. Non plus corps fusion avec un Umwelt mais corps 
moyen ou occasion de projection d'un Welt." (N, pp.283-284).17 
In this quote, the difference between animals and humans is the same as in La structure.19 
In both books, Merleau-Ponty says that only humans interpret the meanings of symbols, which 
in an unnatural (instead of empirical) way are similar or different. When humans learn the 
meaning of jumping over a chair, this implies learning also that it is possible that an 
empirically totally different form of behaviour may be a means to getting food. A dog, by 
contrast, has to learn all over again that jumping over another kind of chair also results in 
the availability of food (SC, pp. 130-131). 
In terms of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between humans and animals as 
follows: "Mais refuser aux animaux la conscience au sens de conscience pure, la cogitatio, 
ce n'est pas faire d'eux des automates sans intérieur. L'animal, dans une mesure variable 
Besides, it is open, transformable; the body arms itself with instruments for perception and action -
Thus, there is no relation with a system of pre-established stimuli, no envelope and rail of 
behaviour, no ecstasy within this melody, and no being closed in it. But there is "interpretation", 
that is the projection of a system of unnatural similarity and difference. Not a fusion of body and 
Umwelt, but body as a means or opportunity to project a Welt. 
In view of the distinction between lower and higher animals, Merleau-Ponty incorrectly sets lower 
animals with a pre-established and closed Umwelt in opposition to humans. 
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selon l'intégration de son comportement, est bien une autre existence, ..." (SC, p. 137).19 
In La nature, which is more ontological, Merleau-Ponty explains the "other existence" of 
animals wherefore we cannot deny them some form of consciousness. In this book, Merleau-
Ponty criticizes the Cartesian concept of humans as animals with a pure consciousness or 
reason on top of their physical body. Humans are primarily an mtertwining of the animal 
way of being and 'reason', he asserts. Cartesian reason or pure consciousness has escaped 
from its body.20 This escape does not mean that a physical body is left behind. Pure 
consciousness exists alongside a phenomenal body. In this sense the human way of being is 
an mtertwining of the phenomenal animal body and pure consciousness, and having a 
phenomenal body distinguishes animals from automata. 
Yet, the phenomenal animal and phenomenal human body are different: "Le rapport 
animal - homme ne sera pas hiérarchie simple fondée sur une addition: il y aura déjà une 
autre manière d'être corps chez l'homme." (N, pp.276-277).21 Here Merleau-Ponty says 
that the animal and the human bodily ways of being vary in that only the human phenomenal 
body has the capacity to set free a pure consciousness. 
Animal experiences 
I have written above exclusively in terms of meaning and consciousness, while the subject 
matter of this book is animal experience. The reason for doing this is that Merleau-Ponty 
uses only those terms in the two books dealing with non-human organisms. Especially 
because Merleau-Ponty says that consciousness appears with life in general, the question of 
whether the bodily animal consciousness is the foundation of animal experiences becomes 
relevant. Simply relating experiences to consciousness would imply that also micro-
organisms, which Merleau-Ponty views as conscious, are experiencing beings. 
Merleau-Ponty never mentions animal experiences explicitly. Phénoménologie de la 
perception concerns the human phenomenal body as the foundation of perceptions. In this 
book, he never mentions animal perceptions and their foundation. In La nature, the concept 
of Umwelt, of which perceptions are an element, covers all organisms. However, Merleau-
1 9 But to deny animal consciousness in the sense of pure consciousness, the / think, is not making 
them automatons without an interior. Animals, in a variable way dependent on the integration of 
their behaviour, represent another form of existence,... 
2 0 An objection may be that animals and humans differ because only humans have a pure 
consciousness which has been embodied rather than escaped from the body. However, bodily going 
around in the world by humans is not reached in a roundabout way through pure consciousness, 
Merleau-Ponty would reply. On the contrary, conscious thinking is based on going around in the 
world with a phenomenal body, as also is clear from his examples of human perception. Besides, 
we cannot understand the emergence of pure consciousness in humans by seeing it primarily as 
pure consciousness. (See also Plessner in the following chapter.) 
2 1 The relation between animals and humans is not one of a simple hierarchy based on an addition: 
there is already another way of bodily being in humans. 
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Ponty tacitly jumps from organisms to higher animals. He does not write about micro-
organisms and plants. He does not say whether or not these organisms perceive and act in 
an Umwelt in the same way as animals. In other words, he does not say whether the bodies 
of micro-organisms and plants are phenomenal, experiencing bodies too. In the following 
chapter we will see that Plessner, whose philosophy of life is more elaborated than Merleau-
Ponty's, explicitly states that only higher animals have experiences. 
4. Personal humans and impersonal animals 
Merleau-Ponty holds that animal behaviour possesses meaning. In La Nature, he states that 
the relationships between organisms and their Umwelt are relationships of meaning (N, 
pp.229-230). In La structure he says that some forms of animal behaviour, namely learnt 
behaviour, appear as meaningful (SC, pp. 174-175). Speaking of the meaning of animal 
behaviour raises the question of the precise character of this meaning. This is the same 
question that we came across in the chapters about Dilthey and Gadamer. If one does not 
consider animals cultural-historical or linguistic beings, what could then be the character of 
the meaning of animal expressions? 
Merleau-Ponty also restricts language, culture and history to humans. With regard to 
animals, he writes in terms of "pre-culture", "the beginning of culture" and "directed at the 
interpretation of symbols" (N, p.231). But, unlike the later Dilthey and Gadamer, he does 
not restrict the understanding of humans to linguistic or cultural-historical understanding. 
Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between bodily comprehension and conscious understanding of 
other humans. This distinction offers an idea of the process of understanding animal 
experiences and it suggests a concept for naming the character of the meaning of animal 
behaviour. 
Bodily comprehension and understanding of other humans 
Exactly for the same reason as Dilthey (see chapter IV.2), Merleau-Ponty rejects the view 
that we know the experiences of others through some kind of reasoning by analogy: 
"C'est de la même manière que je comprends autrui. Ici encore, je n'ai que la trace d'une conscience qui 
m'échappe dans son actualité et, quand mon regard croise un autre regard, je ré-effectue l'existence 
étrangère dans une sorte de réflexion. Il n'y a rien là comme un "raisonnement par analogie". Scheler l'a 
bien dit, le raisonnement par analogie présuppose ce qu'il devait expliquer. L'autre conscience ne peut être 
déduite que si les expressions émotionelles d'autrui et les miennes sons comparées et identifiées et si les 
corrélations précises sont reconnues entre ma mimique et mes "faits psychiques". Or, la perceptions 
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d'autriu précède et rend possible de telles constatations, elles n'en sont pas constitutives." (PP, 404). 2 2 
In summary, Merleau-Ponty says that the argument from analogy is a logical procedure based 
on, rather than resulting in, the appearance of other bodies as humans. This is similar to 
Dilthey's view that the argument from analogy has to be justified by our factual 
understanding of humans and animals. With regard to other humans, Merleau-Ponty says that 
empathy (that is, an articulation of our bodily openness to the world) is the basis of their 
appearance to us as humans (N, p.281). This is also similar to Dilthey's view that the 
understanding of other humans is primarily a matter of empathy, namely reliving their 
experiences as if these were our own. 
Merleau-Ponty, however, emphasizes the bodily character of empathy. Empathy does 
not concern the understanding of someone's experiences, but the appearance of someone as 
an experiencing being: "re-enact the alien existence". As he says with regard to the 
understanding of human sexuality: "Il y a une "compréhension" erotique qui n'est pas de 
l'ordre de l'entendement puisque l'entendement comprends en apercevant une expérience sous 
une idée, tandis que le désir comprend aveuglément en reliant un corps à un corps." (PP, 
183).23 In this passage Merleau-Ponty sees the process of understanding, articulated by such 
authors as Dilthey and Gadamer, as founded in the body. The understanding of human 
sexuality is not primarily a matter of understanding sexual experiences within a cultural-
historical context, as for instance Dilthey would say. The understanding of sexuality is of 
another order, Merleau-Ponty holds. Sexuality is primarily comprehended by the body. The 
understanding of humans in the hermeneutical sense, namely within a cultural-historical 
context, is possible because we already are bodily situated in an intersubjective world (PP, 
pp.404-408). Thus, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between the bodily appearance and 
comprehension of other humans on the one hand and systematic, hermeneutic understanding 
of their expressions as cultural-historical on the other. 
"Mais est-ce bien autrui que nous obtenons ainsi?", Merleau-Ponty asks (PP, p.408).2 4 
His answer to this question is as follows: "Nous nivelons en somme le Je et le Tu dans une 
expérience à plusieurs, nous introduisons l'impersonnel au centre de la subjectivité, nous 
In the same way I understand the existence of other people. Here again I have only the trace of a 
consciousness which evades me in its actuality and, when my gaze meets another gaze, I re-enact 
the alien existence in a sort of reflection. There is nothing here resembling 'reasoning of analogy'. 
As Scheler so rightly declares, reasoning by analogy presupposes what is called on to explain. The 
other consciousness can be deduced only if the emotional expressions of others are compared and 
identified with mine, and precise correlations recognized between my physical behaviour and my 
'psychic events'. Now the perception of others is anterior to, and the condition of, such 
observations, the observations do not constitute the perception, (p.352) 
There is an erotic 'comprehension' not of the order of understanding, since understanding subsumes 
an experience, once perceived, under some idea, while desire comprehends blindly by linking body 
to body. (p. 157). 
But is it indeed other people that we arrive at in this way? (p.355). 
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effaçons l'individualité de perspectives, ..." (PP, p.408).2 5 In the bodily comprehension of 
another, we do not comprehend that "other" as another person or individual but as an 
impersonal subject. Merleau-Ponty uses the term impersonal also with regard to sleeping 
humans (PP, p. 191). Sleeping is an ambiguous life event. While sleeping we are not mere 
physical bodies because we are still able to hear the sound of the alarm. Nor are we 
consciously listening while sleeping. In order to designate that non-conscious ability, 
Merleau-Ponty uses the term impersonal: ".. .ce qui... rend possible le retour au monde vrai, 
ce ne sont encore que des fonctions impersonnelles: les organes des sens, le langage." (PP, 
p.191).2 6 It is this impersonal ability that also belongs to the concept of a subject. 
Seemingly, subjects are not only personal but also impersonal. / would say that the 
aforementioned distinction between bodily comprehension and hermeneutic understanding 
refers to other humans as respectively impersonal and personal subjects. 
The impersonal meaning of animal behaviour 
Many of the things just said can also be said with regard to animals. It is possible to 
distinguish between bodily comprehension of animals as experiencing beings, and 
understanding of their particular experiences. Concerning their apearance, Merleau-Ponty 
states: "La vie animale renvoie à notre sensible et à notre vie charnelle." (N, p.338).2 7 
Notwithstanding this resemblance between the bodily appearance of humans and animals, I 
see a difference between the understanding of humans and animals. From this difference I 
infer a different character of their experiences. 
With regard to humans, bodily comprehension is anterior to understanding as persons. 
Bodily comprehension of other humans presupposes that they are persons, although we do 
not comprehend them as such on this bodily level. With regard to life events such as human 
sleeping, Merleau-Ponty says these imply an existential step (PP, p. 191). Human sleeping 
implies awaking, to be a conscious person. Even when sleeping beside someone, we 'know' 
whether it is our partner or just a friend. Because of this implication, J think it better to use 
the term "pre-personal" with regard to humans. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, I would not speak 
of sleeping humans as impersonal subjects, but as pre-personal subjects. 
In animals, by contrast, our bodily comprehension of them as experiencing beings is not 
anterior to our understanding of them as personal beings because they cannot be persons. To 
be a person, or an "I", requires that one can see oneself as an experiencing being. Animals 
lack this capacity. Animals are able to experience but unable to reflect upon their 
What we do in effect is to iron out the I and the Thou in an experience shared by a plurality, thus 
introducing the impersonal into the heart of subjectivity and eliminating the individuality of 
perspectives (p.355-356). 
...that... makes possible a return to the real world, are still only impersonal functions, sense organs 
and language, (p. 164). 
Animal life reflects our own sensitivity and fleshly life. 
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experiences. In the case of animals, their experiences do not imply an existential step from 
a pre-personal to a personal way of being. In the next chapter about Plessner's philosophy 
of humans and animals, this difference between humans and animals will be explained more 
extensively. 
Merleau-Ponty also avoids writing about a personal meaning of animal expressions. 
Concerning organisms in general, he uses the term "signification vital" (vital meaning) (SC, 
p. 174). However, as we saw in the foregoing section, Merleau-Ponty is not very clear about 
possible differences between organisms, for example between micro-organisms, plants and 
animals. In not making such differences, it does not matter whether the expressed vital 
meaning is the meaning of experiences or not. I propose to use the designation "vital 
meaning " with regard to organisms in general and another, more specific term with regard 
to experiencing animals, to wit: "impersonal meaning'" . 2 8 The designation "impersonal 
meaning" conveys that animal expressions are similar to human expressions as expressions 
of experiences, but are also different from human expressions, insofar as they cannot be 
understood as personal expressions. 
5. Life: th i rd way between humans and non-living nature 
Classical hermeneuticists, like the later Dilthey and Gadamer, restrict meaningful experiences 
and their expressions to humans. They see meaning as personal, cultural and historical. Since 
animals are not personal, cultural and historical, it is impossible to understand them as 
expressing meaning, the inescapable conclusion seems to be. Animals belong to the domain 
of nature, which we can only explain causally or functionally. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
of life holds that all living beings are meaningfully related to their Umwelt, though in a way 
different from humans. He sees non-human life as intermediate between non-living nature and 
humans. 
Writing about human experiences of health and sickness, Gadamer emphasizes the bodily 
aspect of human experiences. These experiences, and actually all human experiences, are 
founded on their bodily way of being, he says. Human experiences are always experiences 
within a bodily and personal situation (see chapter V.2). The question, after having discussed 
Gadamer, was: can the animal bodily way of being also be seen as the basis of meaningful 
animal experience? In order to answer this question, the human bond to their bodies had to 
be clarified. Merleau-Ponty's concept of the ambiguous phenomenal body can be seen as an 
explication of the human boud to their bodies. Illustrated with many examples, he explains 
With regard to animals, Olkowski also writes in terms of an "impersonal existence" because 
animals do not express their own needs, but the needs of their species (Olkowski, 1982/1993, 
p. 100). In chapter IX and X of this book, the meaning of animal behaviour will also be related to 
their species. 
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how our bodily way of being in the world is the basis of all our experiences. Merleau-Ponty 
also explains why this bond to the body is "hard to describe". In Merleau-Ponty, the bond 
of human experiences with the body means that these experiences are primarily experiences 
by the phenomenal body. It is the phenomenal body that is hard to describe. We can only 
describe it in terms of physical body or in terms of consciousness, while it is both. 
The background of the previous question was that the bond to the body as the origin of 
experiences should be articulated more precisely. All living beings - and non-living beings 
as well - are in some sense bound to their body, while we do not say that, for example, 
viruses experience the world. With regard to this question, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of 
life is not clear. He never writes about non-human organisms in terms of experiences. If we 
might see perception as a type of experience, then all non-human organisms have 
experiences, because Merleau-Ponty's use of the Umwelt concept (of which perceptions are 
an element) covers all non-human organisms. He also says that in all organisms, some form 
of consciousness is present which expresses itself in their appearance. Merleau-Ponty does 
not say what type of intertwining of physical body and consciousness is the basis of 
experiences. As we will see in the next chapter, Plessner provides an answer to this question. 
Whether or not an expression of experiences, Merleau-Ponty holds that animal behaviour 
does have a meaning. This meaning is of another character than the meaning of human 
behaviour, however. Animal behaviour has a meaning, but is not in itself a meaning as 
distinct from its physical aspect, because animals are unable to distinguish between their own 
behaviour as physical and as meaningful phenomenon. As Merleau-Ponty says in La Nature, 
only human consciousness can escape from the phenomenal body, which is a requirement for 
making this distinction. In this sense the meaning of animal behaviour is dually bound to the 
body: it originates in the body and remains a bodily meaning. 
A consequence of this dually bodily bond is that we cannot conceptualize animal 
expressions as expressions of personal, cultural and historical meanings. To be personal, 
cultural and historical requires the ability to understand one's own and the expressions of 
others as meaningful, that is as distinct from their physical aspects. Animals lack this ability; 
only humans can make this distinction. / propose the notion of the impersonal meaning of 
animal expressions. This proposal is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's distinction between the 
bodily comprehension and the understanding of other humans, and by the resemblance 
between the bodily appearance of humans and especially higher ariimals as expressing 
experiences. 
CHAPTER VII 
PLESSNER: THE AMBIGUITY OF THE ANIMAL BODY 
75 
In this chapter I will discuss the philosophy of Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985). I see his 
philosophy as occupying an intermediate position between Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the 
human body and Buytendijk's philosophy of animals, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Especially because of the many professional and personal relations between Merleau-
Ponty, Plessner and Buytendijk, it is strange that Merleau-Ponty and Buytendijk hardly refer 
to Plessner in their writings.1 As we saw in the previous chapter, Merleau-Ponty extensively 
writes about the human body as the foundation of experience. He could easily have referred 
to Plessner for extending this idea to animals, who he now confuses with organisms in 
general. Buytendijk writes about the role of the body in animal as well as human experience. 
In order to give a basis to animal experience, however, he refers more to Merleau-Ponty's 
view on the human phenomenal body than to Plessner's view on animals. I consider 
Plessner's philosophy of life a sort of "missing link" between Merleau-Ponty and Buytendijk. 
Plessner extensively writes about the animal body as the foundation of experiences. More 
than Merleau-Ponty, he provides us with a way to conceptualize animal experience as 
intermediate between personal, cultural and historical human experience and the complete 
absence of experience. 
In this chapter, I will first describe Plessner's position in relation to philosophical 
hermeneutics and the philosophy of biology at the beginning of this century (VII. 1). In the 
second section, something will be said about the background, context, method and starting 
point of Plessner's philosophy of life (VTI.2), which I will then summarize (VU.3). I will pay 
special attention to the difference between animal and human experience in Plessner's 
philosophy. We will see that Plessner's philosophy about the experiencing animal body can 
be seen as an articulation of what Merleau-Ponty says about non-human organisms in 
general, although Merleau-Ponty's writings are of a later date (VU.4). In the last section, I 
will present Plessner's view on animal psychology, in which he explicitly mentions 
Buytendijk as a representative of what he sees as good animal psychology (VH.5). 
Plessner, Merleau-Ponty and Buytendijk knew each other professionally as well as personally. In the 
preface to the second edition of his book "Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" [The stages 
of organic and human beings] (1964), Plessner says that there certainly is a similarity between his 
own philosophy and that of Merleau-Ponty, but that this similarity is a coincidence (Plessner, 
1928/1975, p.xxiii). For Merleau-Ponty this was not a coincidence. He explicitly refers to Plessner 
(see, for instance, Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p.323). The relations between Buytendijk on the one 
hand, and Plessner and Merleau-Ponty on the other hand, are very clear. Buytendijk and Plessner 
wrote letters to each other, worked together for a while, and wrote an article together. Buytendijk 
had invited Plessner to the Netherlands after the latter's forced emigration from Germany in 1934. 
Buytendijk and Merleau-Ponty also wrote each other and met a few times (Struyker Boudier, 1993). 
In his writings, Buytendijk often refers to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. 
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References to Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch will be given by S, followed by the 
page(s). Regarding the used edition, see the reference list at the end of this book. 
1. Plessner's philosophical position 
Together with Scheler and Gehlen, Plessner is considered one of the founding fathers of 20th 
Century philosophical anthropology. They all defended a particular way of human being (der 
Sonderstellung der Mensch) as distinguished from an animal way of being. Plessner's aim 
of developing such a concept of humans was twofold: on the one hand he intended to give 
a criticism of purely biological views on humans which were popular at that time, and on the 
other hand he wanted to give a foundation to the philosophy of Geisteswissenschaften, 
especially as developed by Dilthey (S, chapter I; Plessner, 1961/1978, chapter l ) . 2 
Against a historicalizing concept of humans 
Within historical science at the end of 19th Century, a movement originated that saw human 
actions as belonging to particular cultural-historical contexts (see the later Dilthey, for 
instance). This movement criticized the idea that human actions belong to a development of 
humankind. Plessner did not contest this view on human actions. History is not an expression 
of a superhuman development, force or spirit, he said. History is a matter of historically 
changing, human minds. This view on human history assumes that humans are the 
historically changing, but nevertheless permanent actors, on the stage of history. We cannot 
speak of human history if the concept of humans also melts into the changing air of history. 
The concept of humans as historically changing requires a concept of a "human constant" 
as its foundation (Plessner, 1961/1978, pp.23-24). Plessner considered it the task of 
philosophical anthropology to develop such a concept. Plessner's philosophy of life provides 
such a concept of humans and, thereby, a foundation for the philosophy of the 
Geisteswissenschaften that sees human expressions as cultural and historical. 
Against biological concepts of humans 
At first sight, one might be inclined to say that the aforementioned human constant is the 
biological nature of humans, because this nature is the permanent factor throughout human 
history. However, Plessner criticizes the idea that human nature is human biological nature. 
He explicitly criticizes evolutionary and organic concepts of human nature. 
Plessner's criticism of evolutionary concepts of humans focuses on their view on human 
intelligence. Seen from the point of view of the evolution theory, humans are the outcome 
of and subjected to natural selection. Like other properties, intelligence is seen as a property 
by means of which organisms are able to adapt themselves to their environment. Many 
evolutionists say that intelligence is not a specific human property, but also belongs to 
animals. (See for instance Kohler's interpretation of his experiments to test the intelligence 
of chimpanzees which will be discussed in the next chapter.) 
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Plessner's criticism of this evolutionary view on human intelligence is that it denies human 
reason (Vernunft) by reducing humans to their bodies (Plessner, 1946/1983, p.53). In 
evolutionary theories, intelligence is conceived of as the ability to solve problems of 
adaptation, which exhibits itself in the organism's behaviour. Seen in this way, intelligence 
is a biological, namely behavioural, property which animals also possess. Animals are able 
to adapt themselves to their environment by means of intelligent, problem-solving behaviour. 
Humans, however, do not only adapt themselves to an environment, Plessner asserts; humans 
also have insight into their situation, on the basis of which they solve problems by creating 
their own cultural environment. Therefore, human reason, which elevates humans above the 
constraints of their natural environment, is not a biological category and is not subjected to 
natural selection. Human reason is a transbiological phenomenon, Plessner concludes 
(Plessner, 1946/1983, p.56). In his criticism of organic views on humans, it becomes clearer 
what Plessner means by 'transbiological phenomenon'. 
The organic view on humans which Plessner criticizes is that of Von Uexkull. We 
already reviewed Von UexkuH's concept of Umwelt in the previous chapter. Von Uexkull 
said that all living beings are living in an Umwelt. Their sensory and motor organs are 
related to each other in sensorimotor functional circles that fit in their environment which is 
called their Umwelt. One cannot see living beings as distinct from their Umwelt, he held. 
Living beings and their Umwelt form a unity. 
Plessner criticizes Von Uexkull because he sees also humans as living in a species-
specific Umwelt (Plessner, 1946/1983, pp.58-59). For Von Uexkull the human Umwelt is just 
one among many; Plessner, however, holds that the human Umwelt is not similar to those 
of plants and animals. The human Umwelt can contain the Umwelten of plants and animals, 
but not the other way around. Only humans describe and comprehend the Umwelten of plants 
and animals. The human way of being is not only a closed unity between humans and their 
Umwelt, but is also open to the Umwelt of others.3 
This answer to Von Uexkull unites Plessner's criticism of evolutionary and historical 
concepts of humans. Like plants and animals, humans are living in an Umwelt, albeit a 
cultural one. Unlike plants and animals, humans know that they (along with other humans 
and plants and animals) are living in an Umwelt. This knowledge transcends their Umwelt 
because it concerns a common, undetermined world that they can understand in different 
ways. Therefore, Plessner speaks of the human Welt (world) instead of the human Umwelt 
(Plessner, 1961/1978, pp.70-74). Now it is also clear what Plessner means by saying that 
human reason is transbiological. Human knowledge that they are living in an Umwelt cannot 
be explained biologically, because it includes biological knowledge. 
So far Plessner has-offered us nothing new in comparison to Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-
Ponty also writes about the human Welt instead of Umwelt because of the human openness 
Plessner has derived the idea of human openness to the world from Scheler's Die Stellung des 
Menschen im Kosmos (1928). 
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to their environment. Contrary to Merleau-Ponty, however, Plessner has developed a 
philosophy of life that distinguishes animals from plants, and that opens up the possibility of 
a concept of typically animal experiences. 
2. Introduction to Plessner's philosophy of life 
Plessner wants to found the philosophy of the Geisteswissenschaften by means of a 
philosophical anthropology that defends the particular way of human being. The questions 
of such a philosophical anthropology are the emergence of humans from non-human life, and 
the place of humans within the latter (S, p.36). Plessner says that a philosophy about the 
development of life is needed in order to answer these questions. In his book Die Stufen des 
Organischen und der Mensch [The stages of organic and human life] (1928), he developed 
such a philosophy. In this section, I will give some introductory remarks on this book so that 
my summary of it in the following section can be understood. 
Biological sciences and philosophy of life 
Every philosophical anthropology that defends a non-biological human nature meets the 
problem of the emergence of this human nature from non-human life. The biological sciences 
can only explain the emergence of humans as a new biological species; they cannot but use 
their own scientific vocabulary which is inadequate for explaining the emergence of a non-
biological human nature. Plessner asserts that this problem not only arises with regard to the 
emergence of a non-biological human nature, but also with regard to the emergence of the 
nature of plants and animals. The theory of evolution can only explain the development of 
organisms as a gradual, quantitative process. It cannot explain the qualitative development 
of life, that is, the transition from one form of life to another, such as from plants to 
animals. Only a philosophy of life can study and justify the categories and distinctions that 
biologists presuppose and use (S, p. 116). 
Plessner compares the difference between biological sciences and philosophy of life with 
the difference between the theories of colours by Newton and Goethe respectively. The 
quantitative, Newtonian theory of colours cannot explain the difference between red and 
green. Red and green are perceived colours, not perceived wave lengths. The Goethean 
theory of colours is about perceived colours, which Plessner considers just as real as 
Newton's wave lengths (S, pp.29-30). Likewise, Plessner's philosophy of life is a philosophy 
about the perceived distinctions between non-living and living beings, plants and animals, and 
animals and humans. Thus, the question of the emergence of life itself and the different forms 
of life, including non-biological humans, is not a scientific question for Plessner. He sees this 
as a philosophical question, namely of how to comprehend non-human and human life, and 
their transitions. 
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Various biological disciplines also study differences and transitions between plants, animals 
and humans. Biosystematics studies the properties of organisms in order to classify organisms 
into taxa, species, etc. Evolutionary biology studies the development of organisms and the 
origin and extinction of species. Plessner does not consider his philosophical concepts of 
forms of life and their transitions a criticism of or alternative to these biological sciences. His 
philosophical concepts articulate the presuppositions of these sciences. Contrary to the a 
posteriori classifications of the biological sciences that are based on observed properties of 
organisms, Plessner's philosophical classification is an a priori classification that precedes 
scientific observations (S, p.75). Let me explain this by an ordinary example, namely the 
question regarding the distinction between non-living and living beings. When I ask my 
students to establish this distinction, many of them answer that only living beings possess 
DNA. This is a scientific distinction based on an empirical property which non-living beings 
do not and living beings do possess. However, the presence of DNA as a distinguishing 
property is looked for, found or formulated only after one has already made a distinction 
between non-living and living beings. Plessner's philosophy of life concerns the grounds for 
this pre-scientific distinction. This does not mean that from his philosophical concepts of life 
and forms of life, scientific distinctions can and should be derived. As he says, his 
philosophical concepts make comprehensible the pre-scientific distinctions within science (S, 
p.236). 
As the example of DNA clearly shows, Plessner's philosophy of life is relatively 
independent of the changing biological sciences (S, pp. 117-118). Long before we knew about 
DNA, we made the distinction between non-living and living beings. Plessner's philosophy 
of life is also not totally independent of the biological sciences. Both refer to perceptions of 
living beings, although to differently perceived aspects. For example, a view on living beings 
as self-moving highlights another aspect of their motions than a mechanical view on them. 
Both types of perceptions should not be in contradiction with each other. Plessner holds that 
philosophy and science have to cooperate in order to comprehend their complex subject 
matter because it cannot be comprehended by philosophy or science alone (S, p.70). 
Ontology and phenomenology in Plessner's philosophy of life 
Plessner's philosophy of life is seen as a phenomenologically gained ontology (Corbey, 1988, 
pp.26-37; Redeker, 1995, pp.46-49). This philosophy aims at a description of the essential 
characteristics (Wesensmerkmale) of life and the different forms of life which it considers 
presupposed by the biological sciences. This clearly sounds ontological. Plessner gains 
knowledge of these characteristics through perceptions (Anschauungen) which differ from 
scientific perceptions (observations). For example, the double-aspect character of life (see 
below) refers to an observable and an anschauliches aspect. It does not refer to two 
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observable aspects such as the colour and length of a table. Because of this anschauliches 
aspect, Plessner himself calls his philosophical method phenomenological (S, pp.114-115).4 
Development of life: the coming out of an interior 
Unlike evolutionists, Plessner does not start his philosophy of life with single-celled 
organisms from which he derives the emergence of plants, animals and humans. He starts 
his philosophy of life by asking why we call certain beings living beings. For example, what 
is the essential characteristic of a motion for it to be called a vital motion, he asks. The 
essential characteristic of life should logically imply the essential characteristics of different 
forms of life (plants, animals and humans) as its manifestations (S, pp.114-115).5 
Plessner does not invent the essential characteristic of life out of the blue. The final aim 
of his philosophy of life is to understand the emergence of human nature from non-human 
nature, and the place of humans within the latter. Plessner agrees with philosophers of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, especially Dilthey, about their concept of humans. As we saw in 
chapter IV, Dilthey's concept of humans states that humans express inner experiences in their 
outer behaviour and artefacts. Plessner's philosophy of life aims at comprehending the 
emergence, from non-human forms of life, of this typical human relation between interior 
and exterior. Therefore, the relation between interior and exterior is a central theme in his 
philosophy of life. In the next section, we will see that Plessner generally sees the 
development of life as an increasing coming out of an interior of living beings. 
3. Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch 
The ambiguity of life 
The first question of every philosophy of life is always: what is the distinction between non-
living and living beings? Plessner's answer is that this distinction exists in the different ways 
4 Usually philosophers relate phenomenology to Husserl, who primarily puts reality aside in order to 
abstract essences from our perceptions of reality. Husserl's philosophy is called an idealistic 
philosophy because it concerns the essence of our human ideas. Plessner, Merleau-Ponty and 
Buytendijk say that their philosophy is not about the essence of our ideas, but about the essence of, 
for example, humans and animals as expressed in their appearance. One can immediately agree 
with people who say that these essences are our concepts and ideas too. But the difference between 
both kinds of phenomenology is most strikingly expressed by Merleau-Ponty when he states that his 
phenomenology, contrary to Husserl's idealism, attempts to preserve the relation between our 
perceptions and the perceived world (VI, p.49 and p.61). 
5 'Logically imply' should not be read as derivable according to the rules of deductive logic. 
'Logically' must be understood as conceptually. The philosophical concept of life in general should 
be formulated in such terms that each of its successive differentiations are determined in a step-by-
step way. Because of this line of reasoning, Plessner says that his philosophical method can also be 
called dialectical. But because his philosophy of life concerns essential characteristiscs of life as 
apparent and perceived characteristics, he prefers to call his method phenomenological (see above). 
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in which the boundary with the environment is established. With regard to non-living things, 
their boundaries are spatial between body and environment. They belong neither to the body 
nor to the environment but are an empty in-between. At the boundary of a stone, the stone 
ends and its environment begins. Organisms, by contrast, realize their own boundary so that 
their boundary also belongs to themselves. Plants realize their own boundary by growing; 
animals also realize their own boundary by moving (S, pp.99-105). Plessner calls this 
characteristic of living beings their "positionality ": organisms position themselves in relation 
to their environment (S, pp. 127-132). With regard to life in general, Plessner writes in terms 
of "self and "subject" (see, for instance, S, p. 187). On this general level, however, these 
terms should not be understood as "conscious subject", but as "non-spatial centre" that 
controls the spatiality of the body whose centre it is (Grene, 1965, pp.90-91). As we will 
see, the selves of different forms of life are articulations of this abstract concept of self. 
Because of their positionality, living beings have a double-aspect character. On the one 
hand, they are a physical body like non-living things, and are spatially bounded off from the 
environment. On the other hand, living beings are a self that has a body and that gives this 
body a place in the environment. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, living beings appear as 
ambiguous: as spatial bodies and as expressions of a non-spatial self. It is this ambiguity of 
living beings that is apparent in the boundary with the environment. The boundary between 
organisms and their environment is not only a spatial boundary, but also an expression of a 
non-spatial self. In terms of interior and exterior, the exterior of non-living things is the 
spatial boundary between body and environment. With regard to living beings, this spatial 
boundary is the expression of a non-spatial interior as well. Here we run up against the two 
aforementioned, different kinds of perceptions of living beings. Scientific observations are 
perceptions of only one aspect of the appearance of organisms, namely as spatial bodies. 
Phenomenological perceptions also include the second aspect of their appearance, namely as 
expressive bodies. 
Positionality is the essential characteristic of life in general. Plessner elaborates this 
general characteristic further so that it generates the characteristics of three forms of life. 
These forms logically follow each other, and correspond with the way of being of plants, 
animals and humans respectively. 
Open and closed positionality 
Because of the spatial boundary with their environment, both non-living and living beings are 
closed. However, living beings are also open to their environment. They themselves realize 
and change their own boundaries with their environment. 'Closed' and 'open' do not refer 
to the exchange of matter and energy between beings and their environment, but refer to 
different ways in which the boundary between beings and their environment is established. 
Because living beings are both closed and open, in all living beings there is a conflict 
between their closedness as physical bodies and their openness as organisms, Plessner says. 
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He formulates different ways that solve this conflict, namely different types of organization 
which correspond with different forms of life (S, pp.218-219). 
The first distinction that Plessner makes is between the form of life of plants and 
animals: 
"Auf zweierlei Weise ist der Ausgleich [zwischen Organisation und Körperlichkeit - SL] möglich, in 
offener und in geschlossener Form. Findet der Ausgleich in offener Form statt, so liegt eine Pflanze vor, 
findet er in geschlossener Form statt, so zeigt das lebendige Ding die Merkmale des Tieres." (S, p.219).6 
He defines an open form of life as follows: "Offen ist diejenige Form, welche den 
Organismus in allen seinen Lebensäußerungen unmittelbar seiner Umgebung eingliedert und 
ihn zum unselbständigen Abschnitt des ihm entsprechenden Lebenskreises macht." (S, 
p.219).7 An open form means that there is a direct (unmediated) contact between the 
organism and its surrounding environment at the surface of the organism. One can say that 
this is always the case. At the surface of a stone or human skin, there is also direct contact 
with the surrounding environment. In the passage just quoted, however, Plessner does not 
write about an organism as a physical body. He writes about an "organism in all its 
manifestations of life", that is about an organism expressing its living self. By an 
"unmediated insertion into its environment" Plessner means that the relation between the 
physical body of plants (about which he is writing now) and their environment is not 
mediated by a self, as it is in the case of animals and humans the self of plants coincides with 
their spatial, physical body(see below) (S, pp.219-226). An example of this method of 
organization is the length and degree of branching of roots. Plants form their own roots 
under direct environmental influences. The length and degree of branching are directly 
related to the presence and amount of water and nutrients in the soil. Contrary to stones, of 
which the shape is also directly influenced by its environment, the plant itself grows. 
Therefore, one can - in a non-physical aspect - see the shape of the roots of plants as an 
expression of the plant's self. 
Actually, one cannot speak of an interior of plants, Plessner says, because plants lack 
a mediating centre. The self of plants "lies" directly "in" their exterior, i.e., in their spatial, 
physical body (S, p.225 and p.231). Plessner writes these words in quotation marks because 
he does not mean to say that the self of plants lies inside their physical body. As said, the 
self of plants and their spatial, physical body coincide. Hence, one cannot say that the self 
of plants is an interior self which expresses itself in their exterior. The self of plants is solely 
There are two possible ways of compromising [between organization and being a physical body -
SL], namely an open and a closed form. If the compromise is of an open form, one finds a plant. 
If the compromise is of a closed form, the living being has the characteristics of an animal. 
That form is open which, in an unmediated way, inserts the organism in all its manifestations of 
life into its environment and makes the organism a dependent section of its corresponding life 
circle. 
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an aspect of their exterior. The ambiguity of plants consists of the double-aspect of their 
appearance: in one aspect they appear as spatial and physical bodies, and in another aspect 
as exterior selves. 
About a closed form of life Plessner says: "Geschlossen ist diejenige Form, welche den 
Organismus in allen seinen Lebensaußerungen mittelbar seiner Umgebung eingliedert und ihn 
zum selbständigen Abschnitt des ihm entsprechenden Lebenskreises macht." (S, p.226).8 A 
closed way of organization means that the unmediated contact at the surface - in the 
foregoing sense - loses its importance in favour of a mediated contact through a self. Here, 
"mediated" has two meanings. Firstly, it means that the contact between an animal (because 
that is what Plessner is writing about now) and his environment is mediated by a self that 
does not coincide with his spatial, physical body. Secondly, it means that the body mediates 
between the animal self and its environment. The mediating animal self appears as inside or 
behind the physical animal body, and as possessing this body. Again, "inside" and "behind" 
should not be read as spatially inside or behind the physical body. Although the animal self, 
unlike the self of plants, can be thought of as distinct from the physical body, yet it is bound 
to it (S, pp.226-236). As Merleau-Ponty would say, the animal self cannot escape from the 
body (see chapter VI.3). 
Unlike the self of plants, the animal self does not appear as a mere aspect of the 
exterior, but as constituting this exterior. In animals, there is a distinction between sensory 
and motor organs which creates what Plessner calls a "hiatus" (S, p.249). For example, bats 
perceive echo waves with their ears, but react to them by flying in another direction. The 
animal centre fills up this hiatus by mediating between the bats' perceptions of the 
environment and their motor actions in the environment (S, pp.226-234). 
The foregoing explanation of the animal self concerns only higher animals. In lower 
animals (i.e., animals without a central nervous system) the organization of sensory and 
motor organs takes place on the level of separate sensorimotor functional circles. Each of 
these circles has a centre that mediates between these organs. Referring to Von Uexküll, 
Plessner says that animals with a decentralized way of organization are "republics of 
reflexes" in which the separate reflexes occur entirely autonomously (S, pp.245-248).9 With 
regard to these animals, Plessner speaks of an "ausgeschaltetem Subjekt" (a switched off 
subject) (S, p.245). In higher animals with a central nervous system, the organization of 
8 That form is closed which in a mediated way inserts an organism in all its manifestations of life 
into its environment and which makes it to an independent section of its corresponding life circle. 
9 An autonomous occurring of law-like reflexes might seem to be in contradiction to a mediating 
centre, for which there seems to be no need in reflexes. However, in Plessner and Von Uexkull, 
law-like behaviour and an organizing center do not exclude each other. An organizing center is 
needed as soon as sensory and motor organs are separated. The mere presence of a mediating 
center does not say anything yet about the way in which it mediates, law-like or otherwise (S, 
p.263). 
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sensory and motor organs takes place on the level of the whole organism. There is no one-to-
one relation between perceptions and actions of these animals. Their sensory organs are more 
differentiated than those of lower animals. Hence, there is a surplus of perceptions which has 
to be related to motor organs and actions. This is centrally done by a subject (S, p.249). As 
Plessner also says, just as the brains of animals are the centre of their physical body, so their 
self is the centre of their Leib, i.e., their experiencing and acting body (S, pp.244-245). Only 
animals with a central nervous system have a central self that coincides with their bodily 
centre (S, pp. 288-293). 
With regard to animals, one can speak of an interior self. As has been said, in all living 
beings their exterior also appears as a self, though in different ways. The self of plants is an 
aspect of their apparent exterior. The self of animals is an interior self that is expressed in 
their apparent exterior. The ambiguity of animals consists of their appearance to us as, in one 
aspect, a spatial and physical body and, in another aspect, an expression of an interior self. 
In Plessner's account of the animal form of life, we clearly recognize the Umwelt theory 
of Von Uexkiill about the relation between organisms and their environment. What Plessner 
calls the animal self is comparable with what Von Uexkiill called the Gegenwelt 
(counterwork!), which closes functional circles by mediating between sensory and motor 
organs. The Gegenwelt is the inner counterpart of the outer Umwelt because it relates 
perceptions and motivations to act in the Umwelt to each other (Von Uexkiill, 1920, p.96). 
Because of these functional circles, animals are closed, both Von Uexkiill and Plessner say. 
With regard to animals, the meaning of 'closed' differs from its meaning with regard to non-
living beings. Between non-living beings and their environment there is only a spatial 
boundary. Animals are closed off from their environment by the organization of their body 
into closed functional circles. Because the relations between animals and their environment 
(contrary to those of plants) are mediated by a Gegenwelt, animals are more autonomous in 
relation to their environment. Therefore, we see animal movements not only as going along 
with the environment, like the movements of a plant, but also as movements out of the 
animal self. 
Now we see why we can better restrict the Umwelt theory to animals, namely because 
only animals have specialized sensory and motor organs. As we saw in chapter VI, Merleau-
Ponty, like Von Uexkiill, applied the Umwelt theory to all living beings. In plants, however, 
perceptions and actions are not separated and, thus, do not need to be related to each other 
through a Gegenwelt. As Plessner says, plants react to their environment in an unmediated 
way. 
Now we can also understand that the open and closed way of organization are the 
successive stages of the appearance of an interior. The self of plants is an aspect of their 
body, while an animal's self is already seen as distinct from its body. Compared to the self 
of plants, the animal self is more autonomous, more independent of its physical body, though 
still bound to it. Because of this relatively autonomous self of animals, Plessner speaks of 
animals as being a body (Korper) and as having a body (Leib). Being a body means being 
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a physical body. The animal Leib, by contrast, is the living body that the animal self has. 
(See also Merleau-Ponty's statement in the foregoing chapter that moving our body is moving 
our phenomenal body rather than a self moving its physical body.) Plessner also formulates 
the ambiguous way in which animals appear to us in the term "Korperleib ": both being a 
physical body in an environment and having a Leib that mediates between self and Umwelt 
(S, pp.239-240). 
Centric and excentric positionality 
Although we speak in terms of the animal self and the animal body, the animal self and body 
are not distinct from each other, Plessner says. We can only think of them as distinct. The 
self of animals remains bound to the body. The animal self is a bodily self. Only in higher 
animals we see that the gap between their self and their body becomes wider (Grene, 1965, 
p. 100). The next stage of life follows logically, namely a self that is not bound to the body. 
This is the human form of life. Only humans have a self which is distinct from their body. 
This self is the human T . Humans have a centre that does not coincide with their bodily 
self, but which knows it has a bodily centre. Thus, the human body is not the only centre 
of a human's life. Plessner calls this human form of life "excentric". 
Usually, the ambiguity of humans is seen in a Cartesian way. Cartesians see humans as 
made up of a physical body (res extensa) and a reflective or conscious "I" (res cogitans). 
This is not what Plessner means by the typical human ambiguity. Although humans have a 
reflective "I" distinct from their bodily centre, it is not separated from the bodily self. The 
"I" is the -in itself incomprehensible - place and timeless "point of refuge" of the bodily self 
(S, p.290). The typical human ambiguity consists in being an "I" and being a Korperleib (S, 
p.292).1 0 This is in line with Merleau-Ponty's view on the human way of being: 
intertwining of the animal way of being and reason (see chapter VI.3). Plessner, however, 
would say that human reason cannot really escape from the body. 
Given the distinction between centric and excentric positionality, it is clear that the 
human "I" is the next stage in the coming out of the self of living beings. The self of plants 
cannot be thought of as separated from their spatial and physical appearance; it is solely an 
aspect of their appearance. The animal self is an aspect of their bodily appearance too, but 
in another way, namely as an interior self that expresses itself in their bodily appearance. In 
humans, this bodily self partly escapes from their body, namely as an "I" that is able to 
distance itself from the body to which it nevertheless remains bound. 
Actually Plessner says that the human ambiguity consists of being a soul and a Korperleib, the soul 
being the given, shaped, human inneworld (see below). In order to explain Plessner's concept of 
animal experience, I can and will neglect these distinctions concerning the human inner world. 
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Plessner considers the excentric positionality the last stage of life. It is the last stage in the 
coming out of the self of living beings.11 In the philosophy of consciousness one often meets 
a regressio ad infinitum: if humans are conscious of themselves, they are also conscious of 
this consciousness, and so on. Along this line of reasoning there is a super-reflective "I" that 
reflects upon the reflective "I", a super-super-reflective "I", and so on. Plessner, however, 
rejects this reasoning because it sees the reflective "I" as separated from the body. He sees 
the T as still bound to its body as the Körperleib from which it originates. It is not 
constituted by a super-"I", but is, as "point of refuge", given with the excentric positionality. 
For example, the conscious bodily act of grasping something is not constituted by another 
conscious act, but grasping something consciously is given with the human way of life 
(Redeker, p. 134; S, p.300). 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Plessner's aim was to found the philosophy of the 
Geisteswissenschaften on a philosophical anthropological basis that defends the particular way 
of human being. How Plessner sees this Sonderstellung of humans has been discussed above. 
It serves as a philosophical foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften by means of what 
Plessner calls "the law of natural artificiality" (S, pp.309-321). This law states: "Als 
exzentrisch organisiertes Wesen muß er sich zu dem, was er schon ist, erst machen" (S, 
p.309).1 2 With regard to animals, their self, Körperleib and Umwelt are a natural unity in 
the sense of given with their way of being. The animal self coincides with its Körperleib, 
which forms a unity with its Umwelt. With regard to humans, this unity has been broken 
down. It is a part of human nature to have lost this natural unity. This ontologically given, 
broken unity is the origin of human culture, Plessner asserts, because humans have to restore 
the unity of their Körperleib and Umwelt in an artificial way. They must do this because the 
human self is still bound to its Körperleib and Umwelt. This does not mean that humans can 
or should restore a lost, natural unity. Humans cannot but create a unity with their 
Körperleib and Umwelt in an artificial, cultural way, Plessner states. As will be seen below, 
human culture does not express itself only in a cultural external world, such as buildings and 
artefacts, but also in a cultural human inner world. 
" De Mul sees one more possibility of the coming out of the human self by means of virtual reality 
techniques (De Mul, 1995). In these techniques, the self is an unbodily self. By means of virtual 
reality techniques, it could, for instance, be possible to experience a holiday on a beach behind the 
computer screen without actually being there bodily. 
1 2 As an excentric being he has to make himself into what he already is. 
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4. The nature of animal and human experiences 
In the philosophy of classical hermeneuticists such as in Gadamer and Dilthey's later 
writings, the problem with speaking of animal experiences is that experiences and their 
expressions are conceived of as cultural-historical or linguistic. Since classical 
hermeneuticists do not see animals as cultural-historical or linguistic, the conceptualization 
of animal experiences is almost impossible (see Intermediate Reflections 2). Plessner wanted 
to found a philosophy that sees human experiences and expressions as cultural-historical. 
Because he did not equate human experience with experience in general, his ideas resulted 
in a conceptualization of animal experiences that are neither cultural-historical nor linguistic. 
The human inner world 
As expected, Plessner's view on human experiences as distinguished from animal experiences 
must be seen in the light of his concepts of excentric and centric positionality. Because of 
their excentric positionality, humans have a three-fold world, Plessner says. They have an 
outer world (the world of objects), an inner world (the world of inner experiences) and a 
social world (the world of social relations) (S, p.293). Above I have distinguished the human 
world from the animal Umwelt. Actually, I only wrote about the human outer world, which 
humans perceive and in which they act. I will explain Plessner's view on the human inner 
world by comparing it with the human outer world. 
For humans, the outer world has two aspects: it is the place where they bodily live (the 
cultural Umwelt) and it is the world upon which they reflect (the reality consisting of things 
in space and time). Similarly, the human inner world has two aspects: the inner world as 
bodily lived (Erlebnisse) and as given to the reflective "I" (the psychic reality) (S, pp.295-
296).1 3 Pain, for example, has two aspects: feeling pain and being conscious of pain. 
Plessner, criticizes the view that assumes that a bodily experience such as bodily pain 
is absolutely given to the reflective "I". Reflecting upon bodily experiences often 
simultaneously changes these experiences: "Unter den Blicken des Erlebnissubjekts kann sich 
das Innenleben stark veranderen wie die empfindliche Schicht der photographischen Platten 
im Licht." (S, 297).1 4 Just as the Umwelt in which humans bodily live is cultural because 
it is created by them, the inner world which humans bodily experience is cultural as well. 
This view on human experiences is in line with Dilthey's later view that human experiences 
are culturally acquired. 
1 3 In the chapter about Dilthey, I translated Erlebnisse as "lived experiences", but from now on I will 
translate this term as "bodily experiences" in order to emphasize their bodily bound character. 
1 4 In the eyes of the experiencing subject, inner life can change as much as the sensitive layer of a 
photographic film changes in light. 
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Such a privilege of the position of the self would only be right if humans would be solely 
centrically positioned living beings and not, as is the case, excentrical. Regarding animals, it is 
right to say that they totally are themselves in the position of their self. Animals are positioned in 
their positional center. Regarding humans, however, the law of excentricity applies, which states 
that their here-and-now being, which means their being caught up in lived experiences, no longer 
coincides with their existence. Even in thinking, feeling or willing, humans are positioned outside 
themselves. 
This view on animal experience is opposed to that of Carruthers', a contemporary philosopher of 
animal consciousness. Carruthers also says that only humans are reflecting beings who are able to 
be conscious of something. But Carruthers considers this a reason to say that animals, because they 
cannot be conscious of pain, do not feel pain. Animals only have pain, he says (Carruthers, 1992). 
In line with Plessner, I would say that Carruthers over-emphasizes the reflective, conscious aspect 
Animal experiences 
Plessner does not discuss the issue of animal experiences explicitly. In his explication of the 
central subjective organization of perceptions and actions in animals with a central nervous 
system, he always uses the term "consciousness". In his explication of the human inner 
world, he mentions animal Erlebnisse sometimes, namely when he compares humans to 
animals. From this comparison I will derive a concept of animal experience as bodily, here-
and-now experience. 
Plessner's criticism of the view that assumes that human bodily experiences are 
absolutely given is as follows: 
"Mit einem derartigen Vorzug der Selbststellung hätte es jedoch nur dann seine Richtigkeit, wenn der 
Mensch ein ausschließlich zentrisch gestelltes und nicht, wie es der Fall ist, ein exzentrisches Lebewesen 
wäre. Für das Tier ist der Satz richtig, daß es in Selbstellung ganz es selber ist. Es ist in die positionale 
Mitte gestellt und geht darin auf. Für den Menschen dagegen gilt das Gesetz der Exzentrizität, wonach 
sein im Hier-Jetzt Sein, d.h. sein Aufgehen im Erleben nicht mehr in den Punkt seiner Existenz fällt. 
Sogar im Vollzug des Gedankens, des Gefühls, des Willens steht der Mensch außerhalb seiner selbst." (S, 
p.298).1 5 
I interpret this passage as saying that animals, contrary to humans, are caught up in their 
bodily lived experiences. Because humans also are an "I" that reflects upon and transforms 
their bodily lived experiences (see above), they are not caught up in them. In other words, 
animal experiences just occur without the animals knowing that they occur. We must relate 
the phrase "here-and-now being" in the above quoted passage to the absence of an "I". 
Though bound to it, the human "I" does not coincide with its bodily self, i.e., its bodily 
experiences. The "I" that says "I move" is not the moving self. The place and timeless "I" 
(see above) knows of its own bodily, here-and-now lived experiences. For example, bodily 
felt pain is here and now, but being conscious of pain is not located somewhere. Animals, 
however, have only a bodily-bound self. / would say that animals have only here-and-now, 
bodily lived experiences.16 Unlike human bodily experiences, animal bodily experiences are 
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absolutely given. There is no reflective "I" that can transform them. (See also Buytendijk 
about animal and human pain in chapter VJJJ..2.) 
The conceptualization of animal experiences as bodily here-and-now experiences, which 
I inferred from Plessner's philosophy, is more positive than the one given after having 
discussed Merleau-Ponty, which was that animal experiences are impersonal, bodily 
experiences. The latter conceptualization is negative in the sense that it only says that animal 
experiences cannot be seen and understood as personal experiences within a cultural-historical 
context. Plessner has further elaborated animal experiences, in a way that is not in 
contradiction with Merleau-Ponty's view on animals. The concept of animal bodily, here-and-
now experiences implies that animals only experience their Umwelt and Leib as given at a 
particular time and at a particular place. 
At the end of the previous chapter, I said that animal experiences are dually tied to the 
body: they originate in the body and remain bound to the body. After having discussed 
Plessner, this bodily connection needs to be specified. As we saw, human experiences remain 
tied to the body too, because the human "I" - which transforms bodily experiences - remains 
bound to the body. Animal experiences are in another sense bodily-bound. They do not only 
originate in the body and remain bound to the body, but they also remain bodily experiences. 
These experiences cannot be reflected upon and transformed by an unbodily "I". Animals 
only experience their given Umwelt and Leib from the point of view of their body. 
5. Animal psychology 
In Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch Plessner makes a few remarks about the 
knowledge of animal experiences and animal psychology which existed at the time of his 
writing. He says that animal psychology has to steer a middle course between the Scylla of 
excluding research into animal consciousness and the Charybdis of anthropomorphism (S, 
p.68). Like Merleau-Ponty, Plessner sees animal behaviour in one aspect as a physical, 
causal phenomenon, and in another aspect as conscious phenomenon (Korperleib). Animal 
psychology should cover both aspects. It should not exclude animal consciousness and restrict 
itself to behaviour as a matter of stimulus-response. Neither should it make statements about 
animal consciousness irrespective of the physical aspects of animal behaviour as is done "on 
animal protection calendars and by fairy-tale tellers" (S, p.261). Steering the middle course 
is possible by what Plessner calls "eine objektive Disziplinierung der Interpretation" (an 
objective disciplining of interpretation) (S, p.261). In order to know animals as expressing 
of pain and pain feelings and neglects their non- or pre-reflective, bodily aspect. 
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experiences, animal psychology must also include methodical interpretation17. Without such 
interpretation, we only know animals as physical bodies: "Ohne derartige 
Interpretationsversuche unterscheidet sich Tierpsychologie in nichts von Reiz- en 
Bewegungsphysiologie bzw. vergleichender Biologie im Sinne einer physiologisch arbeitenden 
Lebensplanforschung, deren Programm Uexküll aufgestellt hat." (S, p.261).1 8 Plessner 
mentions Köhler and Buytendijk as representatives of an interpretative animal psychology (S, 
p.69). They do experimental research into animal behaviour, but are at the same time fully 
aware that this behaviour is also an expression of animal experiences and thus needs to be 
interpreted. In the following chapter, we will see how Buytendijk combined experimental 
research with animals with an interpretation of their behaviour as an expression of 
experiences. We will also see that Buytendijk is not very clear about his own method of 
interpretation. In the subsequent chapter I will, therefore, present a systematic sketch of a 
method for interpreting animal behaviour in order to make this "objective and disciplined". 
Actually Plessner says that animal consciousness rather than animal experiences should be the 
subject matter of animal psychology (S, p.68). 
Without such attempts at interpretation, animal psychology cannot be distinguished from stimulus-
response physiology or comparative biology in the form of research into life plans on a 
physiological basis, the programme of which has been formulated by Uexkûll. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
BUYTENDIJK: UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING 
OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 
Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk (1887-1974), a Dutch physiologist, did what the 
philosopher Plessner did not: namely, research into animal experiences. Plessner and 
Buytendijk knew each other's work. Buytendijk's work is even seen as "[giving] concrete 
body to Plessner's philosophical theory" (Grene, 1965, p. 178). In this chapter we will see 
that this concerns Plessner's philosophy of the distinction between the animal and the human 
way of being and, therefore, the difference between animal and human experience. In his 
books and articles written before World War U, Buytendijk regularly refers to Plessner. 
When Merleau-Ponty starts to publish, however, he hardly refers to Plessner any more but 
mostly to Merleau-Ponty, even in his writings about animals. This is remarkable because, 
as we saw in chapter VI, Merleau-Ponty is not very clear about the animal body and animal 
experience. 
In this chapter, I will first expound Buytendijk's view on the vital meaning of 
phenomena of life as distinguished from the personal, cultural and historical meaning of 
human expressions (VIJI.l). The main part of this chapter will consist of a discussion of a 
few examples of his interpretations of animal behaviour (VTU.2). At the end, I will give 
some conclusions and comments with regard to Buytendijk's interpretative approach of 
animals (VD3.3). 
1. The vital meaning of phenomena of life 
Buytendijk's criticism of the natural sciences of animals 
Contrary to the authors discussed in the previous chapters, Buytendijk was not a philosopher; 
he was a physiologist by training. Though himself an experimental scientist of human and 
animal behaviour, Buytendijk criticized the monopoly of natural-scientific, physiological 
explanations of behaviour. 
At the beginning of Buytendijk's scientific career, in the early 20th Century, causal 
explanations of human and animal behaviour by means of the concept of reflex were very 
popular. Buytendijk conceived of reflexes as invariable, innate or engraved pathways between 
sensory stimuli and motor responses connected by nerves (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, pp. 1-6; 
Buytendijk & Plessner, 1935, pp. 156-157). In a jointly written article, Buytendijk and 
Plessner criticize Pavlov's reflex theory of behaviour. They say that this theory does not 
actually explain observed behaviour. It only gives names to it, namely "stimuli" and 
"responses" (Buytendijk & Plessner, 1935). Buytendijk and Plessner consider the explanation 
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provided by the reflex theory (that neurophysiological processes causally determine 
behaviour) a purely hypothetical assumption. They also consider the assumption of the reflex 
theory, namely that a locatable center controls animal and human behaviour, an "imaginary 
metaphor" (Buytendijk & Plessner, 1935, p. 164). This criticism must be read in the light of 
the time of writing. At the beginning of this century, neurophysiology was less developed 
than now. Now it is possible to test many of the theoretical assumptions by means of 
experiments. However, the main point of Buytendijk and Plessner's criticism does not concern 
the untestable character of the reflex theory. It states that the use of words such as "arousal" 
and "inhibition" confuses behaviour as a meaningless event with meaningful behaviour 
(Buytendijk & Plessner, 1935, p. 166). This criticism can also be given of empirically testable 
and tested neurophysiological explanations. Thirty years later Buytendijk offers the same 
criticism of cybernetic models of animal and human behaviour. These models conceive of 
animal and human behaviour as determined by causal feedback mechanisms rather than as 
subjectively - and therefore meaningfully regulated - behaviour (Buytendijk, 1965, chapter 
CI; Buytendijk & Christian, 1963). 
Buytendijk's criticism of natural-scientific explanations of behaviour might suggest that 
he totally rejects them in favour of understanding the meaning of behaviour, but this is not 
true. Buytendijk consistently speaks of explanation as well as understanding of behaviour. 
He is not clear, however, about the relationship between explanation and understanding of 
animal behaviour. In different books and articles, he writes differently about this relationship 
(see, for example, the difference between Buytendijk 1965, pp.83-84 and pp.229-252). The 
most promising view to start with is the one once given by Buytendijk himself. This view 
sees explanation and understanding as concerning two different knowable aspects of 
behaviour that cannot be studied simultaneously. One aspect concerns the (explainable) 
material conditions of behaviour, the other the (understandable) meaning of behaviour 
(Buytendijk, 1965, pp.83-84). This is similar to Merleau-Ponty's view that we know human 
bodies either as physical bodies or as expressions of meaning. 
Life sciences alongside natural and human sciences 
Buytendijk's view on animal behaviour as meaningful behaviour fits into his view on non-
human life in general. Like Merleau-Ponty, Buytendijk says that all phenomena of life 
express a vital meaning. This meaning should be the subject matter of the life sciences 
(Buytendijk, 1938a, p.208; Buytendijk, 1948, p.35; Buytendijk, 1965, pp.78-79). Here 
Buytendijk positions himself against the classical hermeneutical concept of meaning and the 
dualism of explanatory, natural sciences and understanding, hermeneutical sciences. A 
dualistic world view forms the basis of this dualism within classical hermeneutics. It asserts 
that the world consists of experiencing humans, whose expressions are meaningful, and non-
experiencing and thereby meaningless non-human nature (see Intermediate Reflections 2). 
Buytendijk does not agree with this dualistic world view. He distinguishes between 
meaningless non-living nature, living nature that bears a meaning, and humans who give 
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meaning to the world (Buytendijk, 1938a, p.94-95). All phenomena of life (plants and 
animals but also bodily phenomena in humans such as breathing) have a meaning, though 
this meaning is not consciously experienced. He calls this meaning the "vital meaning". By 
means of this concept Buytendijk distinguishes phenomena of life from - in itself meaningless 
- non-living nature as well as from meaningful human expressions. 
Concerning the meaning of human expressions, Buytendijk agrees with classical 
hermeneuticists. It is typical for humans that the meaning of their expressions can be 
conscious and thematic, he says, whence this meaning is personal, cultural and historical. 
The subject matter of the Geisteswissenschaften consists of these personal, cultural and 
historical meanings, so that the Geisteswissenschaften truly are humanities (Dekkers, 1985, 
pp. 176-177). Buytendijk, however, does not consider the Geisteswissenschaften to have an 
exclusive right to understanding. To be true life sciences rather than sciences of only the 
material aspects of life, the life sciences should be directed at understanding the vital 
meaning of phenomena of life (Buytendijk, 1925). Buytendijk wanted to reintroduce 
organisms as subjects into the life sciences - but without identifying non-human living beings 
with humans and the life sciences with the Geisteswissenschaften (Thinés & Zayan, 1975, 
p.86).1 Later we will see what the consequences are of this category of non-human subjects, 
in addition to human subjects, for the understanding of animal experiences. 
Vital meaning 
Although Buytendijk says: "Nicht dass gedeutet bzw. verstanden werden muss, ist eine Crux 
der Wissenschaft, sondern wie." (Buytendijk & Plessner, 1935, p.166)2,1 think it must first 
be justified that there exists some meaning for the life sciences to understand. This requires 
a clarification of Buytendijk's concept of 'vital meaning', which we also need for a clear 
insight into the meaning of animal behaviour. 
I will first explain this concept by saying how it must not be understood, namely by 
distinguishing it from the meaning of machines, the evolutionary meaning of phenomena of 
life and the meaning of human expressions; then I will give a more positive description of 
it. 
Organized and self-organizing structures 
Buytendijk always relates the vital meaning to the concept of function (see Buytendijk, 1948, 
pp.31-32). For explaining the difference between living beings and machines with regard to 
their function, Buytendijk focuses on living beings as self-organizing structures and machines 
as organized structures. 
The introduction of living beings as subjects into the life sciences is called a "réintroduction" 
because in earlier times, for example with Aristotle, living beings (and non-living beings as well) 
were seen as subjects because of their self-movement. 
The problem of science is not that but how it must be interpreted or understood. 
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Machines are organized structures in the sense that they are man-made structures of causal 
processes. Only humans see the structures and motions of machines as functional. The 
structures and movements of organisms, by contrast, are the results of self-organization 
(Buytendijk, 1948, pp.25-33). The concept of 'vital meaning' refers to the latter type of 
organization. Living beings organize themselves in an meaningful way, while machines are 
meaningfully organized by humans (Buytendijk, 1948, pp.25-33; 1965, pp.242-243). Hence, 
the function of machines is a function for humans; the function with regard to organisms also 
has the sense of: function for the expression of a vital meaning. 
The two meanings of 'function' (function for humans and expressive function) become 
more clear when Buytendijk writes in terms of intentionality. In his comparisons between 
cybernetic machines and animal and human behaviour, he says with regard to machines: "De 
automaat fingeert het intentionele, want in de machinale nabootsing wordt ons werkelijke 
gedrag door een constructie, programma en z.g. 'Strategie' vooruit gedetermineerd." 
(Buytendijk, 1965, p.236).3 With regard to living beings, he says: "Husserl spricht von 
"fungierenden Intentionalitäten", d.h. aber, daß der Leib als ein "corps connaissant", ein 
"corps suject" (Merleau-Ponty) gedacht wird. (Buytendijk & Christan, 1963, p.97).4 As the 
function of machines is only a function for humans, so their intentionality is a man-made, 
constructed imitation of the functioning intentionality of organisms. For example, the motions 
of both a sewing-machine and a sewing woman can be said to have the function of sewing. 
In the case of the woman, the intention to sew - which is the meaning of her movements -
has not been pre-programmed by herself or someone else, but she expresses this while she 
sews. The construction of a sewing-machine is a reconstruction of this intention and its 
realization. 
Vital meaning and biological functionality 
Biologists might say that the vital meaning of phenomena of life is their survival value. They 
see, for example, the way that plants root, or an animal flight from a predator as functional 
for their own survival or that of their species. In his reply to this evolutionary reading of 
'vital meaning', the concept of 'function' as expressive function shows up again: 
"De architectoniek van het lichaam is [door Braus - SL] bezien in zijn geschiktheid voor het optreden van 
de bewegingen, welk noodig zijn voor de soorttypische functioneele verhouding met de buitenwereld. Toch 
is het een andere toepassing van het doelmatigheidsbeginsel, dan wij bij Darwin (en zijn navolgers) 
The automaton simulates intentionality because in the mechanical imitation, our real behaviour has 
been predetermined by a construction, a programme and a so-called 'strategy'. 
Husserl speaks of "functioning intentionalities", which means, however, that the body is seen as a 
"knowing body", a "subject body" (Merleau-Ponty). 
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aantreffen. De geschiktheid der structuren is hier namelijk niet betrokken op het doel: behoud van het 
indidvidu en soort, maar op de logische realiseering van bewegingswijzen." (Buytendijk, 1938a, p. 196).3 
Here Buytendijk explicitly distinguishes between function with regard to survival and function 
with regard to what he calls "the logical realization of ways of moving". We came across 
a similar phrase in Plessner's philosophy of life, namely the different forms of life as logical 
stages of life. As I have explained, "different forms of life" should not be read as 
evolutionarily developed forms. These forms are the successive manifestations of the essential 
characteristic of life, namely the open way of being of plants, the centric way of being of 
animals and the excentric way of human being (see chapter VJJ.2). 
Buytendijk's explanation of the passage quoted above is completely in line with 
Plessner's philosophy of life. Almost in the same words as Plessner's, Buytendijk says that 
the structure (architecture) of animal bodies is an expression of their centric way of being 
that, according to an "immanent cause", develops itself to the human, excentric way of being 
(Buytendijk, 1938a, pp. 196-197). What he calls "ways of moving" seems to refer to the 
specific way of being of organisms, especially animals, since they move by themselves. 
Therefore, I read the foregoing quote as asserting that the vital meaning which animals 
express in their bodily and behavioural structures consists of the specific way of life of the 
animals involved. 
The expression of this meaning does not need to exclude the survival value of this 
expression. As said, the meaning and the survival value of animal bodily and behavioural 
structures can be seen as two different aspects of them. It is even plausible that the survival 
value is the condition for the very existence of meaningful bodily and behavioural structures. 
Vital and personal meaning 
Reasoning along the same line, human behaviour also has the meaning of being an expression 
of the human way of life. The first difference between the meaning of human and animal 
expressions is that only the former can be conscious and thematic because of the excentric 
way of human being. The vital meaning expressed by plants and animals can only be 
expressed in their bodies and movements, but cannot become conscious and thematic. This 
is the meaning of the above-mentioned 'functioning intentionality'. The intentionality or 
meaning of non-human phenomena of life only expresses itself while functioning. A sewing 
woman, by contrast, can also say that she sews and why she sews. This agrees with what I 
concluded in the foregoing chapter regarding animal experience, namely that they originate 
in as well as remain bound to the body. 
The architecture of the body has been seen [by Braus - SL] from the point of view of its 
appropriateness to perform movements which are needed for a species-specific relation to the outer 
world. Yet this is a different application of the principle of functionality which we meet in Darwin 
(and his followers). Here the appropriateness of structures is not related to the goal of survival of 
the individual or species, but to the logical realization of ways of moving. 
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From the excentric way of human being also stems the second difference between the 
meaning of human expressions and those of non-human organisms. In line with Plessner, 
Buytendijk says that the meaning of only human expressions is personal, cultural and 
historical (Buytendijk, 1938a, p.53 and p. 197). Even such a bodily phenomenon as breathing 
is not just a vitally meaningful phenomenon, but also has a personal and cultural meaning 
(Buytendijk, 1965, pp.306-320). For example, we recognize the way of breathing of our 
partner or a good friend. 
The vital meaning of animal behaviour 
So far I have written of the vital meaning of non-human organisms in general. Like Plessner, 
Buytendijk makes a distinction between plants and animals and between animals. In line with 
Plessner's philosophy of life, Buytendijk speaks of the open way of being of plants and the 
centric way of being of animals (Buytendijk, 1938a, pp.82-83). Buytendijk, however, makes 
this distinction more concrete. As explained in the previous chapter, the 'open way of being' 
of plants means that plants are inserted into their environment in an unmediated way. 
Animals, on the other hand, are inserted into their environment in a mediated way, i.e., 
mediated by a central self. Buytendijk illustrates this distinction with the example of being 
touched by and touching something. Plants and, for example, sea-anemones react in the same 
way to being touched by a glass rod and to touching it by themselves. Other animals, 
however, such as octopuses react differently to being touched by and to touching a glass rod. 
Only animals such as octopuses also have the capacity to perceive their environment actively, 
Buytendijk concludes. In terms of Plessner, only animals in this group are not only going 
along with their environment as plants do (being touched), but also move by themselves in 
their environment (touching). For designating this difference, Buytendijk says that plants and 
lower animals react to stimuli from their "milieu", and that higher animals shape and 
structure their own Umwelt by means of their perceptions and actions (Buytendijk, 1938a, 
pp.83-84 and pp.209-215; 1958/1972, p.53).6 
Here Buytendijk explicitly restricts the Umwelt concept to animals. In the previous 
chapter I said that it is better to do this because only animals have specialized sensory and 
motor organs. Buytendijk offers an additional argument. He criticizes Von Uexkiill for seeing 
his own Umwelt theory as a natural-scientific biological theory, which implies that the 
relationships between perceptions and actions are causal relationships. The above-mentioned 
animal perceptions and actions, however, are not separate elements of a causal chain, but 
they involve each other (Buytendijk, 1965, p.238). Particular perceptions already involve 
particular actions, and vice versa. Higher animals are actively looking for perceptions and 
perceive their environment as an Umwelt to act in. Concerning higher animals, the vital 
meaning expresses itself in their bodily and behavioural actions as shaping and structuring 
Here lower animals are animals who react in the same way to being touched by and when touching 
their environment, which can be demonstrated empirically. 
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their own Umwelt. Lower animals and plants express a vital meaning in the way in which 
they react to stimuli from their environment. 
Knowledge of the vital meaning of animal behaviour 
The vital meaning of animal behaviour as expounded above is still quite abstract. Because 
Buytendijk was not a philosopher, he did not clarify his concepts extensively. Buytendijk was 
a man of practical research in animal psychology that aimed at gaining knowledge of the 
meaning of animal behaviour. 
Von Uexkull would say that Buytendijk tried to get what he could not get. Von Uexkull 
considered his Umwelt theory a natural-scientific biological theory. He held that biology only 
studies subjects from the outside, treating the animal subject as the abstract origin of 
observable changes of behaviour. Psychology studies subjects from the inside, namely as an 
"I" that unites perceptions and actions (Von Uexkull, 1920, pp.98-100, pp. 128-130 and 
p. 165). Von Uexkull also called such an "P the "Gegenwelt" or "inner world". With regard 
to animal psychology, Von Uexkull was ambiguous. On the one hand he said that animal 
psychology is impossible because we humans do not have access to the animal inner world, 
thereby ascribing human meanings to animal behaviour (Von Uexkull, 1920, p.99). On the 
other hand he said that "modern" (for his time) animal psychologists have developed methods 
to communicate directly with animals about their inner world (Von Uexkull, 1920, p. 130). 
I do not know whether Buytendijk belongs to those "modern animal psychologists". 
Buytendijk also speaks of understanding phenomena of life from the inside (Buytendijk, 
1938b, p. 11). Yet he does not see animal psychology as directly communicating with animals 
about their inner world. He sees animal psychology as carefully and precisely studying animal 
behaviour in its environment so that we can say how the Umwelt appears to an animal 
(Buytendijk, 1958/1972, p.27).7 This careful and precise study of animal behaviour is also 
needed in order to prevent illegitimate anthropomorphism, Buytendijk feels. He admits that 
we cannot but use human concepts when interpreting animal behaviour, but we can prevent 
the ascription of meanings to animals that are obviously illegitimate such as when we speak 
of pets as persons (Buytendijk, 1938b, pp. 19-20; 1958/1972, pp.25-26). In the following 
examples we will see how Buytendijk, by studying animal behaviour in its environment, 
gained knowledge of its meaning and prevented illegitimate anthropomorphism. 
7 As far as I know, Buytendijk did not reply directly to objections to animal psychology such as that 
made by Von Uexkull. But in line with Buytendijk's philosophy about the distinction between 
animals and humans, I would say that animal psychology differs from human psychology in that we 
cannot directly communicate with animals about their inner world because the animal inner world is 
only expressed in their body and behaviour. See also Plessner who holds that animals, contrary to 
humans, do not have an "I" as distinguished from their bodily bound self. 
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I am not sure whether Buytendijk sees habit formation as a different kind of adaptation than 
through physical, chemical or mechanical processes. In the case of the toads, he relates their 
learning processes, which are based on experiences, to the toad's survival value (see below), but 
whether animal experiences and their expressions are always adaptive he does not say. 
2. Some examples of interpreting the meaning of animal behaviour 
2.1. Habit formation in toads 
The question that Buytendijk tried to answer in his experiments with toads is whether a 
changed reaction of these animals to a changed environment is a matter of adaptation or a 
matter of habit formation. Buytendijk conceives of adaptation as physical, chemical or 
mechanical processes. Habit formation is based on experiences of the changed environment 
(Buytendijk, 1920/19321, pp.33-44).8 
In the first experiments a toad was offered a small worm behind a window. When the 
worm was held still in one place, then the toad tried to seize it four times and then stopped. 
When the worm was moved repeatedly, then the toad continued to try to seize it (Buytendijk, 
1920/1932U, p. 123). These results are ambiguous. The experiment with the moving worm 
does not show any habit formation in toads. Despite the fact that the toad was unable to get 
the worm, which was moved repeatedly, he tried to seize it over and over again. It seems 
that seizing at food-like things by toads is a reflex, as we know is the case in frogs. The 
result of the experiment with a non-moving worm is remarkable, Buytendijk says. Why does 
the toad stop trying to seize the worm? Buytendijk's interpretation of this result is that the 
non-moving worm loses its meaning of food and, therefore, no longer gives rise to a reaction 
of the toad (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, p. 123). This experimental result seems to prove the 
toad's capacity to learn to change his behaviour based on experiences. In the beginning the 
toad perceived the worm as food, later as non-food. This change in perceptions expresses 
itself in the change of behaviour. However, this is in contradiction to the results of the 
experiment with a moving worm, namely that the toad does not learn that he cannot seize the 
worm. 
Other experiments with toads solved this contradiction. In these experiments toads were 
offered a small, moving piece of black paper which looked like food to a toad. As expected, 
the toads always tried to seize the paper. When they did not succeed, they tried again, as 
they did in the above-mentioned experiment. When they succeeded and had eaten it, they 
stopped trying to seize the piece of paper. Only after having seized and eaten a good tasting 
insect, did they try again to seize the piece of paper (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, p. 123-124). 
From these experiments it appears that a single unsuccessful experience of eating a piece of 
paper is enough to stop the toad from trying to seize it. This shows a very fast learning 
process in toads which, however, is in contradiction to the experimental results that toads 
keep on trying to seize a food-like thing that they cannot get (Buytendijk, 1918, p. 158-159; 
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1920/193211, p. 124). Buytendijk explains this contradiction by referring to the natural life 
of toads. Toads hunt during the evening, so they have to collect their food within a short 
period of time. One experience of eating inedible or bad tasting insects stimulates toads to 
stop eating in that place and go and search for food somewhere else. Only one experience 
of eating a good tasting insect is also enough to stimulate the toads to try to seize food at that 
same place again. If they unsuccessfully seize at a food-like thing, they keep on trying in 
order to get the desired food (Buytendijk, 1918, p. 159; Buytendijk, 1920/1932U, p. 124). 
Here we see that Buytendijk invokes the natural, species-specific way of life of toads in order 
to interpret different behaviours of toads that, at first sight, seem to be contradictory, namely 
behaviour that seems to be a reflex and behaviour which would indicate fast-learning in 
toads. 
This interpretation of the behaviour of toads shows that the vital meaning of their 
behaviour does not need to compete with the evolutionary function of that same behaviour. 
Buytendijk himself also explains the fast-learning process in toads by referring to its survival 
value (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, p. 124). Buytendijk's interpretation of the toad's behaviour 
shows that evolutionarily functional behaviour is also an expression of the way in which toads 
are related to their environment, namely through meaningful perceptions of and actions in 
their Umwelt. 
According to Buytendijk, these and other experimental results with toads cannot possibly 
be explained by the reflex theory or any other theory that sees animal behaviour as a law-
governed reaction to quantitative environmental stimuli (Plessner & Buytendijk, 1925, pp.72-
74). The reactions of the toads to food or food-like things cannot be explained as causal 
effects of certain, perceived properties of these things, he says. Their reactions differ 
depending on former experiences such as the perception of something as food or non-food, 
or the experience of having eaten good or bad tasting food. I do not dare to say that these 
results cannot be explained causally. Just as Buytendijk invokes the natural way of life of 
toads to understand why toads under some circumstances learn faster than under other 
circumstamces, his opponents may invoke these different circumstances for explaining the 
different behaviours of toads in a causal way. In the following chapter I will argue that the 
interpretative and causally explaining approach to animals are competitive, scientific 
paradigms that are based on different non-scientific points of view on animals. 
2.2. Intelligent behaviour of chimpanzees 
At the beginning of this century, Kohler did experiments with chimpanzees who used and 
made tools. He considerd such achievements to be expressions of intelligence similar to 
human intelligence. In several of his writings, Buytendijk criticized this interpretation of the 
behaviour of the chimpanzees. I will give some examples of Kohler's experiments, his own 
interpretations of the results, and Buytendijk's criticism. 
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In a comparative experiment, chickens and chimpanzees were placed before a fence behind 
which lay food which was too far away to be grasped through the fence. The chickens 
behaved in a different way than the chimpanzees. The chickens walked around at random and 
got the food by chance, while the chimpanzees, after a short while, went directly around the 
fence to the food (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, pp.217-219). In another experiment with a 
chimpanzee, a stick was laid before the same fence. After a while, the chimpanzee took the 
stick and pulled a banana through the fence by using the stick (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, 
p.223). From these experiments Kohler concluded that chimpanzees, contrary to chickens, 
have insight into their situation, namely into relationships between things (the fence, the 
banana and their own place) and into the functional value of things (of the stick as a tool) 
(Buytendijk, 1920/193211, p.223). Kohler defined 'intelligence' as "Einsicht in Sachbezuge" 
(insight into relationships between matters) or as "schlichtes Erfassen von Bedeutungen" 
(simple grasping of meanings) (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, p. 173). 
Buytendijk considers Kohler's definition of 'intelligence' insufficiently specified. Using that 
definition, every animal act can be called intelligent, he says, even a simple reaction to 
stimulus or trial and error (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, pp. 176-178). Criticizing Kohler's 
interpretation of the chimpanzee's behaviour, Buytendijk discerns two kinds of intelligence: 
namely, practical and rational. He defines 'practical intelligence' as: "[Verwijzend naar] 
verworven gedrag, dat bepaald wordt door de waarneming van de zinsstructuur van een 
situatie, in samenhang met de beschikbare bewegingsmogelijkheden." (Buytendijk, 
1958/1972, p.134).9 He defines 'rational intelligence' as: "... een rationeel-logisch, 
categorisch oordelend begrijpen van de concrete situatie als een opgave en de ontdekking van 
een oplossing,..." (Buytendijk, 1958/1972, p. 123).10 The most important difference between 
these two types of intelligence is that practical intelligence is solely based on given 
perceptions and present bodily possibilities, while rational intelligence is also based on 
concepts and judgements. This is the reason why Buytendijk relates practical intelligence to 
acquired behaviour: a solution to a problem can only be found by acting bodily and then 
repeating the action in similar situations (Buytendijk, 1920/1932U, p. 195). Rational 
intelligence, by contrast, is based on perception-independent concepts and judgements. These 
judgements involve possible solutions to a problem on the basis of such concepts (Buytendijk, 
1918, pp.180-181; 1920/193211, p.192; 1959/1972, pp.123-141). This is the sense of 
"understanding of a concrete situation as a task" (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, pp. 183-184). 
Kohler's definition of 'intelligence' is insufficiently specified because the presence or absence 
of consciously developed concepts, a capacity to abstract and the understanding of principles 
[Referring to] acquired behaviour, which is determined by the perception of the structure of 
meaning of a situation in relation to the available possibilities of movement. 
... a rational-logical and categorical, judgmental understanding of a concrete situation as a task and 
the finding of a solution ... 
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do not matter. Buytendijk asserts that these things matter. They make up the core of his 
distinction between practical and rational intelligence. Here we clearly recognize Merleau-
Ponty's distinction between removable and symbolic behavioural structures. Merleau-Ponty 
defines a removable behavioural structure as one that is based on perceived and learnt 
empirical relations. Symbolic behavioural structures, by contrast, presuppose the capacity to 
abstract from bodily perceived things, and to conceive of things in the world as physical and 
as meaningful (see chapter VI.3). Buytendijk's distinction between practical and rational 
intelligence is also in line with Plessner's distinction between the centric and excentric way 
of being which states that the former involves only the bodily-bound self, while the latter also 
involves a reflective "I" (see chapter VTI.3 and 4). The capacity for reflection is similar to 
what Buytendijk calls the capacity of rational, i.e., perception-independent, insight into a 
situation. 
The application of the two types of intelligence to the use of tools by chimpanzees implies 
that it is possible to interpret their use in two ways. First, one can see this use as an 
expression of practical intelligence. This means that the chimpanzee's behaviour is seen as 
the expression of an immediate understanding (through bodily perceptions and actions) of 
means-end relationships such as between his body, the stick and the banana behind the fence 
(Buytendijk, 1958/1972, p. 129). This is similar to, for instance, our learning to drive a car 
by doing it rather than by reading a book about driving a car. Secondly, one can see the 
chimpanzee's use of tools as an expression of rational intelligence. This would imply that the 
chimpanzee objectively understands the above-mentioned relationships (Buytendijk, 
1958/1972, p.128). In this case 'objective understanding' is understanding these relationships 
as causal and, therefore, effective means-end relationships. Seeing the same tool as a means 
to realize different ends, or seeing different materials as means to realize the same end are 
expressions of such an objective understanding (Buytendijk, 1958/1972, pp. 137-138 and 
p. 141). Buytendijk's conclusion is that it has not been demonstrated that the chimpanzee has 
a rational insight into his situation (Buytendijk, 1920/193211, pp.183-184 and p.225). 
Other experiments by Kohler did seem to provide a more conclusive answer to the 
question of whether or not chimpanzees have rational insight. In the first experiment a 
chimpanzee learnt to use a box in order to grasp a banana that was hanging too high. In the 
second experiment the banana was banging higher still and a second box had been placed 
somewhere in the room. The chimpanzee took the second box and did a lot of things that 
appeared to be strange with it such as holding it beside the first one under the banana, 
placing at a certain angle upon the first one, holding it high above his head, or placing both 
boxes where the banana was hanging in the previous experiment (Buytendijk, 1958/1972, 
pp. 136-137). Kohler said that these behaviours are not that strange but stupid and good 
mistakes. For example, placing the second box at a certain angle upon the first one is a good 
mistake: the construction is higher, although less stable. On the other hand, placing both 
boxes where the banana was hanging in the first experiment is a stupid mistake. Kohler 
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considered both types of mistakes expressions of the intelligence of the chimpanzee. Even 
intelligent people make stupid mistakes, he said (Buytendijk, 1958/1972, p. 136-137). 
Buytendijk also says that the chimpanzee did not act randomly but made stupid and good 
mistakes. But he considers this experiment not a proof that the chimpanzee has rational 
insight into a problematic situation; this experiment only proves that the chimpanzee is able 
to perceive spatial relationships in his environment very precisely. Similar to the case of the 
toads, Buytendijk explains this ability by referring to the species-specific way of life of 
chimpanzees (Buytendijk, 1958/1972, pp. 126-127). Chimpanzees are living in trees where 
they jump from tree to tree to get their food. This explains their capacity for precise spatial 
perceptions. In their natural environment they also use sticks or other tools in order to get 
food that is too far away. As Buytendijk says with regard to toads, if a laboratory experiment 
appeals to the instincts of the animals, they will learn rapidly. This explains why the 
chimpanzees in the experiments quickly learn to use a stick or box in order to get a desired 
banana. However, precise spatial perception and fast learning are not necessarily the same 
thing as having rational insight into a situation. Concerning the experiments with the boxes, 
Buytendijk says: "Het komt mij voor, dat bij deze dieren de gewoontevorming spoedig het 
inzicht in de ding-relaties, dat in den beginne wel degelijk aanwezig is, achterhaalt." 
(Buytendijk, 1920/193211, p.222)11, and: "Het zogenaamde 'inzicht' is een lichamelijk 
(senso-motorisch) bepaalde verhouding die bij alle diersoorten, die zich aan nieuwe situaties 
aanpassen, in zekere mate optreedt.'' (Buytendijk, 1958/1972, p. 137).12 In these quotes 
Buytendijk warns against a possible identification of the apparent similarity between the 
behaviour of chimpanzees and humans with a similar type of insight. As is clear from both 
quotes, Buytendijk interprets the chimpanzee's behaviour not as an expression of rational but 
of practical intelligence. The chimpanzee's solution to the first problem of getting the banana 
by means of climbing onto one box seems to be based on what we call rational insight. 
Actually it is a solution found by bodily action, which he repeats in order to solve the second 
problem of getting the banana by means of two boxes: as in the first experiment, he tries to 
bring the second box closer to the banana by placing it on top of the first box or by holding 
it above his head under the banana. If the chimpanzee's solution was really based on rational 
insight into the relationships between his own body, the boxes and the banana, then he would 
have understood that he could not climb on a box which he holds above his head. This 
requires, Plessner would say, an excentric positionality, i.e., the capacity to see one's own 
bodily actions from another point of view than that of the bodily bound self. Buytendijk 
concludes that the actions of the chimpanzees, though sometimes technically perfect, are 
1 1 It seems to me that with these animals, habit formation rapidly overtakes insight into thing-
relationships which surely is present initially. 
1 2 So-called 'insight' is a bodily (senso-motorially) determined relation, which to some degree occurs 
in all animal species which adapt themselves to new situations. 
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applications of acquired senso-motor experiences to the problematic situation (Buytendijk, 
1920/193211, p.200). 
Does Buytendijk's interpretations of the chimpanzee's behaviour really prove that these 
are solely based on practical, bodily bound intelligence? According to Buytendijk himself, 
the study of the chimpanzee's behaviour alone is not enough to decide about this question, 
as is testified by the following quote: 
"... alleen een alomvattende metaphysische ontologische beschouwing van alle zijn vermag zich over de 
herkomst der zinvolle spontaniteit, der "wijsheid der natuur", uit te spreken. 
Anders gezegd: dierlijke intelligentie vormt geen psychologisch, maar een ontologisch probleem." 
(Buytendijk, 1938a, p.97).° 
I understand this quote as follows: every organism can be said to be an intelligent problem-
solver (see above). However, the observable problem-solving behaviour does not indicate 
anything about the way in which organisms solve problems; this belongs to the possibilities 
or impossibilities of the way of being of the organisms involved, which is an ontological 
question. Thus, I conclude, the question of whether chimpanzees only have a practical 
intelligence or also a rational intelligence cannot be decided upon solely by the interpretation 
of their behaviour, but is an ontological question as well. A precise and careful study of the 
chimpanzee's behaviour in their environment cannot, therefore, prove which interpretation 
is correct: Kohler's interpretation of the chimpanzee's behaviour as an expression of 
intelligence similar to human intelligence, or Buytendijk's interpretation of it as an expression 
of solely practical intelligence. 
2.3. Animal and human pain 
In the following example, the same issue shows up again. In his book Over de pijn [Pain] 
(1943/1957), Buytendijk searchs for the meaning of animal and human pain. As we will see, 
his ontological view on animals and humans strongly influences his answer to this question. 
Most biologists see survival as the meaning of pain. Painful feelings have the function 
of learning to avoid harmful situations, they say. Buytendijk asserts that this functional 
explanation does not explain pain. It only explains bodily phenomena such as the avoidance 
of harmful situations, not the associated pain. Many non-human organisms avoid harmful 
situations, while we do not say that they are in pain. Thus, the question of why we say that 
this functional behaviour is associated with pain is still unanswered (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, 
p.39). Neither biology nor psychology can answer this question, Buytendijk holds, because 
... only a all-comprehensive metaphysical ontological reflection upon all being is able to articulate 
the origin of meaningful spontaneity , the "wisdom of nature". In other words, animal intelligence 
is not a psychological but an ontological problem. 
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the foundation of pain has to be found at the level of the animal way of being (Buytendijk, 
1943/1957, pp.35-41). Let us see how Buytendijk articulates the meaning of animal and 
human pain on this level. 
Buytendijk distinguishes bodily pain from mental pain (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp.23-
31). I will restrict myself as much as possible to bodily pain because this offers the best 
opportunity to discuss the ultimate question of the difference between animal and human 
bodily experiences. 
Buytendijk sees bodily pain as a vital feeling of displeasure. The difference between 
bodily pain and other vital feelings of displeasure such as hunger and thirst is that bodily pain 
always implies that it hurts somewhere. Pain also forces the affected organisms to question 
and think because the relationship between pain and the reaction it provokes is problematic. 
Hunger urges, in an unproblematic way, eating. (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp.23-25). For 
example, although most humans and animals react to having their leg burnt by withdrawing 
it, the relationship between the pain of the leg and withdrawing it is problematic. 
Withdrawing does not stop the pain as eating satisfies hunger. This and other problematic 
aspects of pain force the affected organism to question and think. The fundamental 
characteristic of pain is that, in a specific way, it sets one's own body in opposition to self-
consciousness, Buytendijk asserts (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.40). This specific way consists 
of "... een disharmonie, een onmachtig staan tegenover de scheiding van het ik en zijn 
lichamelijkheid ..." (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.28). 1 4 Here Buytendijk summarizes the 
difference between pain and, for example, hunger. Hunger implies its cause and so urges the 
act of eating to satisfy itself. Although the pain of a burnt leg implies its cause, and 
automatically urges the act of withdrawing, this act does not stop the pain. This is the essence 
of feelings of pain: the helplessness to stop it. I want the pain to go away from my leg, but 
it does not. 
Usually there is a unity between the "I" and its bodily bound self (its corporeality): we 
are not conscious of the warmth of our leg (see also "hidden health" as mentioned by 
Gadamer in chapter VI.2. When we feel pain, this unity has been broken down and makes 
pain a specific feeling of displeasure. Pain caused by a burn is not only a hot feeling, but is 
also the specific unpleasant feeling of the inability to get rid of the pain by some action. 
Because feeling pain also involves this inability, Buytendijk articulates the aforementioned 
fundamental characteristic of pain as the unpleasant experience of a sharp contrast between 
a personal and a bodily way of being (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp. 158-161 and pp. 192-193). 
A person in pain wants to but cannot chase away the pain in his own body. 
This characteristic of pain raises a problem for speaking of animal pain. If animals do not 
have an " F , self-consciousness or personality, as Buytendijk holds, then they also are unable 
14 a disharmony, a powerless being opposed to the separation of the I and its corporeality 
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to experience a disunity between their T and their bodily self. With regard to this problem, 
Buytendijk says: 
"Naarmate het dier in zijn centrische positionaliteit meer geprononceerd verwerkelijkt is en tegenover de 
dingen en tegenover de eigen lichamelijkheid staat, treden verschijnselen op, die de grenzen van het op 
zelfbehoud en soortbehoud gerichte vitale functionele veld overschrijden. 
Zulk een verschijnsel is - zoals ik indertijd heb trachten aan te tonen - het spel, zulk een verschijnsel is 
ook het pijngevoel." (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.122).1 5 
Here Buytendijk seems to assert that animals do have an T ("transgress the limits of the 
vital functional field"). Hence, it would be possible to conceive of animal pain as similar to 
human pain. Yet Buytendijk makes a distinction here. Based on this distinction, I will argue 
that suffering animals touch rather than transgress the boundary with an excentric 
positionality. 
Buytendijk explains the existence of animal pain in light of their centric positionality. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, the difference between the open positionality of plants and 
the centric positionality of animals is that animals are more autonomous in relation to their 
environment. Plants go along with their environment; animals position themselves in relation 
to their environment. To take up a position in relation to the environment presupposes the 
possibility of a disharmony between self and environment. The reverse of the autonomy of 
animals, however, is the resistance of their environment regarding the fulfilment of their 
needs (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p. 183). The same is true with regard to the body. The 
development of a self implies taking up a position in relation to one's body, and so the 
possibility of meeting resistance of it. Animal pain is the realization of this ontologically 
given possibility. 
The development of a self is not a matter of all or nothing. In the last quoted passage, 
Buytendijk writes about a more or less distinctive realization of a centric positionality. This 
is the same as a more or less developed self or, as Buytendijk also says, the clarity of animal 
consciousness. This is the degree to which animals are conscious of their Umwelt and Leib. 
The more clear their consciousness is, the more clear an "I" has been developed as distinct 
from a bodily self (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp.84-86). Translated into terms of animal pain, 
this means that animal pain is a matter of degree. The one extreme is the absence of a self 
and therefore the absence of pain; the other extreme is the presence of a reflective "I" and 
therefore consciousness of and opposition to the vital feeling of pain. In between there is a 
degree of coincidence of the animal self with its bodily experiences and therefore a degree 
1 5 The more the animal has a distinctive realization of his centric positionality, and the more it places 
itself in front of the things and its own corporeality, phenomena occur which transgress the limits 
of the vital functional field that is directed at self-preservation and preservation of the species. As I 
have once tried to demonstrate, play is such a phenomenon. The feeling of pain is also such a 
phenomenon. 
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of the vital feeling of pain. The question regarding animal pain is whether the degree of 
animal pain can reach the extreme of a reflective "I" that is consiuous of pain. 
Buytendijk says that animal pain can be assessed by studying their reactions to, for instance, 
an injury (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.86 and p.88). Let us have a closer look at the way in 
which Buytendijk assesses the two extremes of the degree of animal pain, namely the absence 
of pain and the consciousness of pain. The question regarding the former limitis of whether 
a reaction to an injury is a non-conscious reflex or an expression of pain. Usually we see 
flight and a motorial disorganization as expressions of pain. Buytendik says that hese 
behaviours are not always associated with pain. Many lower animals and even brainless 
animals perform flight movements and motorial disorganizations. In these cases we do not 
see these reactions as expressions of pain but as non-conscious reflexes, he says without 
further argument (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp.88-90). The aforementioned example of the 
difference between being touched and touching might have provided Buytendijk with some 
arguments for this statement. If the animals involved do not react differently to being touched 
and touching by themselves, then they are not a self and so their reactions to an injury are 
solely behavioural reactions and not also expressions of pain. Or Buytendijk could have 
invented a similar test for deciding whether their reactions to an injury differ from those of 
higher animals, which can be seen as decisive for the question of whether or not these are 
also an expression of pain. 
Let us now have a look at the other limit, the boundary between animal and human pain. 
Buytendijk assumes that a dog's care for an affected part of the body is an expression of 
pain. The question he raises is whether the affected part of the dog's body is in the same way 
opposed to the dog's individual centre as in the case of humans. His answer to this question 
is: "Het waarneembare gedrag kan hierop geen antwoord geven. " 1 6 (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, 
p.98). Both humans and animals take care of an injured leg. This does not prove, however, 
that the dog's way of being is excentric, i.e., that the dog 'objectively' experiences his 
injured and painful leg (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.99). This is the same argument with regard 
to the question of whether the intelligence of chimpanzees is practical or rational. There 
Buytendijk said that it was an ontological question as well. Given his interpretations of the 
chimpanzee's behaviour, he seemed to say that chimpanzees, because of their centric 
positionality, do not possess rational intelligence. With regard to the degree of animal pain, 
Buytendijk does not seem to restrict this by the centric way of being of animals. As quoted 
before, he says that animal pain is a phenomenon that transgresses the boundary of the vital 
field. However, if we look at what Buytendijk says about the other, human side of this 
boundary, then there seems to be a distinction between animal and human pain. 
As discussed earlier, Buytendijk considers the general meaning of pain to be the 
helplessness to chase away bodily felt pain. It is this experience of helplessness that leads to 
The observable behaviour cannot answer this question. 
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questioning and thinking which influence the reaction to pain. Buytendijk also says that the 
experience of pain calls for a restoration of the disharmony between the T and the bodily 
self (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp. 183-189). Humans react to pain in a personal way; they do 
this, for example, by taking pain 'like a man', or by resigning themselves to pain. Character 
formation is one of the meanings of pain (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, pp. 170-182). This is in 
line with Plessner's view that humans need to restore the broken unity between their "I" and 
their own Kbrperleib in a personal, cultural and historical way. A specific human reaction 
to pain is weeping. Buytendijk considers weeping an expression of complete helplessness, as 
admitting that there is nothing left one can do to handle pain; giving up one's personality. 
He adds that weeping is still a personal act, and that humans can give up their personality 
is a testimony to their having a personality. When pain is so bad it causes a person to weep, 
it has forced him to the boundary of his way of being where nothing can be done any more 
(Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.169). So, unbearable human pain is a border-line experience 
without, however, transgressing the boundary between an excentric and a centric 
positionality. 
Let us now return to the animal side of the boundary. Undoubtedly animals experience 
the pain of a disharmony between their self and their painful body, Buytendijk admits. He 
adds, however, that this experience does not lead to questioning and thinking which influence 
their reaction to it, as it does in humans. In animals the experience of pain is a compulsive 
occurrence and immanent to life. Unlike human pain, animal pain is not affected by a source 
of freedom that transcends life; animals just accept pain (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.184). 
This is the reason why animals do not weep. They passively surrender themselves to long-
lasting, heavy pain. Animals suffer impersonally (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p. 168). / 
understand these remarks as saying that animal pain does not have a personal meaning 
because animals do not reflect upon their pain. Even heavy pain in animals with a clear 
consciousness does not make these animals into persons, as humans do not really lose their 
personality when in unbearable pain. I see suffering by animals as a foreshadow of the next 
stage in life, namely that of the emancipation of a personal "I" from its bodily self. The 
absence of a specific reaction to pain (weeping) and Buytendijk's interpretation of it, can 
support this view. 
3 . Conclusions and comments with regard to an interpretative animal psychology 
The elaboration of the three examples of Buytendijk's interpretation of animal expressions 
results in a few conclusions regarding an interpretative study of animals. 
The first conclusion concerns the prominent role of Buytendijk's ontological view on 
animals. As is clear from the examples, Plessner's philosophy of life functions as a 
framework for Buytendijk's interpretation of animal behaviour (Strasser, 1962, p.254 and 
p.285; Thines, 1977, p.18). Buytendijk's first ontological presupposition is that at least some 
108 
animal behaviour is an expression of experiences rather than a mere effect of internal or 
external causes. His second ontological presupposition is that ariimal experience differs from 
human experience. 
Ontological presuppositions are not popular in science, but in the next chapter I will 
argue that any science is based on ontological or otherwise philosophical points of view 
regarding its subject matter. Most animal welfare science is based on a view that is the same 
as Buytendijk's first ontological presupposition: namely, that animals are experiencing 
beings. Wiepkema and Toates, for example, assume that animal behaviour, contrary to the 
motions of machines, is regulated by emotions. Buytendijk's second ontological 
presupposition that animal experience differs from human experience is not common in 
animal behaviour science. On the contrary, the widely used argument from analogy states 
that animal experiences are similar to human experiences. Especially Buytendijk's analysis 
of the meaning of animal and human pain, however, has provided arguments for saying the 
opposite: namely, that animal experiences are not personal like human experiences. 
The second conclusion is that Buytendijk can indeed be seen as giving concrete body to 
Plessner's philosophy. Whether or not one agrees with the alleged difference between human 
and animal experiences, Buytendijk has made more concrete Plessner's view on animal 
experiences. I have explained the latter view as stating that animals have bodily, here-and-
now experiences; that they only experience their Umwelt and Leib from the point of view of 
their body. Buytendijk's application of this view to animal experience consists of concrete 
interpretations of animal behaviour in light of this view. The example of the intelligent 
behaviour of chimpanzees (as expression of perceptions and bodily actions) has shown the 
possibility of such an interpretative investigation of bodily animal experiences. 
Hermeneutical scientists understand human experiences, expressions and meanings as 
personal, cultural and historical. Given the difference between humans and animals, animal 
experiences cannot be understood as such, they say. My third conclusion concerns the 
species-specific way of animal life within which Buytendijk interprets animal behaviour. In 
the examples of habit formation in toads and the use of tools by chimpanzees, Buytendijk's 
interpretations of the species-specific behaviour of these animals in their natural environment 
seemed to function as a standard for his interpretations of their behaviour in experiments. In 
the next chapter I will defend my third conclusion from the discussion of Buytendijk's 
interpretative research, namely that the species-specific way of animal life is comparable to 
the personal, cultural and historical context within which we understand other humans. 
Nevertheless I agree with classical hermeneuticists that animal experiences are not 
personal. As said after having discussed Merleau-Ponty, the designation "impersonal" 
expresses that the meaning of animal behaviour is close to that of human behaviour. Unlike 
the vital meaning expressed by plants, the meaning of animal behaviour includes experiences. 
This meaning can be more or less close to that of human behaviour, depending on the 
development of their self or consciousness. Buytendijk's analysis of the meaning of animal 
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and human pain has shown that the degree of animal pain runs from the almost absence of 
it to the almost presence of personal pain, but without becoming personal pain. 
The fourth conclusion is that the interpretation of animal behaviour does not need to 
compete with natural-scientific explanations of it. Whether they compete or not, depends on 
the type of natural-scientific explanation and its claims. For example, an evolutionary 
explanation of animal pain behaviour and an interpretation of the meaning of this behaviour 
are not mutually exclusive, as we saw with the examples of habit formation in toads and 
animal pain. Other natural-scientific explanations such as those given by the reflex theory 
seem to be based on ontological points of view that exclude the possibility of seeing animal 
behaviour as meaningful behaviour. I will discuss this question of the different relationships 
between an interpretative and natural-scientific approaches more fully in the next chapter. 
The final conclusion concerns Buytendijk's method of research. He says that we can 
know the meaning of animal behaviour by carefully studying their behaviour in its 
environment. The methodology of such careful study is not clear at all. Buytendijk clearly 
considers it necessary to interpret animal behaviour in its environment rather than only 
explain it causally or functionally. He does not say, however, how such interpretations can 
be realized and confirmed or falsified. With regard to pain in higher animals, he once refered 
to a method of understanding similar to the one mentioned by Dilthey, namely reliving 
experiences of others as if these were our own. We readily accept the existence of pain in 
higher animals, he says, because we are able to imitate their pain behaviour, because we see 
their experiences as recognizable and understandable (Buytendijk, 1943/1957, p.91). With 
regard to pain feelings in lower animals, he just says that we do not see the behaviour of 
these animals as expressions of pain. With regard to pain feelings of octopuses, he says: "Op 
grond van mijn persoonlijke ervaring meen ik, dat de functionele ontwikkelingsgraad van dit 
weekdier minstens even hoog is als die van de hoogst ontwikkelde koudbloedige gewervelde 
dieren. Pijngevoel is dan ook met grote waarschijnlijkheid aanwezig." (Buytendijk, 
1943/1957, p.91). 1 7 The interpretation of animal behaviour seems to be a personal matter 
rather than carefully studied behaviour. This leaves the door open to illegitimate 
anthropomorphism and other incorrect interpretations of animals, as is done "on animal 
protection calendars and by fairy-tale tellers." (Plessner). I think that animal psychology 
should not be based on personal experience with animals, but, like any science, on 
intersubjectively agreed methods. In the next chapter I will give my reconstruction of the 
method as used by Buytendijk, which can serve as a proposal for, paraphrasing Plessner, 
such an intersubjective discipline for interpretation. 
On the basis of personal experience, I think that the degree of functional development of this 
mollusc is at least as high as that of the most highly developed cold-blooded vertebrate animals. So 
it is highly probable that the feeling of pain is present. 
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CHAPTER IX 
ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE THIRD WAY BETWEEN THE 
HERMENEUTIC AND THE NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES 
In Intermediate Reflections 1, I concluded that natural-scientific theories of animal welfare 
cannot do justice to the subjective character of animal experiences. In order to find an 
approach that can comprehend this character, I started to explore the philosophical 
hermeneuticists Dilfhey and Gadamer, each of whom developed a concept of subjective 
experience. The specific question was, what did they say about animal experience?: I 
concluded that they (with the exclusion of Dilthey in his early period) started with specific 
human experience and took this as the basis of a philosophical concept of experience in 
general; then they founded experience on a characteristic that happens to be typical human, 
for instance language. Their implicit or explicit conclusion was mostly that animals do not 
have the capacity to have experiences. I also concluded that it is unfruitful to try to derive 
from human experience a philosophical and theoretical concept of animal experience. As 
classical hermeneuticists correctly say, human experience is always related to specific human 
characteristics such as language, history or culture (see Intermediate Reflections 2). 
Still searching for a philosophically sound concept of animal experience, I tried to find 
a third way somewhere between human experience and the complete lack of experience. I 
found this way in Merleau-Ponty, Plessner and Buytendijk. Merleau-Ponty provided a 
philosophy of the human body as an experiencing body. It turned out that Plessner went 
further, and with better results, than Merleau-Ponty by developing a philosophy of the animal 
body as an experiencing body. Buytendijk put the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and 
Plessner to more concrete use in his interpretations of animal behaviour. There is a wide gap, 
however, between Plessner's philosophical concept of animal experience and Buytendijk's 
interpretations of animal behaviour as expressions of it. This gap concerns a method for 
interpretative study of animal behaviour which is absent in the writings of Buytendijk. 
In this chapter I will first review the philosophy of psychology of the Utrecht School, 
within which Buytendijk worked (IX. 1); then I will elaborate a methodology for the 
interpretation of animal behaviour by discussing four methodical issues within the Utrecht 
School and the hermeneutical sciences (IX.2); in the following section the different kinds of 
relations between interpretative and natural-scientific studies of animal behaviour will be 
sketched (IX.3), and finally I will formulate a few principles of an interpretative approach 
to animal welfare (IX.4). 
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1. The Utrecht School in Psychology 
The ideas of the Utrecht School in Psychology serve to introduce a methodology for an 
interpretative study of animals. The members of this school had the same criticism of natural-
scientific psychology as I have of natural-scientific theories of animal welfare, namely that 
such scientific approaches cannot understand humans as subjects. The designation 'Utrecht 
School' refers to the scientists working in the Psychology Department of the University of 
Utrecht between 1947 and the beginning of the 1960s. These scientists had a special view on 
psychology as a science. Their main, common tenet seems to be a negative one, namely the 
rejection of natural-scientific views about the human psyche. Their positive point of view is 
less clear but is mostly referred to as a phenomenological view on the human psyche. As we 
will see, this view implies an ontological view on humans. One can say that the view of the 
Utrecht School on humans, like Plessner's view on living beings, is a phenomenologically 
gained ontological view. In 1947 Buytendijk became head of the Department of Psychology. 
He did not get this job because of his eminent work in human psychology (which he had not 
done at all), but because of his philosophical view on the human and animal psyche which 
he had developed before. In this section I will expound the ideas of the Utrecht School with 
regard to human psychology. In the next section, more will be said about animal psychology 
in line with these ideas. 
Ontological and ethical foundations of human psychology 
Johannes Linschoten, one of the members of the Utrecht School, considered the question of 
the character of humans - and especially of the human psyche - to be the general question 
of any sort of psychology. As a member of the Utrecht School, he rejected natural-scientific 
approaches to humans within psychology, because these did not do justice to the subjectivity 
of humans (Linschoten, 1953, pp.252-253). Doing justice to humans as the foundation of 
psychology has an ontological and ethical meaning within the psychology of the Utrecht 
School (Dehue, 1990, pp.80-82). Ontologically it means that the essence, or way of being, 
of humans should be the subject matter of psychology. The psychologists of the Utrecht 
School considered meaningfully being in the world the essence of human being (see below). 
Denying that humans are meaningfully related to the world, as natural-scientific psychology 
does, is not solely ignoring this essence but is considered ethically unacceptable too by the 
psychologists of the Utrecht School. 
'Worldly humans and human worlds 
Referring to Husserl, the members of the Utrecht School conceived of the human way of 
being as intentionally related to the world. Human consciousness is not an empty 
consciousness like in Descartes, Husserl said. It always has a content, namely being directed 
at the world (the intentionality of human consciousness). In line with Husserl, the 
psychologists of the Utrecht School said that it is possible to know a person by understanding 
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the world as experienced by him, i.e., by understanding a person's situation (Kouwer and 
Linschoten, 1966, pp.87-89; Linschoten, 1963, p.244). These psychologists rather spoke of 
experiences (Erlebnisse) than consciousness. 
In the philosophy of the Utrecht School, the concepts of person and world are 
interrelated. Persons (individual humans) are living in the world through intentional, 
meaningful relations to it. Because of these relationships, persons are meaningful subjects and 
the world is a meaningful world (Linschoten, 1953, p.247). This corresponds with Gadamer's 
view that the undetennined world becomes meaningful thanks to human understanding of it 
(see chapter V.I). 
Like Merleau-Ponty, the psychologists of the Utrecht School emphasized the bodily 
human way of being in the world (Kouwer and Linschoten, 1966, p.94; Linschoten, 1953, 
p.244; 1962, pp.184-185; 1963, pp.119-120). They saw the intentional relations of humans 
to the world as primarily bodily relations. Therefore the empirical focus of their 
phenomenological understanding was the bodily appearance of humans. Despite the emphasis 
on the human body, they said that the meanings that humans express are always cultural-
historical. We can understand such meanings by virtue of communication within and about 
a common cultural-historical situation (Linschoten, 1953, p.245). This is in accordance with 
the view of the discussed hermeneuticists Dilthey and Gadamer, who also saw human 
expressions as cultural and historical. 
Method of interpretative psychology 
Like Gadamer, the psychologists of the Utrecht School also rejected a strict methodology in 
the sense of techniques and rules for acquiring true knowledge. The methods they used in 
their own research were very implicit, unclear and personal. Buytendijk speaks of his method 
of research in terms of "participating with love in the existence of the other person" (Dehue, 
1990, p.80). At the end of the previous chapter, I already cited a statement by Buytendijk 
in which he refers to personal elements in his research. However unclear, it seems to be a 
common view of the Utrecht School that understanding another person is a matter of a 
meeting between two persons, namely between the researcher and his 'object'. Linschoten 
articulated this process of understanding by saying that phenomenological psychology does 
not aim at explanations but explications of persons in their situation. This means that a 
phenomenological psychology is oriented to understanding a person as the centre of meanings 
in his world, instead of deriving from general explanatory laws how particular humans 
behave. Like hermeneuticists, Linschoten called this process of understanding "moving 
within a hermeneutical circle". This way of understanding goes to and fro between assumed 
meanings of the world and particular meanings of a person in a situation (Linschoten, 1953, 
pp.252). This process of understanding will be further explained in the next section. 
I already mentioned some similarities between the philosophical ideas of the Utrecht 
School and those of hermeneutics. The undetermined world becomes a meaningful situation 
thanks to persons living in it. Psychology does not aim at explaining persons but at 
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understanding persons as centres of a meaningful situation that is always cultural and 
historical. This understanding can be gained by communication within and about a common 
cultural-historical context. By systematically discussing four methodical issues that are central 
in the Utrecht School as well as in hermeneutics, I will now elaborate a method for 
understanding animals. 
2. Towards a method for understanding animals 
As said, Buytendijk was not very clear about the method he used. From the examples of his 
interpretations of animal behaviour, only the difference between his interpretative approach 
and the causal or functional, natural-scientific method has become clear. The difference 
between Buytendijk's method and the geisteswissenschaftliche has not yet become clear. In 
this section I will discuss this difference with regard to four methodical issues within 
hermeneutic and phenomenological understanding. 
Subject matter of interpretation 
This issue concerns the philosophical, whether ontological or otherwise, presupposition of 
interpretative studies with regard to their subject matter. I hold that any science is based on 
such a presupposition. Causal-analytical sciences, for example, presuppose that their subject 
matter is governed by causal laws. Sciences that claim to say something about human or 
animal experiences presuppose that humans and animals are experiencing beings. Such a 
presupposition raises the question of the relation between a philosophical view on animals 
and the science of animal psychology. 
In the beginning of the 1960s, when he dissociated himself from the Utrecht School, 
Linschoten criticized the view that the ontology of the Utrecht School with regard to humans 
should be the basis of psychology. Natural-scientific and interpretative psychology have 
different aspects of humans as their subject matter, he said. Neither of them may claim that 
the essence of humans is their subject matter. Any philosophy or scientific approach to 
humans is only about one aspect of humans, and not about others. He concluded that the 
phenomenology of the Utrecht School cannot prescribe a concept of humans to psychology 
(Linschoten, 1962, pp. 182-183; 1963). This conclusion is correct insofar as it says that a 
phenomenological concept of humans (in the above-mentioned sense) does not need to form 
the basis of all sorts of psychological disciplines. Neuropsychological disciplines, for 
example, which do not claim to indicate something about human experience, can see and 
study humans as information processing systems. Only if a psychological discipline claims 
to indicate something about human experience, views on humans as experiencing beings 
(such as the phenomenological or hermeneutical) are inevitable. Likewise, an interpretative 
animal psychology cannot abstract from a concept of animals as meaningfully experiencing 
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the world. Its methodology should do justice to this way of being, so that it really can 
indicate something about the meaning of animal behaviour. 
As I said in Intermediate Reflections 2, classical hermeneuticists reject animals and all 
non-human nature as not proper subject matter of the Geisteswissenschaften. Non-human 
nature is only the subject matter of these sciences insofar as humans give meaning to it, for 
example the economical meaning of farm animals, or the aesthetical meaning of landscapes. 
Only the early Dilthey does not restrict the subject matter of hermeneutics to human 
expressions. He does not exclude animal expressions of experiences from the 
Geisteswissenschaften, although these experiences are not personal, cultural and historical 
(see chapter IV.2). Buytendijk would say that the meaning of animal experiences is a vital 
one. Contrary to classical hermeneuticists, Buytendijk distinguishes between in itself 
meaningless non-living nature, living nature that bears a meaning, and humans who give 
meaning. On the basis of this distinction, he also discerns three types of science: not only 
natural sciences and Geisteswissenschaften, but also life sciences. The subject matter of the 
life sciences is the vital meaning expressed by living beings. In the foregoing chapter, I have 
argued that the designation "impersonal meaning" for animal behaviour is a specific case of 
the vital meaning of life. Hence, animal psychology belongs to the life sciences. Animal 
psychology differs from interpretative human psychology in that the meaning it aims to 
understand is not also reflective and, therefore, not personal, cultural and historical. By 
discussing three other methodical issues, we will see what the consequences are of this 
difference in subject matter. 
Context of understanding 
According to the classical view on the Geisteswissenschaften, we can understand the meaning 
of human expressions within a personal, cultural and historical context that constitutes this 
meaning (see the later Dilthey and Gadamer's view). I will argue that the concept of a 
species-specific animal Umwelt, as mentioned by Merleau-Ponty, Plessner and Buytendijk, 
offers a comparable context for understanding animal expressions. 
The concept of ' Umwelf has three senses: the world of animals as compared to the 
human world, the species-specific animal Umwelt and the Umwelt of individual animals. The 
concepts of the human 'world' (Welt) and animal 'Umwelf have a very specific, 
philosophical sense. The concept 'world' refers to the undetermined world to which humans 
are open. Only humans are free to shape this world into their own personal, cultural and 
historical world. In order to express the idea that animals lack this openness to the world, 
philosophers speak of the animal Umwelt. In a certain sense one can speak of an 
undetermined world of animals, which becomes meaningful by and for animals living in it. 
But, and this is the second sense of 'Umwelf, animals are not free to shape their own 
meaningful world; they just shape this in a species-specific way by living in it. 
Sometimes ethologists also use the concept of a species-specific animal Umwelt in the 
sense of Von Uexkiill's. In the course of evolution, animal species have become adapted to 
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their environment, so the form of the body and the behaviour of an animal species cannot 
be seen independent of its environment, ethologists hold. Like animal bodies and behaviours, 
animal environments are species-specific. These ethologists conceive of the species-specific 
animal Umwelt in which an animal species fits like a key in a lock, as a portion of the total 
physical environment. They call this their "ecological niche". 
Merleau-Ponty, Plessner and Buytendijk, however, relate 'species-specific' to the 
meaning of the animal Umwelt. This concerns a different aspect from the physical 
environment to which an animal species is adapted. It concerns the environment as 
meaningfully perceived and acted in by animals. It seems plausible that such meanings have 
co-evolved with the bodily and behavioural forms of animals, especially the meanings as 
bound to these forms. For example, the precise spatial perceptions of and actions in the 
environment by chimpanzees are certainly evolutionarily developed capacities. It is plausible 
that the meaning of these perceptions and actions has co-evolved with bodily capacities. One 
may say that the evolutionary development of the chimpanzees' eyes and behaviour has gone 
hand in hand with the development of the meaning of their behaviour. Such a co-evolution 
of bodily and behavioural forms and their meanings is similar to Merleau-Ponty's view that 
the ontogenetic development of organisms is also the unfolding of an Umwelt (see chapter 
V7..3). This co-evolution implies that the meanings of animal expressions can be grouped into 
evolutionarily changing species, just as the meaning of human expressions can be clustered 
into historically changing cultures. Hence, from a methodical angle, the species-specific way 
of animal life occupies the same place as the cultural-historical way of human life. Both are 
contexts of understanding between the ontological way of being and the meaning of particular 
expressions of an individual in a particular environment. 
This leads me to the last sense of 'Umwelt', namely the Umwelt of an individual animal. 
Not only during their phylogenetic and ontogenetic development but during their whole life 
the meaning of the animal Umwelt is changing, for instance through learning processes, or 
when brought into artificial circumstances. Just as a person's situation is an individuation of 
a cultural and historical situation, the Umwelt of an individual animal is a particularization 
of a species-specific Umwelt. Before discussing how the species-specific animal Umwelt can 
function in the method employed to interpret particular animal behaviour, the meaning of 
'species-specificity' as used in contemporary debates about animals has to be analyzed. 
The standard of species-specificity 
In contemporary debates about animal welfare and animal ethics, one uses the concept of 
'species-specificity' as a standard for animal welfare (see also the next chapter). It is not 
clear, however, what the content of this standard is. 
Van den Bos distinguishes the scientific meaning of 'species-specific' from its common-
sense and ethical meaning. The scientific meaning originates from Lorenz and Tinbergen, 
for whom 'species-specific' refers to genetically fixed behavioural patterns that are specific 
of a species. In modern ethology, 'species-specific behaviour' also refers to learnt and 
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flexible (in the sense of dependent on the environment) behaviour that is typical of a species 
(Van den Bos, 1999). Summarizing the modern concept, I conclude that species-specific 
animal behaviour, whether innate or learnt, is seen as common to all animals of a species in 
a particular environment. This modern scientific concept of 'species-specific' raises the 
problem of the designation of behaviour as species-specific.1 For example, some farm mink 
react to their housing and treatment through restless behaviour, others through quiet 
behaviour. Which form of behaviour do we have to designate as species-specific? One of 
these types, or both, or none at all? Many ethologists solve problems such as these by 
appealing to the common-sense and ethical meaning. 
In societal-ethical debates about animals, 'species-specificity' has two different meanings: 
the behaviour of animals of a species in their natural environment, and the expression of the 
species-specific nature of animals. The first meaning runs into many problems. What is the 
natural environment of an animal species, given the changing environments on earth and the 
omnipresence of human influences? And, why should animal behaviour which occurs in an 
artificial environment but not in a natural environment, be less species-specific than learnt 
and changing behaviour in a changing natural environment?2 An example of such problems 
is Van Hooff s attempt to define animal welfare in terms of natural and adaptive behaviour. 
First he defines natural behaviour as behaviour in non-artificial circumstances (Van Hooff, 
1974, p.2). One of the categories of behaviour that deviates from natural, adaptive behaviour 
is unnatural, maladaptive behaviour. An example with which he illustrates this category is 
animal sickness - even in natural circumstances (Van Hooff, 1974, p.7). Sickness might be 
maladaptive, but why should it also be considered unnatural, especially given Van Hooff s 
own definition of natural behaviour as behaviour in natural circumstances? One can say that 
sickness occurring in natural circumstances is natural as well. 
The problem with both the scientific and this first common-sense meaning of 'species-
specific' is that they claim to give a purely descriptive definition to it in terms of particular 
animal behaviour. They suggest that observed animal behaviour can simply be compared to 
this behaviour in order to say whether it is species-specific or not. However, especially when 
species-specificity is used as a standard, for instance for animal welfare, value judgements 
creep in. Many people surely consider sickness a situation of poor welfare, but not only 
because the behaviour of a sick animal should deviate from some standard. They evaluate 
sickness as bad (see also Tannenbaum, 1991). 
The fulfilment of species-specific needs as articulation of 'species-specificity' raises the same 
problem, besides the problem of how to know the species-specific needs of animals independently 
of their behaviour (see chapter X.2). 
Also Buytendijk seems to suggest that the species-specific way of animal life is their way of life in 
their natural environment. He refers to the natural way of life of chimpanzees and toads in order to 
understand the meaning of their behaviour in experiments. Elsewhere, however, he rejects this 
equation of species-specific with natural (Buytendijk, 1938b, p. 160). 
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The second common-sense and ethical meaning of 'species-specific' does not claim to be 
purely descriptive. Animal ethicists who use the phrase "the species-specific nature of 
animals" conceive of a species similar to the way in which, for example, laypeople classify 
the animal kingdom into species. This meaning of 'species-specific' has its origin in debates 
about animal biotechnology. It has been put forward as an answer to the question of which 
technologically changed behaviour or property is still acceptable. As Thompson summarizes 
this meaning, it is a "fine appreciation of the sheepness of the sheep on the pigness of the 
pig" (Thompson, 1997, p.98). Below we will see that I also use 'species-specificity' in a 
non-descriptive sense, but not as a given, normative standard. I use 'species-specificity' as 
an assumed context within which we can interpret particular animal expressions. 
The hermeneutical circle 
An assumed context of interpretation makes the process of understanding particular animal 
expressions into a process with two unknown variables. Both the meaning of particular 
expressions and the context within which this meaning can be understood are unknown. 
Interpretative sciences aim at knowledge of both unknown variables. Clifford Geertz, a 
contemporary cultural anthropologist, calls this "our double task": 
"... setting down the meaning particular social actions have for the actors whose actions they are, and 
stating, as explicitly as we can manage, what the knowledge thus attained demonstrates about the society 
in which it is found and, beyond that, about social life as such." (Geertz, 1973, p.27). 
Hermeneuticists and the phenomenologists of the Utrecht School designate the method by 
which this double task can be fulfilled as the "hermeneutical circle": a going to and fro 
between the assumed meaning of particular expressions and its assumed personal, cultural 
and historical context (see Gadamer, 1959/1986, and Linschoten in the foregoing section). 
First I will explain this concept as used within the interpretative humanities; then I will apply 
this method of understanding to animals. 
Geertz explains the difference between this method and that of the natural sciences by 
means of the natural-scientific concepts 'description' and 'explanation' and the interpretative 
concepts 'thick description' and 'specification' (Geertz, 1973, p.27). Natural scientists move 
between descriptions and explanations by trying to subsume particular observations under 
general, explanatory laws which are already known or have to be developed. Particular 
observations are given data. Natural scientists consider these data as explained if they can 
see them as logically deducible, particular cases of general, theoretical laws (the "covering 
law model" of science). Within the interpretative sciences, by contrast, the relationship 
between particular cases and a 'theory' is different. Particular cases are specifications, 
"theoretical peculiarities", Geertz says (Geertz, 1973, p.26) (A theory within the 
interpretative sciences is the scientist's knowledge of culture in general, different cultures, 
or a particular culture.) The to-be-understood meaning of particular human expressions is not 
119 
a logically deducible, particular case of some general cultural system. This meaning itself 
also makes up and, therefore, reveals the culture within which it has been generated; this is 
the sense of "peculiarities" as opposed to particularities. 
Particular human expressions are the only key to attain knowledge of the two 
aforementioned unknown variables, namely the meaning of these expressions and the context 
within which this meaning is intelligible. For example, both the meaning of expressions of 
Dutch persons and the Dutch culture can only be known through interpretation of particular 
expressions of Dutch persons. The idea of the 'hermeneutical circle' refers to the process of 
simultaneously getting knowledge of particular expressions and of the context. When starting 
to try to understand the meaning of a particular expression, both its meaning and its context 
must be assumed. One can test both assumptions by looking for and trying to understand 
other particular expressions as specifications of that same context ("thick descriptions"). If 
the meaning of a particular expression understood in this way does not fit into this context, 
it is possible to adjust either the assumed meaning or their context. This process goes on until 
they fit, i.e., until various, particular expressions are intelligible within a certain culture that 
they make up and by which they are generated as well. 
Let us now see whether this method of understanding can also be applied to animals. / will 
argue that the interpretation of animal behaviour can be conceived in the same way, that 
understanding the meaning of particular animal expressions is simultaneously understanding 
their species-specific Umwelt. Let me take Buytendijk's interpretations of the behaviour of 
toads as an example in order to argue this point. 
At first sight, the observations in the first experiment were contradictory: the toads 
stopped reacting to non-moving, food-like things but kept on trying to seize moving, food-
like things. These observations are contradictory in light of Buytendijk's assumptions. He 
assumed that non-moving as well as moving things look like food for toads, and that toads 
are able to learn to stop trying to get what they cannot get. Probably on the basis of the 
knowledge that toads in their natural environment only hunt for moving insects, Buytendijk 
dropped his assumption that also non-moving things look like food for toads. In the 
discussion of other similar experiments with toads, he says that non-moving things lose the 
meaning of food for toads (Plessner & Buytendijk, 1925, p.71). At this point he could have 
stopped and said: the reaction of toads to food-like things is just a reflex. However, he went 
on trying to understand why toads did not stop trying to get food that they could not get. 
Now the question becomes: is this understanding a matter of carefully observing feeding 
behaviour of toads in their natural environment until their behaviour in experiments can be 
seen as a particular case? I would say no. If Buytendijk had done this, undoubtedly he would 
have seen that toads in their natural environment also keep on trying to get food that they 
cannot get. This would not have provided him with an answer to the question of the meaning 
of this behaviour. It just says that the behaviour of toads in experiments is the same as in 
their natural environment, i.e., that also the laboratory toads perform species-specific 
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behaviour. Buytendijk, however, also involved eating behaviour of toads in further 
experiments instead of only foraging behaviour. The result from these experiments was that 
toads rapidly learn to stop trying to get food-like but inedible things. Buytendijk explained 
this rapid learning process as well as the slow learning process to react to just food-like 
things by referring to the natural way of life of toads. Again, he did not see both learning 
processes as particular cases of species-specific behaviour of toads. He tried to understand 
the meaning of the toads' behaviour in his experiments as well as in their natural 
environment. Actually it does not matter that Buytendijk did experiments in a laboratory. He 
could as well have carefully studied and tried to understand the behaviour of particular toads 
in their natural environment; it only takes more patience to observe particular situations 
occurring in nature. 
Only within a very specific sense can we say that Buytendijk subsumed the meaning of 
his laboratory toads' behaviour under that of their species-specific Umwelt. At the start of 
his experiments, the meaning of the Umwelt for toads was as unknown to Buytendijk as 
covering laws are sometimes unknown at the start of natural-scientific investigation. 
Buytendijk did not refer to the toads' behaviour in their natural environment in order to have 
a standard for interpretation of his laboratory toads' behaviour; natural behaviour needed to 
be interpreted too. He tried to bring the assumed meanings of the toads' behaviour under 
natural as well as laboratory circumstances into coherence with each other under the heading 
of a toad's specific Umwelt. This heading is correct until toads perform new, unintelligible 
behaviour and the process of the hermeneutical circle must be started again. This is similar 
to the process of understanding the expressions of various Dutch persons as expressions of 
the Dutch culture. 
Single and double hermeneutics 
These concepts originate from Anthony Giddens, a contemporary social theorist. They refer 
to a difference between scientific knowledge of nature and humans respectively. 'Single 
hermeneutics' refers to the fact that natural-scientific concepts and their founding pre-
scientific meanings of nature are shared by scientists and laypeople only. 'Double 
hermeneutics' refers to the fact that the concepts and pre-scientific meanings of the social 
sciences are also shared by the 'objects' themselves. Giddens asserts that humans, unlike 
nature, are not only determined by social rules, but that the humans involved also have 
constituted these rules. It is the aim of the social sciences, he states, to understand the social 
world as constituted by active humans, a constitution that is based on their meaningful 
understanding of themselves and their own actions. In order to understand the human social 
world properly, social scientists have to base their concepts on this non-scientific 
understanding already achieved by their 'objects' (Giddens, 1976/1993, pp. 163-167). 
The question is of whether understanding animals is a matter of single or double 
hermeneutics. Giddens' answer to this question is: "The hermeneutical element involved here 
[in the social sciences-SL] does not have a parallel in natural science, which does not deal 
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with knowledgeable agents in such a way - even in the case of most animal behaviour" 
(Giddens, 1976/1993, p. 13). Except for the latter phrase, this answer is in line with the 
classical hermeneutical view on non-human nature. That view also says that non-human 
nature does not express a meaning of its own, whence our pre-scientific understanding as 
well as our scientific concepts of non-human nature cannot be shared with it. Giddens says 
that, in order to know the natural world properly, natural scientists do not have to penetrate 
into non-scientific meanings as understood by nature itself (Giddens, 1976/1993, pp.9-15). 
With regard to animals, the last words of Giddens' just quoted answer are important. "In the 
case of most animals" may imply that perhaps in the case of some animals a double 
hermeneutics is possible and needed. If the constitution of their own meaningful world is the 
criterion of double hermeneutics, then the answer to the question of whether understanding 
some animals can be a matter of double hermeneutics should be positive. As we saw in the 
previous chapters, it can be said of many animals that they shape their own bodies and 
environments into a meaningful Leib and Umwelt. So, it seems possible to base the concepts 
of an interpretative animal science on the meaningful way in which the animals themselves 
are related to and shape their Leib and Umwelt. 
Although some animals shape their own Leib and Umwelt, there are good reasons to 
argue that understanding animals is not a matter of double hermeneutics. These reasons refer 
to the character of animal experiences that is typical of animals. Most people will admit that 
animals cannot be conscious of their experiences in the sense of that they can reflect upon 
them. Animal experiences may imply some form of awareness, but not awareness of their 
experiences as such. In short, animals do not understand their selves as experiencing selves. 
As Plessner would say, experiences happen to animals as here-and-now experiences of which 
they cannot become conscious. Because the animals themselves do not understand their own 
experiences, it is impossible for them to understand and share their meaning as understood 
by us. Another reason for this impossibility is that animal experiences, because of their 
specific character, remain bodily experiences, and cannot be personal like human 
experiences. As argued in the previous chapters, even our own bodily experiences are always 
personal, cultural and historical (see, for example, the discussion of human pain feelings). 
We cannot take away these aspects like a coat so that only the bodily aspects, which we can 
share with animals, remain.3 As Plessner says, this would require that we become animals, 
but then we would be unable to speak about animal experiences: 
Kockelkoren is of the opinion that in modern science, even hermeneutical science, the bodily 
aspects of understanding are neglected. For the above given reason, I do not agree with him that 
we have to develop these aspects of understanding in order to understand animals in the same way 
as humans (Kockelkoren, 1992). 
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"Doch zu den aussermenschlichen Umwelten führt kein Weg. Wir müßten uns da ganz aufgeben, müßten 
selbst Tiere werden, um zu wissen, wie ihre Welt aussieht, aber dann hätten wir keine Möglichkeit mehr, 
davon zu erzählen und über die Anmaßung des Menschen zu lächeln." (1946/1983, p.59).4 
ƒ conclude that the difference between human and animal experience constitutes the ground 
for the impossibility to share our understanding of animals with them. However, Plessner's 
statement and this conclusion are in contradiction to what Buytendijk asserts. The latter holds 
that we can say how the Umwelt appears to an animal by carefully and precisely studying his 
behaviour in his environment (see chapter VUI.l). I say: although Buytendijk's 
interpretations of animal behaviour may be persuasive, he did not and could not get what he 
wanted, namely knowledge of the way in which the animals themselves experience their 
Umwelt. 
Does the absence of a double hermeneutics, therefore, necessarily imply 
anthropomorphism? And, was Von Uexküll right in saying that we cannot but ascribe human 
meanings to animal behaviour? These questions can be understood and answered on different 
levels: that of the presence of meaning in animal behaviour, that of the presence of 
meaningful animal experiences, and that of the type of expressed experiences. On the three 
levels, anthropomorphism is inevitable in the sense that every understanding of non-human 
nature cannot but use human concepts. Some forms of anthropomorphism, however, are more 
legitimate than others. 
With regard to the first two levels, I refer to Plessner's view on animals. As said in the 
relevant chapter, Plessner intended to make comprehensible the different ways in which non-
living nature, plants and animals respectively appear to us, and the ways in which we 
conceive of them in a pre-scientific way. Some animals do appear to us as expressing 
meaningful experiences (see also early Dilthey). Plessner's philosophy of animals provides 
us with a persuasive account of this appearance. Perhaps it is anthropomorphistic to ascribe 
meaningful experiences to animals, but this objection can be turned upside down: to deny 
animal experiences leaves us with the problem of the apparent differences between non-living 
nature, plants and animals. 
Usually, anthropmorphism is seen as a question concerning the third level, namely the 
ascription of typical human experiences to animals. For deciding whether we incorrectly 
ascribe particular experiences to animals, we need to know whether and why there is a 
difference between animal and human experiences. Plessner and Buytendijk provide us with 
a key to such a difference, namely that only human experiences are personal, cultural and 
historical. This might prevent us from the ascription of experiences to animals which they 
cannot possibly have, for example experiences of personality in pets. 
4 But, there is no way to non-human Umwelten. We would have to give up our selves totally and 
become animals in order to know what their world looks like, but then we would not have the 
possibility any more to speak about their world or to laugh about the arrogance of humans. 
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3 . Interpretations as well as explanations of animals 
My plea for an interpretation of animal behaviour does not imply that I reject every natural-
scientific approach to it. On the contrary, interpretative and natural-scientific studies can and 
need to support each other. For explaining this, we must have a closer look at the different 
sorts of relationships between interpretative and natural-scientific views on animals. 
The Utrecht School in Psychology criticized all types of natural-scientific psychology because 
these do not do justice to what they saw as the essence of human being. Later, Linschoten, 
one of the members of the Utrecht School, weakened this criticism by saying that 
phenomenology and natural-scientific psychology have different aspects of humans as their 
subject matter. I stated, in the beginning of the previous section, that the choice of the type 
of (human and animal) psychology should depend on the kind of subject matter one wants 
to gain knowledge of. If, for example, animal ethologists want to indicate something about 
animal welfare as an experience of animals, then they need a subjectivating view on animal 
behaviour. Such a view does not need to reject all natural-scientific approaches, as the 
psychologists of the Utrecht School felt. The Utrecht School made no distinction between 
different types of natural-scientific psychology. In this section I will show that the sort of 
relationship between natural-scientific and interpretative views on animals depends on the 
content and claims of the involved natural sciences. 
Competing paradigms about animal behaviour 
Generally speaking, the view on animal behaviour within animal ethology has changed twice 
during this century. At the beginning of the century, the reflex theory of animal behaviour, 
to which Buytendijk opposed up in the beginning of his career, was the most common view. 
This theory states that animal behaviour is the causal effect of physical, chemical or 
mechanical processes. Later the behaviouristic view became the most popular view. 
Behaviourism sees animal behaviour as the effect of internal or external causes. Common to 
both views on animal behaviour is that they do not allow subjective phenomena such as 
experiences, cognition, or emotions within behavioural science. The recognition and 
allowance of such subjective phenomena form the basis of what is seen as a new, cognitive 
paradigm in animal ethology (see Rollin, 1989). 
In Intermediate Reflections 1,1 argued that this paradigm shift is not profound enough. 
Followers of this new paradigm assume subjective phenomena in animals, but they do not 
arrive at a conception of these phenomena. The only difference between this paradigm and 
the former concerns the allowance of subjectivating concepts as explanations of animal 
behaviour. Animal experiences as subjective experiences to which such concepts refer are 
still no subject matter of this ethological paradigm. / consider only an animal science that 
allows subjective animal experiences as its subject matter a real paradigm shift. 
A change of view on the subject matter of science is an ontological question. This 
ontological question cannot be decided by experiments, because it constitutes the non-
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scientific, philosophical basis of scientific paradigms. Therefore, it is incorrect that 
Buytendijk considered his experiments with toads a refutation of the reflex theory, because 
every behaviour of ariimals that can be understood as an expression of experience can also 
be explained as more or less complex reflex behaviour by means of new hypotheses. What 
Buytendijk tried to question in his experiments with toads is not only a scientific theory, but 
also an ontology regarding animals. By means of experiments, he tried to prove that animals 
are experiencing beings. This is impossible. Upon ontological and other philosophical 
questions, which form the basis of paradigms, one cannot decide in the same way as 
scientists decide upon competing theories and hypotheses. Questions regarding the character 
of the subject matter of science can only be decided upon by philosophical arguments. 
Experimental data cannot give an answer to ontological questions, but the other way 
around: experimental data are interpreted differently depending on one's ontological or 
otherwise philosophical view. As Buytendijk also says, adopting either a natural-scientific or 
an interpretative approach to animals is a matter of non-scientific motives (Buytendijk, 
1938b, pp.45-46). Natural-scientific approaches to animals such as the reflex theoretical and 
behaviouristic on the one hand, and an interpretative approach on the other hand, are 
competing approaches insofar they are based on competing views on animal behaviour, 
namely as governed by causal laws and as expression of experiences respectively. 
Complementary views on animals 
There are natural-scientific approaches to animals that, unlike the reflex theory or 
behaviourism, do not deny subjective animal experiences. They just say that these 
experiences are not their subject matter. As we will see in the next chapter, animal welfare 
scientists only studying physical aspects of animal welfare mostly do not deny animal 
experiences of welfare. They only say that these experiences are not the subject matter of 
their research. Similarly, people defending an interpretative view on animal behaviour may 
say that they do not deny that genetic, physical, chemical, mechanical or environmental 
factors causally determine this behaviour. Like the aforementioned scientists, they may say 
that these factors are not the subject matter of their research. Actually, Buytendijk is saying 
this when he considers the physiological and meaningful aspects of behaviour two different 
aspects that cannot be studied simultaneously (Buytendijk, 1965, pp.83-84). Depending on 
one's knowledge interest, one can adopt a mtural-scientific or an interpretative view. So, if 
natural-scientific and interpretative views moderate their claims and say that they study only 
one aspect of animal behaviour, then they are not competing but complementary views on 
animal behaviour. This is also Linschoten's position in the 1960s and that of hermeneuticists 
like Dilthey and Gadamer. They do not deny that humans (and animals) can also be 
conceived of as physical bodies. Linschoten speaks about different aspects of humans (see 
the previous chapter). Dilthey says that physical processes are conditions for experiences (GS 
V, pp.250-253). Gadamer, finally, does not deny the success of a natural-scientific medical 
view on humans (see chapter V.2). 
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Coherence between natural-scientific and interpretative studies 
Many animal scientists say that we cannot know animal experiences directly because animals 
are not able to report them to us. Animal experiences can only be known indirectly, they say. 
We can indirectly know these experiences by means of associated (neuro)physiological states 
or processes, or by deriving them from the biological functionality of animal behaviour (see, 
for example, Sandoe's view on knowledge of animal experiences of welfare in the next 
chapter). This reasoning makes use of the formerly discussed argument from analogy. As 
said before, this argument is solely an assumption, namely that particular 
(neuro)physiological states or processes or biologically functional behaviour in animals, like 
in humans, is,associated with experiences. From a scientific point of view, so-called indirect 
knowledge of animal experiences does not indicate anything about these experiences. As 
Plessner correctly said, without trying to interpret animal behaviour, animal psychology 
differs in no way from stimulus-response physiology or comparative biology studying life 
plans physiologically (see chapter VTI.5). 
Interpretations of animal behaviour do not make the aforementioned indirect scientific 
assessments of animal experiences worthless. Such assessments are not merely physical 
measurements, but are in a certain sense also interpretations of these measurements. For 
example, the use of the term "stress" by physiologists is an interpretation of a physical, 
bodily phenomenon, albeit an implicit interpretation. An interpretative study of stress in 
animals make such implicit interpretation explicit and amenable to discussion. In this sense, 
an interpretation of particular animal behaviour as expression of stress also indirectly refers 
to physical states that we call stress, just as an interpretation of a movement as walking 
implies that legs are moving in a mechanically explainable way. One can say that the 
hermeneutical circle of interpretation and the empirical circle of scientific explantion touch 
each other at the use of concepts with a double-aspect character such as stress. Therefore, 
an interpreted meaning of a particular animal behaviour and natural-scientific data that are 
seen as other aspects of that same meaning should be in coherence with each other. 
Real and constructed animal experiences 
Cybernetic theories about animal experiences represent a fourth kind of natural-scientific 
approach to animal behaviour. They pose the question of the relationship with interpretative 
animal science in yet another way. The animal welfare theory of Wiepkema and Toates, 
which I discussed in chapter n , is an example of the contemporary cognitive cybernetic view 
on animals. Unlike followers of the reflex theory or behaviourists, Wiepkema and Toates do 
not deny animal experiences. On the contrary, motivations and emotions are part of their 
theory. This theory explains animal behaviour as regulated by feedback mechanisms of which 
motivations and emotions are elements. Dilthey and Buytendijk, however, say that objective 
models of animal behaviour of which experiences are elements, such as cybernetic models, 
are constructions of subjective animal experiences that are known in another way. Buytendijk 
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has explicitly discussed cybernetic models of behaviour. I will present only his arguments, 
which basically do not differ from Dilthey's. 
Buytendijk holds that a cybernetic view on behaviour relies upon the subjective character 
of behaviour. Cybernetic models of behaviour are abstract and a posteriori reconstructions 
of it. Cybernetic models abstract from the subjective, meaningful character of behaviour by 
conceiving of this behaviour in logical or mathematical terms. Even concepts that refer to 
subjectivity such as intentions, plans, and information are formulated in such formal terms. 
In cybernetic models, there is no conceptual difference between, on the one hand, humans 
and animals and, on the other hand, cybernetic machines set up by humans. Both are 
conceived of as organized systems. Buytendijk says that the difference between humans and 
animals and cybernetic machines is that the former organize themselves (to which concepts 
such as intentions, plans, and information refer), while the latter are organized by humans 
(see chapter VJH.2). Only afterwards can one see humans and animals as organized systems 
(Buytendijk, 1965, chapter CI; Buytendijk & Christian, 1963). Wiepkema and Toates do 
exactly what Buytendijk describes: they explain animal behaviour that they consider to be 
subjective, emotional behaviour by means of a theory in which emotions are solely formal, 
theoretical entities. Subsequently they are confronted with the problem of reconnecting 
emotions as theoretical entities to emotions as subjective phenomena again. 
4. Principles of an integrated approach to animal welfare 
As a transition to the next chapter, I will formulate four principles of an approach to animal 
welfare science that integrates the natural-scientific and interpretative views on it. In the next 
chapter these principles will be elaborated in light of two contemporary debates about animal 
welfare and animal welfare research. 
One of the conclusions of chapters II and m was that natural-scientific approaches to 
animal welfare require the argument from analogy for relating objectivating, theoretical 
statements to subjective experience. The discussed ethological animal welfare theories that 
include theoretical concepts such as 'motivation' and 'emotion' are in need of this argument, 
and also animal scientists who study physiological or neurological aspects of animal welfare 
require it (see the following chapter). This implies that natural-scientific approaches to animal 
welfare rely upon the assumption that animals, like humans, have subjective experiences, 
because this assumption makes up the argument from analogy. The first principle is that, in 
order to legitimize this assumption, an approach that conceptually and methodically sticks to 
animal welfare as subjective experience should be developed. The proposed interpretative 
method for understanding animal behaviour can fulfil this role by systematically and critically 
elaborating our daily understanding of animals. This is what I meant by saying that the last 
paradigm shift within animal ethology which consists of recognizing of animals as 
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experiencing beings, is not profound enough; it also requires a view different from the 
natural-scientific objectivating, cognitive view on animals: namely, a subjectivating one. 
Most animal welfare researchers consider animal welfare experiences similar to human 
welfare experiences. This is the core of the argument from analogy. Because humans say that 
particular behavioural or physiological processes are associated with feelings of welfare, one 
assumes that similar processes in animals are associated with similar feelings. I have argued, 
however, that animal experiences are not similar to human experiences. That humans say or 
can say what they feel means that they are (or can be) conscious of their feelings. This makes 
these feelings personal instead of merely bodily. Animal feelings of welfare, by contrast, are 
and remain bodily, vital feelings. This difference between human and animal experiences is 
not a matter of a gradual difference but of a qualitative distinction. (According to Plessner 
and Buytendijk, this qualitative distinction is based on an ontological distinction between 
animals and humans.) 
On the face of it, especially the idea of typically animal experiences, appears to give 
sense to the phrase "from the animal's point of view" which is often used in animal welfare 
debates. By means of this phrase, one intends to convey that animal welfare is not a matter 
of how humans evaluate the situation of animals, but of how the animals themselves see it. 
After critical scrutiny, however, it appears that the interpretation of animal expressions as 
representing good or poor welfare always remains a human interpretation. Because of the 
bodily character of animal experiences and, therefore, the one-sidedness of interpretations 
of animals, these interpretations always remain human interpretations philosophically, 
theoretically as well as practically. The second principle is that, although animal experiences 
are the subject matter of animal welfare sciences, we have to give up the animal's point of 
view as the ideal of these sciences. We must acknowledge that our interpretation of animal 
behaviour and other bodily phenomena as expressions of welfare is a matter of inevitable 
anthropomorphism. 
Though inevitably anthropomorphistic, interpretations of animal behaviour can be more 
or less justified by the use of an agreed-upon method for understanding animals. Such a 
method can - except for its one-sidedness - be similar to that of understanding humans. 
Concerning humans, this method consists of going to and fro between the assumed meaning 
of particular expressions and its cultural and historical context. Concerning animals, this is 
going to and fro between the assumed meaning of particular expressions and its species-
specific context. Like the cultural and historical context of human expressions, the species-
specific context of animal expressions is not known beforehand. We gain knowledge of it by 
the interpretation of particular expressions of individual animals of a species. This implies, 
and this is the third principle, that species-specificity does not function as a given standard 
for understanding particular animal behaviour as good or poor welfare. 'Species-specificity' 
refers to an unknown context of understanding that is revealed simultaneously with the 
understanding of the expressions of individual animals. 
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The interpreted meaning of animal behaviour is one aspect of their behaviour; others are, for 
example, physiological and biologically functional aspects. Especially if one sees the latter 
as associated with animal experiences, interpretations of animal behaviour should be in 
coherence with natural-scientific research results. For example, many animal welfare 
scientists consider the production of endorphin in animals a sign of stress. Let us suppose 
that interpretative scientists do not understand the behaviour of the animals involved as 
expression of stress. Then both physiologists and interpretative scientists of animal welfare 
are faced with a problem, namely that of the incoherence of their interpretations. By aiming 
at a consensus about - and thus a coherence of - their interpretations, they can solve this 
problem. So, the fourth and last principle is that interpretations of animal behaviour and 
natural-scientific research data that also suppose to refer to good or poor welfare should not 
be in contradiction with each other. 
129 
CHARTER X 
A CRITICAL READING OF TWO ANIMAL WELFARE DEBATES 
In the previous chapter I have given a first sketch of a method for studying animal behaviour 
as an expression of experience. This method intends to be a justification of the argument 
from analogy that assumes that animal behaviour, like human behaviour, is an expression of 
experience. Contrary to what the argument from analogy assumes, I do not see animal 
experience as similar to human experience. In the previous chapters, I have developed a 
concept of animal experience as impersonal and bodily and environmentally bound. This 
differs from the concept of human experience as personal, cultural and historical. In this 
chapter, I will explore the fruitfulness of these philosophical ideas for contemporary debates 
about animal welfare. Two such debates will be analyzed in light of these ideas. 
The first debate took place at a conference about welfare of domestic animals in 
Denmark in January 1994. It had a philosophical focus because it concerned the definition 
of animal welfare and the method for measuring it. Most contributions involved attempts to 
set out and defend different views on these issues (Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section 
A, Animal Sciences, Supplement 27, 3, 1996). I will discuss a few of these contributions 
(X.l). 
The second debate is about the welfare of mink who are kept for fur. This subject was 
in dispute among mostly Dutch philosophers and scientists of animal welfare. In the second 
section of this chapter, I will comment upon this debate from the point of view of the concept 
of animal experience and the method for studying it as developed in the previous chapter 
(X.2). 
1. Philosophical-theoretical problems in contemporary animal welfare science 
At the aforementioned conference in Denmark, the two major problems were the definition 
and measurement of animal welfare. The problem for defining animal welfare was the 
question of how much importance should be given to animal feelings as an element of animal 
welfare. This question is related to the problem of the measurement of animal welfare itself, 
because most of the participants held that it is impossible to know animal feelings. In their 
concluding remarks, the conference editors say: "The "definition issue", of course, gives rise 
to a number of questions which could be the object of future research: What is the nature of 
feelings? Why isn't it possible to measure the occurrence of feelings in an animal?" (Sandee 
et al., 1996, p.110). In this section some answers to both questions will be discussed. In 
doing this, I consider animal feelings of welfare as a sort of subjective animal experience. 
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1.1 Definition of animal welfare 
The debate about the definition of animal welfare can be seen as a discussion about the 
definition proposed by Lorz: "a state of physical and psychical harmony between the animal 
and itself and its environment" (Lorz, 1973, p.70). The issue at the conference was whether 
either the physical or the psychical aspects of animal welfare are the most fundamental. 
Especially Donald Broom and Ian Duncan defended the opposite views on this issue. 
Physical welfare and feelings 
Broom defines the welfare of an animal as "[the]... state as regards its attempts to cope with 
its environment" (Broom, 1996, p.23). As living beings, animals have needs to obtain 
particular resources or to respond to particular environmental or bodily stimuli. Animal needs 
affect their motivations to behavioural and physiological coping responses that fulfil these 
needs. Broom's line of reasoning is: if an animal is not able to cope with his environment, 
or only with difficulty, then that animal is in poor welfare (Broom, 1991, pp.4167-4168; 
Broom, 1996, p.23). The main point of Broom's definition of animal welfare is that he 
defines it solely in terms of the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of animal needs irrespective of the 
presence or absence of feelings. Broom's definition of animal welfare relies upon a theory 
which is more or less like that of Wiepkema and Toates. Wiepkema and Toates say that 
every attempt to reduce a difference between Sollwerte and Istwerte is regulated by emotions, 
at least in vertebrate animals. Broom explicitly says that injuries without pain, increased 
susceptibility to diseases or inability to reproduce are evidences of poor animal welfare 
(Broom, 1991, pp.4168-4169). This means that animal welfare does not always include 
feelings. Some, not all needs are associated with positive and negative feelings: "Some needs 
are associated with feelings and these feelings are likely to change when the need is satisfied" 
(Broom, 1996, p.23). 
Duncan denies that, for example, injuries without pain point towards poor animal 
welfare. He also considers animal welfare as dependent on the presence of feelings (Duncan, 
1996, p.29). He sees animal welfare related to the fulfilment of needs, but of felt needs only, 
which he calls "wants" and "desires". He also recognizes that as living beings, plants also 
have needs; however, they do not have feelings, wants and desires. Duncan's main argument 
is " ... that needs in themselves are irrelevant to welfare and that it is the wants or desires 
or emotional states associated with needs that are of paramount importance" (Duncan, 1996, 
p.31). An inability to reproduce, injuries or increased susceptibility to disease are situations 
of poor welfare only if they are felt by animals, he asserts. 
Sometimes it seems that Broom agrees with Duncan. He says that subjective feelings are 
an extremely important part of animal welfare (Broom, 1991, p.4169; 1996, p.26). Referring 
to the German difference between Bedarf and Bedürfnis, he also distinguishes between needs 
to stay alive and needs that are wished to be satisfied (Broom, 1996, p.23). However, Broom 
does not want to restrict animal welfare to situations that include animal feelings. 
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In their concluding remarks, the conference editors explain the difference between Broom 
and Duncan's definitions of animal welfare as a difference between their concerns. Duncan 
wants to give a definition of animal welfare that focuses on what is at issue when laypeople 
feel concern about animal welfare. Broom wants to give a definition that is useful for 
practical purposes (Sandae et al., 1996, p. 109). By seeing these different definitions as 
simply a matter of different concerns, they obscure some important underlying issues. 
Various grounds for animal ethics 
Stafleu et al. have given an Uluminating analysis of the different definitions of animal welfare 
(Stafleu et al., 1996). They discuss three types of definitions, namely common-sense, 
explanatory and operational definitions. They consider the development from the common-
sense to explanatory and operational definitions of animal welfare as both an evolution and 
an erosion. The evolution consists of making animal welfare amenable to scientific research. 
The erosion consists of the loss of moral aspects of animal welfare. 
In light of the dispute between Broom and Duncan, the moral aspect that gets lost is that 
feelings are involved in animal welfare. Duncan holds onto the common-sense meaning of 
animal welfare, which includes feelings. Broom, who intends to give a scientific, operational 
definition, defines animal welfare not in terms of feelings. 
Duncan's view can be misunderstood by reading this as implying that only situations that 
include feelings are morally relevant (see, for instance, Fraser et al., 1997, p. 194). This 
would imply that he sees, for example, injuries without feelings of pain as morally irrelevant. 
However, Duncan's definition of animal welfare does not need to imply this however.1 
This misunderstanding concerns the foundation of animal ethics and bio-ethics. I believe that 
animal feelings are only one of the reasons for moral concern about animals and other 
organisms. Just as we are morally concerned about the destruction of tropical forests without 
saying that forests feel this destruction, we can be morally concerned about an injured animal 
without the animal feeling pain. In order to be clear, I propose to name different situations 
differently. / propose to use 'quality-of-life' as a general concept that can be specified for 
different situations. The morally relevant aspects of situations that do not include feelings 
(such as of plants, landscapes, and animal injuries without pain) can be designated by 
'integrity' or 'bodily integrity'. In my view, 'animal welfare' can better be restricted to 
morally relevant situations that include feelings. This proposal prevents misunderstandings 
such as found in Fraser et al. who equate animal welfare concerns with quality-of-life 
concerns. My reply to Fraser et al. would be that I do not restrict quality-of-life concerns 
nor moral concerns to organisms with the capacity to feel. I say that any harm to organisms 
might be a moral question, even if they do not feel this harm. 
I do not know whether Duncan agrees with the forthcoming argument, so I will present it as my 
own. 
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Knowledge of animal feelings 
The most important philosophical question that is concealed by seeing the definition issue as 
a matter of different concerns, is the problem of how to know animal feelings. Many animal 
welfare scientists, including Broom, say that animal feelings are an important element of 
animal welfare. Nevertheless, they reject a definition of that welfare in terms of feelings 
because they think it is impossible to know animal feelings directly and scientifically. They 
assert that Duncan's definition of animal welfare is of no use for measuring it. "It is neither 
scientifically nor practically desirable to define welfare only in terms of subjective 
experiences such as suffering" (Broom, 1991, p.4169).2 The scientific undesirability refers 
to two issues: the neglect of other indications of poor animal welfare such as extreme 
physiological responses or abnormal behaviour (Broom, 1996, p.27), and it presumes that 
only natural-scientific measurements of animal welfare are good measurements.3 In the 
section below, I will discuss the latter issue. The former will be discussed in the second part 
of this chapter. 
1.2 Assessment of animal welfare 
Some participants in the aforementioned conference try to solve the definition problem by 
saying that, whether or not one defines animal welfare in terms of feelings, behavioural, 
physiological and other physical indicators are useful for measuring it. Either they see such 
measurements as making operational the concept of animal welfare (Broom for example) or 
they see these as indirectly referring to animal feelings (Sandeie and Simonsen for example). 
However, such measurements do not provide us with a solution to the definition problem. 
Broom and Duncan judge physical measurements differently. Whether one considers an 
animal to be in good or poor welfare depends on the used definition. Yet many animal 
welfare scientists say that physical measurements are indicative of animal feelings of welfare. 
In this section I will discuss both views on the measurement of physical aspects of animal 
welfare: measuring physical welfare and measuring psychic welfare. I will show that both 
views are problematic. 
As I argued in the previous chapter and will argue in the next section, I do not define animal 
welfare "only in terms of subjective experiences". I see subjective experiences as a fundamental 
aspect of animal welfare in addition to physical aspects. 
Already the term "measurement" betrays a scientistic view on animal welfare which holds that only 
natural-scientific measurements are good measurements. Therefore, I prefer to use the more neutral 
term "assessment". 
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Measurement of physical animal welfare 
Seeing animal welfare as not involving or independent of feelings implies that particular 
physical states of animals indicate their welfare. Broom, a representative of this view, 
mentions five examples of physical indicators that measure the degree of animal welfare: 
adrenal activity, stereotypic behaviour, growth and reproduction, immune response, and 
injuries (Broom, 1996, p.25).4 The scientific and practical usefulness of Broom's view 
consists of its objective, scientific information concerning animal welfare. Broom gives a 
simple example of this usefulness: namely, animal welfare during transport. It is the task of 
animal welfare scientists to measure the effects of different methods of transport on animals, 
he says. Let us suppose that these scientists find out that a particular method of transport 
results in a higher adrenal activity and more injuries than other methods. According to 
Broom, these results should indicate reduced or poor welfare during that particular method 
of transport. Ethical questions (for example, that animal welfare should not be poor and how 
to take into account animal welfare during transport) can and must be separated from 
scientific questions, he says (Broom, 1996, p.26). 
Tannenbaum, however, argues that animal welfare science and ethics are inextricably 
connected. He mentions many values that are present in animal welfare science: the selection 
of animals and the environmental conditions to be studied, the choice of the measured 
indicators, and value judgements about the animals' welfare based on the measurements as 
mentioned by Broom (Tannenbaum, 1991). 
Animal welfare scientists can admit many of the mentioned values without rejecting what 
Tannenbaum calls the "pure science model". For example, they can admit that the selection 
of animals is not value-free, but hold that the measurements themselves are purely descriptive 
and value-free. One value, however, cannot be separated from animal welfare science: even 
when animal welfare is conceived of as only physical welfare, it already implies that 
particular physical states are better or worse than others. As Broom says: "... welfare refers 
to how well the individual fares in life." (Broom, 1996, p.27). And, as Fraser et al. say: the 
concept of animal welfare is "... a 'bridging concept' which links scientific research to the 
ethical concerns that the research is intended to address." (Fraser et al., 1997, p. 188). The 
very notion of animal welfare has a descriptive, scientific and evaluative sense, and 
measurements which are thought of to indicate animal welfare have both senses as well (see 
also Tannenbaum, 1991, p. 1366).5 A descriptive, scientific view on animal welfare neglects -
4 Measurements of animal welfare are mostly measurements of poor animal welfare. This might be 
caused by a conceptual problem similar to the difficulty (or even impossibility) of defining human 
health, which contrasts to the ease with which human diseases are defined (see Gadamer in chapter 
V.3). 
5 Contrary to Tannenbaum, I do not equate values with ethical values. I use the term "evaluative" for 
values in general, which include more than only moral values (for example, aesthetic values). The 
terms moral, ethical and normative will be used for issues concerning the way in which we ought 
to act with regard to humans, animals or other beings. 
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and thus does not justify - the inextricable evaluative sense of it. The value judgement 
involved in speaking of good and poor welfare cannot be separated from animal welfare 
science. Only ethical questions such as how to take into account animal welfare and of which 
animals can be separated from it. 
This calls into question the very reason why Broom's view is praised, namely its 
provision with objective, scientific information about animal welfare. This information looks 
objective and scientific, but actually it also has an evaluative sense. For example, a figure 
that shows a higher adrenal activity in pigs during a particular method of transport compared 
to free-range pigs seems to represent only objectively demonstrated facts. Actually, animal 
welfare scientists evaluate these facts to the effect that the welfare of pigs during this method 
of transport is less than the welfare of free-range pigs. Laypeople and politicians are 
interested in this kind of statement, not in statistical figures. This evaluation, however, is not 
objective and scientific. 
Indirect measurement of animal feelings 
Animal welfare scientists who see particular physical measurements as indirect indicators of 
psychic animal welfare put forward an evaluative sense of 'welfare' by means of positive and 
negative animal feelings. 
Almost all participants in the aforementioned conference agreed that there is no direct 
way to know animal feelings. This argument is widespread within animal welfare science. 
Animal welfare scientists mostly conceive of feelings as internal states or events that can only 
be known directly by the humans or animals involved and only indirectly by others. Most 
animal welfare scientists who emphasize animal feelings as an element of animal welfare, 
consider measurements of physical animal welfare indirect measurements of animal feelings. 
Peter Sandoe and Henrik Simonsen represented this view at the conference. They started 
a jointly written article with noticing a dilemma in animal welfare research: either this 
research is scientific but does not give satisfactory answers to questions concerning animal 
feelings, or it gives satisfactory answers but is not scientific (Sandoe & Simonsen, 1992, 
p.258). To them, mere quantitative figures about adrenal activity in transported and free-
range pigs is scientific but unsatisfactory. The statement that transported pigs are in poor 
welfare is satisfactory but not entirely scientific (in the sense of the "pure science model"). 
The conclusion of their article is that animal welfare science necessarily implies philosophical 
questions. In their view, these philosophical questions are of two kinds. Firstly, the concept 
and theory of animal welfare should answer evaluative questions such as: What is animal 
welfare? and: What is good for the animal? Secondly, there is the question of analogies and 
homologies between humans and animals with regard to their feelings. 
Like Tannenbaum and Fraser et al., also Sancfcie and Simonsen state that the very 
concept of animal welfare implies evaluative issues which should be articulated and justified 
in animal welfare science and research. As we saw above, strictly scientific views on animal 
welfare obscure these issues. I fully agree with this part of their argument. 
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With regard to the analogies and homologies between humans and animals, the line of 
reasoning followed by Sandoe and Simonsen is the same as that followed by ethologists such 
as Toates, Wiepkema and Dawkins. Sandae and Simonsen say that a general welfare theory 
is based on human welfare but abstracts it from humans. It covers animals because it is 
reasonable to believe that the capacity to feel has evolved in (higher) animals as well (Sandoe 
& Simonsen, 1992, p.264). Here they put forward the argument from analogy. They also 
recognize that this argument is not scientifically justified. Hence, they say that the assumed 
analogy between humans and animals is a philosophical question, namely belonging to the 
background knowledge of most scientists and philosophers working in this field (Sandoe & 
Simonsen, 1992, p.264). 
The homology and assumed analogy between humans and animals justify the inference 
from physiological and behavioural measurements to animal feelings of welfare (Sandoe & 
Simonsen, 1992, p.264). In light of the debate about the definition of animal welfare, this 
is problematic. The same physiological and behavioural parameters which Broom, for 
example, mentions as indicators of the physical aspects of animal welfare, are now also 
mentioned as indirect indicators of animal feelings of welfare. People like Broom might say 
that the only thing that is demonstrated scientifically is that the animals involved are 
physically in good or poor welfare. That they also have corresponding feelings is a mere 
assumption. I think that, if one sees feelings as a fundamental aspect of animal welfare, then 
the animal feelings themselves should be the indicators of poor welfare. At the conference 
Duncan was very clear about this: 
"Nevertheless, it is feelings that govern welfare and it is feelings that should be measured in order to 
assess welfare We must devise ways of asking the animal what it feels about the conditions under 
which it is kept and the procedures to which it is exposed." (Duncan, 1996, p.33). 
In this passage Duncan formulates one of the aims of this book. I have tried to realize this 
aim by developing an interpretative method for studying animal behaviour. With the example 
of welfare of farm mink in the second part of this chapter we will see the necessity and 
fruitfulnes of such a method for animal welfare science. 
1.3 Problematic psychical aspect of animal welfare 
One of my conclusions is that animal welfare scientists who stress the physical aspects and 
measurements of animal welfare are faced with two problems. First, from a purely scientific 
point of view, physical measurements are solely descriptions of physical states and events. 
Saying that these measurements are indicators of animal welfare implies an evaluative 
judgement that is ignored and thus not amenable to discussion. Secondly, this view on animal 
welfare does not and cannot make a distinction between plants and animals. Plants also can 
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have injuries, reproduce and have biological needs (for water, for example). Relating welfare 
to biological needs alone obscures the fact that in higher animals feelings can be involved, 
which is at the heart of the common-sense view on animal welfare. 
The view on animal welfare that stresses animal feelings provides us with a solution for 
both problems. By saying that feelings are an essential element of animal welfare, one 
introduces an evaluative sense to the concept. Suffering, an instance of poor welfare, is not 
a mere state of animals which subsequently is evaluated negatively by humans. To be a 
negative feeling belongs to the very meaning of 'suffering'.6 By introducing feelings as an 
element of welfare, one distinguishes between beings and situations with and without 
feelings. This distinction reflects our different views on and moral concerns about plants and 
at least higher animals. Therefore, I proposed to use 'quality-of-life' as a term with regard 
to living beings in general, and 'welfare' only with regard to situations in which feelings are 
involved. 
However, the proposed indirect measurement of animal feelings raises another problem: 
the same measurements are used by Broom as indication of only physical welfare. The latter 
can say that nothing more has been measured than physical welfare, and that the inference 
to animal feelings of welfare is not justified or is sheer nonsense. He can say this because 
the inference from these physical measurements to feelings assumes rather than demonstrates 
that animals, like humans, have feelings. 
I largely agree with the opinion put forward by Duncan. I also hold that feelings, as a 
sort of subjective experience, are anessential element of animal welfare. And I also hold that 
it is animal feelings that should be assessed. In my view, the customary concept of animal 
feelings constitutes the main reason why animal welfare scientists struggle so much with the 
problem of how to know animal feelings directly. Most animal welfare scientists consider 
feelings internal effects of brain structures and causes of behaviour. Feelings can be known 
directly by the humans or animals involved but only indirectly by others, namely by studying 
brain structures and behaviour. This view reflects the natural-scientific attitude of most 
animal welfare scientists. Because of this attitude, they cannot but conceive of animal feelings 
as unobservable things or events inside animals (see Intermediate Reflections 1). 
In line with the philosophy of the Utrecht School, however, I consider human and animal 
feelings a sort of intentional relationships to the world (see chapter LX.l). In the case of 
animals, these relationships are only bodily and behavioural. Referring to Merleau-Ponty and 
Plessner, I say that animal bodies and behaviours are ambiguous. On the one hand these are 
physical phenomena which can be studied scientifically, as animal welfare scientists usually 
do. On the other hand these are meaningful phenomena, namely expressing feelings that can 
Here I do not agree with Tannenbaum. He mentions many values that creep back into the scientific 
study of animal experiences (Tannenbaum, 1991, p.1371). None of these values, however, concern 
the evaluative sense of used concepts such as discomfort, pain, stress and pleasure. Referring to his 
own statement about welfare, I would say that the very concepts of discomfort, pain, stress or 
pleasure include an evaluative component. 
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be interpreted, as Buytendijk did. Therefore, knowledge of animal feelings, such as of good 
or poor welfare, also requires a complementary, interpretative perspective on animal bodies 
and behaviours beside the usual natural-scientific perspective. In the following section about 
behavioural expressions of poor welfare in farm mink, the need for such a perspective and 
a first elaboration of it will become more concrete. 
2. Ethological debate about welfare of farm mink 
The main principle of the Dutch Animal Health and Welfare Act is that it is forbidden to 
harm animal welfare, unless there are good reasons for doing so. The Dutch Society for the 
Protection of Animals and the Fur for Animals Foundation are of the opinion that the welfare 
of farm mink is harmed - at least in the regular farming circumstances in which mink from 
the age of seven to eight weeks are individually housed in cages of about 0.25 m 2. These 
organizations do not consider the production of fur coats a good reason for harming the 
mink's welfare. Therefore, in the beginning of the 1990s, they started a campaign to prohibit 
mink farming. The Dutch organization of mink farmers, however, said there were no 
problems regarding the welfare of the mink. They consider producing fur coats a legitimate 
way of earning an income. In 1993 the Minister of Agriculture, Nature Management, and 
Fisheries (who is responsible for the implementation of the aforementioned act) asked the 
Dutch ethologist Piet Wiepkema to advise him on this difference of opinion. Wiepkema stated 
that there are "relatively minor welfare problems, which can largely be solved", for example 
by housing them in small groups, by changing their feeding regime, or by selective breeding 
directed at quiet mink (Wiepkema, 1994). Immediately after the publication of Wiepkema's 
report, the Fur for Animals Foundation solicited about ten mostly Dutch ethologists, animal 
ethicists and philosophers of animals to give their opinion about it.7 Then it became clear 
how difficult it is to say whether or not the animals' welfare is harmed. 
By discussing three issues that emerged in this debate, I will demonstrate the relevance 
but also the insufficiency of natural-scientific measurements, experiments and explanations 
of animal welfare. I will also show the need for and possibility of interpretations of 
behaviour as developed in chapter LX. 
2.1 The interpretation of quiet behaviour 
Many mink exhibit restless behaviour which most of the consulted scientists and philosophers 
consider to be a symptom of poor welfare (see below). Not all mink exhibit this behaviour. 
7 The papers and letters of the participants in this debate were not published, hence they are not put 
in the list of references of this book. 
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It has been discovered that this restless behaviour is partly determined genetically. In animal 
welfare science this is a quite common phenomenon: some animals exhibit an active way of 
trying to cope with their environment, others a passive way. Because of the genetic 
background of the activity of mink, mink breeders and researchers (including Wiepkema in 
his advice) propose programmes to breed for quiet mink. The assumption behind these 
breeding programs is that quiet mink are not in poor welfare. 
Some of the consulted ethologists question this assumption. They believe that those 
breeding programmes will only take away one of the symptoms of poor welfare, not poor 
welfare itself. Indeed, I would add, there is no reason to assume that a passive way of trying 
to cope with the environment is automatically successful. This was also the proviso that 
Wiepkema added to his proposal; he said that other data that indicate their welfare such as 
their heart rate should give an answer to this question (Wiepkema, 1994, p.4). The heart rate 
of a quiet mink, measured at a Dutch research institute, did not show any sign of internal 
restlessness. But the experiment involved insufficient numbers of mink to draw a definite 
conclusion from it (De Jonge & Kleyn van Willigen, 1994). 
A further hypothesis that researchers of this institute tested was that quiet behaviour in 
mink is apathetic behaviour. Apathetic behaviour is seen as the pathological phase of 
boredom, reflecting the unfulfilled need for environmental stimuli. A simple test for deciding 
whether or not animals are apathetic is to offer them a stimulus, and see if they react to it. 
If they do not react to it, this would mean that they have become indifferent to changes in 
their environment, i.e., are apathetic (Wemelsfelder, 1993). This test has been performed 
with quiet and restless mink. The result was that quiet mink, more than restless mink, sniffed 
at, bit in, and attacked a stick held out to them (Leipoldt & De Jonge, 1993). This result 
does not point towards the presence of apathy among the quiet mink. Also an inventory of 
studies in which various criteria of welfare were applied to quiet and restless mink showed 
that quiet mink never scored more negatively. Their reproduction, growth, adrenal activity 
and abnormal behaviour did not indicate poorer welfare than restless mink (De Jonge, 
1993a). The conclusion, however, that quiet mink are perhaps in less poor welfare than 
restless mink does not necessarily imply that they are in good welfare. 
The last example shows the relevance and necessity of physical and behavioural criteria 
and natural-scientific experiments for determining whether a particular animal behaviour is 
an expression of good or poor welfare. If, according to the criteria used in such experiments, 
the animals are not in poor welfare, it is hard to persist in saying that they are. As one of 
the researchers correctly said: if there is something wrong with the welfare of an animal, this 
must be observable (De Jonge, 1995, p.53). As the above-mentioned inventory also shows, 
physical and behavioural indicators alone are insufficient for evaluating animal behaviour. 
The measured indicators are not enough for concluding whether the quiet mink are either in 
good welfare or in less poor welfare than restless mink. The following examples demonstrate 
this insufficiency more clearly. 
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2.2 The need for swimming water 
Another issue that emerged in the debate about farm mink was whether their welfare is 
harmed by the absence of swinmiing water, which some of the consulted ethologists assume 
to be expressed in restless behaviour. 
Wiepkema held that this is not the case because mink in natural environments are 
opportunistic foragers (Wiepkema, 1994, p.3). They hunt for fish as well as rabbits. If there 
is not enough fish, mink will go hunting on land. So, mink do not need swimming water that 
much, he states in his advice. This argument takes the behaviour of wild mink, who are 
assumed to be in good welfare, as a reference. 
Nagel Dunstone, one of the consulted ethologists (who has written a book about wild 
mink) took the same reference but reached a different conclusion. In natural environments 
mink prefer the waterside and hunting for fish; 70 to 90 per cent of their food is fish. Only 
when fish is not available, they leave the waterside, he asserts. So, if swimming water is 
absent, it might be that mink are in less welfare, he suggests. The reference to the behaviour 
of mink in the natural environment seems to be ambiguous. Wiepkema considers shifting from 
waterside to land an opportunistic way of foraging and eating; Dunstone considers it a 
response to the unfulfilled need for fish, which is higher than the need for rabbits, though 
both fulfil the need for food. 
Most of the consulted people, however, did not refer to the behaviour of mink in a 
natural environment. They asked for experiments to prove whether the unfulfilled need for 
swiniming water is one of the causes of restless behaviour of farm mink. One of the 
experiments for testing this consists of comparing the behaviour of mink in housing systems 
with and without swiniming water. This experiment had already been performed at the 
previously mentioned Dutch research institute. The results of this experiment were that 
restless mink spend more time at the waterside than quiet mink, but that they hardly swim. 
This should point towards a higher need for water in restless than in quiet mink. Restless 
mink in cages with swimming water, however, perform as much restless behaviour as restless 
mink in cages without swimming water. Seemingly, the presence of swimming water does 
not reduce restless behaviour, wherefore the absence of swimming water cannot be a cause 
of this behaviour. This confirms Wiepkema's statement that mink do not need swimming 
water that much. Also after the experiment, when the mink were housed again in a cage 
without swimming water, they did not exhibit more restless behaviour, which could reflect 
their missing of swimming water. From these results, the researchers concluded that the 
absence of swimming water is not a cause of the niink's restless behaviour before feeding 
time (De Jonge, 1993b, pp.294-295; De Jonge & Leipoldt, 1994). 
Georgia Mason, another consulted ethologist, would be unwilling to accept this 
conclusion. In her reaction to Wiepkema's advice, she asserts that the low frequency of 
swimming does not indicate the importance of swimming. As another respondent puts it, 
maybe they just have a very strong need to swim only once a day. Mason and other 
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respondents hold that only such experiments as developed by Dawkins can give an answer 
to the question of whether the absence of swirnming water harms the mink's welfare. As 
described in chapter IJJ.l, in such experiments the intensity of the motivation to attain 
something that the animal cannot get is measured. Dawkins considers this a measure of 
suffering. 
Can preference tests be decisive for the need for swimming water? If mink do not seem 
willing to work for attaining swimming water, one might still hold that they do not need 
swimming water always. Or, as Dunstone suggests, maybe they do not need water for 
fulfilling their need for foraging behaviour or swimming, but for fulfilling their need for 
food. If mink are willing to do a huge amount of work for attaining swimming water, then 
this result would contradict the above-mentioned research result that mink in cages with and 
without swimming water perform the same amount of restless behaviour. Pursuing further 
reasoning along these lines would lead to an arm's race between experiments that only 
confirm or contest the prejudices of the researchers concerning the need for swimming water. 
The conclusion of this example is that one can always contest natural-scientific criteria and 
the results and conclusions of experiments regarding animal welfare by proposing new 
hypotheses and new experiments. 
One of the participants at the conference about welfare of domestic animals, namely 
Simonsen, says the same. He also says that objective measurements of behaviour and other 
aspects are necessary but insufficient. They form the scientific background for saying 
whether animals are in good or poor welfare, but have to be interpreted subjectively 
(Simonsen, 1996, p.92). By 'subjective interpretation' he means that the evaluation 
concerning the animals' welfare depends on human evaluations of these objective 
measurements. I agree that evaluations of animal behaviour are always human evaluations 
(see the second principle of interpretative animal welfare research in chapter LX.4). I disagree 
that these evaluations are subjective (in the sense of personal) evaluations of objective 
measurements. Firstly, these measurements are not as objective as they seem to be. For 
example, the selection of what will be measured already implies that this is relevant for 
indicating something about the animals' welfare. As discussed in the previous section, 
objective scientific measurements always have an inextricable, evaluative sense. This 
evaluative sense concerns the interpretation of the scientifically measured, physical 
phenomena as expressions of good or poor animal welfare. Secondly, it is possible to develop 
an intersubjective method for evaluating animal behaviour and other physical phenomena as 
indications of good or poor welfare. A first step to developing such a method is to make the 
hitherto implicit interpretations of the researchers explicit, so that these become public and 
amenable to discussion. This will be done in the following example. 
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2.3 The interpretation of restless behaviour 
As is clear from the foregoing issues, the most discussed question was how to evaluate 
restless behaviour that most mink exhibit before feeding time and which does not always stop 
after feeding. Most of the consulted experts disagreed with Wiepkema's evaluation of this 
behaviour before feeding time as normal foraging behaviour. They used many arguments to 
claim that this restless behaviour is a stereotypy and, therefore, an expression of the mink's 
poor welfare. Sometimes restless behaviour starts six hours before feeding time and it does 
not always stop after feeding; mink also exhibit this behaviour when fed freely, it has a fixed 
and permanent character. Before I continue the debate about mink, something must be said 
about stereotypic behaviour and its relation to poor animal welfare. 
Stereotypic behaviour as an indicator of poor animal welfare 
Animal welfare scientists see stereotypic behaviour as a particular type of abnormal 
behaviour. They define 'stereotypic behaviour' as characterized by an invariable form, a high 
frequency and no obvious function. Most ethologists consider stereotypic behaviour an 
expression of poor animal welfare (Wiepkema et al., 1983, pp.2-3). Stereotypic behaviour 
is explained by means of a theory that is more or less similar to that of Toates and 
Wiepkema. Animals perform stereotypic behaviour when they give up an attempt to fulfil a 
need. Wiepkema and Toates would say: if they are unable to reduce a difference between an 
Istwert and a Sollwert. Stereotypies are seen as indicators of poor welfare because they 
reflect the impossibility or difficulty of performing highly motivated coping behaviour. The 
reasoning seems to be clear: particular animal behaviour can be identified and explained as 
stereotypic and thus as indicating poor welfare. 
Mason questions both elements of this reasoning. With regard to the identification of 
stereotypic and thus poor welfare behaviour, Mason says that all the mentioned 
characteristics can also be present in normal animal behaviour, which we do not consider as 
indication of poor welfare. For example, repetition and inflexibility characterize explorative 
behaviour in mice (Mason, 1991, pp.1016; Mason, 1993a, pp.8-10).8 It is hard to say when 
behaviour is still normal behaviour or becomes abnormal, especially when stereotypies are 
seen as ritualizations of normal behaviour, (Mason, 1991, pp.1026-1027).9 A well-known 
example of ritualized behaviour is dustbathing by hens on a grid floor. Dustbathing is 
This example might be considered as not to the point, because explorative behaviour of mice is 
seen as normal, natural or species-specific, whence it is not a stereotypy and thus not an expression 
oi poor welfare. However, this argument only says that the presence of the used characteristics of 
stereotypic behaviour are not enough for saying whether animal behaviour is a stereotypy indicating 
poor welfare. This is exactly the problem that Mason puts forward. 
A ritualization of normal behaviour is the persistence of need fulfilling behaviour, although the 
animal is unable to fulfil the need in question because his environment is inadequate or 
unchangeable. 
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normal, functional behaviour, namely conditioning of plumage that is caused by a diurnal 
rhythm and by a period of deprivation of dust (Vestergaard, 1966, p.62). The question is 
how long a hen must perform dustbathing on a grid floor in order for it to become abnormal 
behaviour (Mason, 1991, pp. 1026-1027; Mason, 1993a, pp. 10-11). Mason's conclusion is 
that it is hard to say whether animal behaviour with the characteristics of stereotypic 
behaviour is abnormal and thus an indicator of poor welfare. Her own reply to this 
conclusion is that an explanation of the behaviour in question can solve this problem. 
However, her criticism of the usual explanation of stereotypies is that ethologists 
wrongly assume a one-to-one relation between stereotypic behaviour and its motivational 
basis, i.e., the non-fulfilment of a need. Hence, they conclude too easily that stereotypic 
behaviour is an indication of poor welfare. The same motivational basis can be the cause of 
various forms of behaviours, Mason holds. Depending on, for instance, age, sex, type (active 
or inactive), and learning capacities of the animals, the non-fulfilment of a need can express 
itself in several forms of behaviour (or other physical manifestations, such as ulcers - SL). 
One of these forms of behaviour is stereotypic behaviour. What is more important, however, 
is that behaviour that seems to be stereotypic is not always caused by the non-fulfilment of 
a need. Therefore, it is not always an expression of the animal's poor welfare. One can think 
of habits and the aforementioned example of explorative behaviour in mice. For saying 
whether a particular behaviour is an indicator of the animal's poor welfare, the unfulfilled 
need has to be demonstrated independently of the presence of the stereotypy, Mason states 
(Mason, 1991, p. 1019). From a scientific point of view, this is a correct line of reasoning. 
The same effect (in this case stereotypic behaviour) can have different causes (in this case 
an unfulfilled need or some other cause). Whether an alleged cause is the operative cause is 
usually tested in a series of experiments in which the effects of the presence and absence of 
this factor are observed. Let us have a closer look at the way in which Mason, in her own 
research with farm mink, demonstrated that an unfulfilled need is the cause of their restless 
behaviour. 
Back to the mink 
Mason was one of the ethologists solicited by the Fur for Animals Foundation to give her 
opinion about Wiepkema's report. For the reasons already stated, she did not agree with 
Wiepkema's opinion that restless behaviour before feeding time is normal foraging 
behaviour. She holds that this behaviour is abnormal stereotypic behaviour. Mason claims 
that the problem of identifying abnormal stereotypic behaviour can be solved by 
demonstrating that an inability to fulfil a need is the cause of the behaviour. Only if one can 
demonstrate this, can the restless behaviour of mink be said to be an expression of their poor 
welfare. I will show that the identification problem cannot be solved by a scientific 
explanation alone but also needs an interpretation of the mink's behaviour. 
Mason says that the possible cause of restless behaviour before feeding time can be the 
unfulfilled need to perform appetitive hunting behaviour. She founds this hypothesis on the 
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character of most of this behaviour which consists of making use of the whole cage, such as 
pacing, (Mason, 1993b, pp.220-222). A scientific experiment to test this hypothesis would 
be to give the mink the opportunity to hunt. I do not think, however, that this experiment can 
provide the required answer. Let us suppose that the mink would stop exhibiting restless 
behaviour and start hunting. Then one can still hold that the restless behaviour before feeding 
time in the farming situation is a good substitute of foraging behaviour in the natural 
environment. Maybe both pacing and hunting meet the mink's need for appetitive foraging 
behaviour. The issue at hand is that animals may be able to fulfil their need for appetitive 
foraging behaviour in various behavioural ways. Restless behaviour of farm mink before 
feeding time might be a variant of fulfilling this need. 
Another argument for saying that scientific experiments are unable to identify the cause 
of stereotypic behaviour can be derived from an experiment of De Jonge and Leipoldt (De 
Jonge & Leipoldt, 1995). The aim of this experiment was to find out whether an individual 
housing system affects the mink's welfare. The result of this experiment was that housing 
mink in groups reduced their restless behaviour before feeding time (De Jonge & Leipoldt, 
1995; De Jonge, 1993b, p.293). This indicates that the unfulfilled need for companionship 
is, indeed, one of the causes of restless behaviour of mink. But one can say as well that 
restless behaviour is caused by some other unfulfilled need that is compensated by the 
presence of companions. As Simonsen says, animal experiences are the result of many and 
possibly antagonistically or synergistically acting experiences (Simonsen, 1996, p.91). The 
issue at hand is that animal behaviour and animal welfare is always the aggregate result of 
fulfilled and unfulfilled needs in a particular situation. The cause of a behaviour and the 
importance of its cause might change, depending on that particular situation. 
Identification is interpretation 
Mason herself used different arguments than the explaining ones for saying that restless 
behaviour of mink before feeding time is an expression of their unfulfilled need for hunting 
behaviour. She had discovered a statistically significant, difference between restless 
behaviour of mink before and after feeding time. She called the behaviour before feeding 
time "longitudinal": locomotion involving the length of the cage. The behaviour after feeding 
is of a "stationary" character: nodding, head-twirling, snaking, and U-shaped movements 
(Mason, 1993b, pp.201-202). She notes that longitudinal restless behaviour looks like hunting 
behaviour. Because of other aspects of its form, however, namely its persistence and fixity, 
she also holds that the meaning of restless behaviour before feeding time is not exactly the 
same as that of hunting behaviour. Stationary restless behaviour always involves facing out 
of the cage. Therefore, Mason thinks that it is derived from attempts to escape (Mason, 
1993b, pp.221-222). 
What Mason does - at least according to this reconstruction - is relate various forms of 
behaviour (before and after feeding time) of various mink (farm mink and wild mink) to each 
other because of assumed meanings of these forms. She relates pacing by farm mink to 
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hunting by mink in their natural environment in a twofold way. Because of the longitudinal 
aspect of pacing, she assumes that its meaning is related to hunting and because of its 
persistence and fixity, she sees it as an abnormal variant of hunting. She has not 
demonstrated, independently of the observed behaviour (pacing), that pacing is caused by the 
unfulfilled need for hunting; she sees pacing as an abnormal variant of hunting behaviour 
because of different aspects of its form. 
2.4 Interpretation and explanation 
My overall conclusion with regard to the dispute about the welfare of farm mink is that 
scientific measurements and experiments alone are not decisive for the evaluation of the 
mink's behaviour as an expression of poor welfare. This evaluation also needs an 
interpretation of the mink's behaviour, either in experiments, in their natural environment, 
or on farms. Interpreting is primarily a matter of carefully looking at the forms of animal 
behaviour under various circumstances, and seeing these forms as expressing various 
meanings. I see the way in which Mason perceives mink as an example of such interpretative 
perception. 
Scientists who acknowledge only the natural-scientific method of research might give two 
comments on such interpretative perceptions. First, they may say that such perceptions are 
just careful scientific observations. However, there is a difference between scientific 
observations in the usual sense and interpretative perceptions. Scientific observations are 
directed at giving descriptions of behavioural properties. Interpretative perceptions are 
perceptions of the form of the whole behaviour as expressing a meaning. Because of this 
difference, I prefer to speak of perceptions of animal behaviour conceived of as meaningful 
behaviour (see also the distinction between observations and perceptions made by Plessner 
in chapter VTI.2). This way of looking at animal behaviour is similar to the perception of a 
work of art. Trying to understand the meaning of a work of art requires carefully looking, 
listening or reading, though not aimed at precise descriptions of its physical properties. 
Similarly, interpretative perceptions of animal behaviour differ from descriptive scientific 
observations. 
Secondly, the comment might be that interpretative perceptions are just sources of 
scientific hypotheses; as such they are not relevant for the truth of the hypotheses, but belong 
to the context of discovery. These hypotheses must be tested in experiments in order to say 
whether they are true or not. In the case of restless behaviour of mink, the truth of Mason's 
interpretation of this behaviour must be tested by, for example, preference tests or 
comparisons between more and less confined housing systems. Actually, Mason's view can 
be reconstructed along such lines. One can say that she, on the basis of the character of 
restless behaviour before feeding time, only puts forward the hypothesis that the unfulfilled 
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need for hunting behaviour is the possible cause of this behaviour. According to her own 
words, this can and must then be demonstrated experimentally. 
However, we saw that interpretations of animal behaviour are not only sources of 
experiments but also modify evaluations of experiments. Results of experiments can be 
contested in light of different interpretations of the performed animal behaviour. One can 
interpret an unwillingness to do a huge amount of work to attain swimming water as 
indicating that mink do not need swimming water that much or that they need swimming 
water very much but not always. The latter interpretation gives rise to a more specified 
hypothesis. The result of a test of this hypothesis, however, can also be interpreted in 
different ways that give rise to another, new hypothesis, and so on. So, the comment that 
experiments must prove the truth of interpretations can also be turned upside down: whether 
experiments reveal the truth about the cause of a particular animal behaviour depends on 
one's interpretation of this behaviour. 
For two reasons I do not agree with Simonsen that interpretations of animal behaviour 
are purely personal. Firstly, scientists are able to agree about their interpretations, so that 
these can become intersubjective. For example, Wiepkema, Mason and the other consulted 
ethologists and philosophers all call a particular behaviour of wild mink "hunting behaviour". 
This agreement is not based on a demonstration of the cause of this behaviour, but is an 
agreement about its meaning. 
Secondly, interpretations can be better or worse, depending on the way in which they 
are attained. In science, methodological procedures determine this way. In chapter LXI have 
formulated a few methodological principles for an interpretative animal science such as the 
procedure of the hermeneutical circle. The debate about the meaning of restless behaviour 
of farm mink before feeding time can also be reconstructed as following such procedures. 
At a more abstract level, I see this dispute as concerning two different behaviours and three 
meanings. The behaviours involved are hunting behaviour of wild mink and restless 
behaviour of farm mink. The three meanings are normal hunting, a normal variant of 
hunting, and an abnormal variant of it. Wiepkema and Mason agree about the meaning of 
hunting behaviour under natural circumstances so that they both call it "hunting behaviour". 
They disagree about the meaning of restless farm mink before feeding time. Wiepkema 
asserts that this is a normal variant of hunting behaviour under natural circumstances. Mason 
asserts that it is an abnormal variant of it and calls this behaviour "pacing". Whether this 
behaviour is a normal or an abnormal variant of hunting behaviour is similar to the question 
of whether a performance of a piece of music is bad or good. A bad and a good performance 
share some characteristics of the piece of music but differ in others. Likewise one can say 
as Mason does that because of its longitudinal form, the meaning of the mink's restless 
behaviour relates to that of hunting behaviour, but because of its persistence and fixity 
deviates from it. Just as the question of a good or bad performance of a piece of music is 
solved by applying common evaluative rules, the question of the meaning of animal 
behaviour can be solved by applying the rules of an interpretative method. 
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I do not intend to say mat the meaning of animal behaviour as good or poor welfare is 
completely dependent on interpretations. My third reason for not agreeing with the personal 
character of interpretations is that they should not be in contradiction with observations of -
causally or functionally explainable - physical and behavioural properties. One cannot 
interpret such properties in whatever way one wants. The interpretation of quiet behaviour 
of farm mink as poor welfare, for instance, is problematic because it contradicts the 
measured, normal heart rate, which is assumed to indicate no poor welfare. Which of the 
assumed meanings is correct cannot be stated beforehand; interpretatively and natural-
scientificaUy attained meanings should be brought into coherence with each other. 
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CHAPTER XI 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATION OF INTERPRETATIVE AND 
NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO ANIMAL EXPERIENCE 
As concluded at the end of the conference about welfare of domestic animals, the 
conceptualization and knowledge of animal feelings are questions for further research into 
animal welfare. This book, in which I have tried to develop a concept of subjective animal 
experiences and a method to know them, can be seen as a philosophical answer to these 
questions. 
Ultimately, the phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty, Plessner and Buytendijk have provided 
me with this answer. They consider the bodily instead of the personal, cultural and historical, 
way of being the foundation of experiences. Especially Plessner offers an elaborated 
philosophical concept of animal experience as leiblich experience, that is as bodily and 
Umweltlich-boxmd, here-and-now experience. This concept of animal experience can be seen 
as an elaboration of Merleau-Ponty's thinking about the experiencing human body, although 
Plessner's writings about animals were published before Merleau-Ponty's. Plessner sees 
personality, culture and history as founded on the human excentric positionality, i.e., on the 
human capacity to reflect upon their own experiences, body, and natural and social worlds. 
Although animals lack this capacity, they do have experiences but only currently lived ones, 
he asserts. Buytendijk has made more concrete Plessner's concept of animal experience; in 
his writings about and experiments with animals, Buytendijk understands animal bodies and 
behaviours as meaningful expressions of their experiences. A discussion of a few examples 
of Buytendijk's research formed the basis of my sketch of an interpretative method for 
studying animals. I compared such a method to the interpretative method of hermeneutics and 
the natural-scientific, explanatory method. 
The first result of this comparison concerns the subject matter. The subject matter of 
hermeneutics is the personal, cultural and historical experiences and expressions of humans. 
The subject matter of an interpretative study of animals, however, are impersonal animal 
experiences and expressions that are tied to the present Umwelt and bodily possibilities. This 
specific subject matter has two consequences for the method of mterpreting animals. 
We understand human experiences and expressions within a personal, cultural and 
historical context. The animals' species-specific way of life is the context within which we 
understand animal experiences. The process of understanding animals is largely similar to 
the process of understanding humans. The species-specific way of animal life is comparable 
to the personal, cultural and historical way of human life. It also functions as an assumed 
whole of related meanings that we can know by understanding the meaning of particular 
expressions (the hermeneutical circle). In the case of animals, this means that the species-
specific way of life of animals does not function a standard for the interpretation of particular 
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animal behaviour. We get knowledge of this way of life by interpreting various behaviours 
of animals of a certain species, either living in a natural environment, in laboratories, or on 
farms. 
The second consequence concerns the absence of double hermeneutics with regard to 
animals. It is impossible to understand animals as they understand themselves. This 
impossibility is fundamental rather than practical, because the ground for it is that animals 
do not even have the capacity for understanding themselves. Animals have experiences but 
they do not know they have them; animal experiences just occur. Therefore, our 
interpretations of animal behaviour are always anthropomorphistic and never "from the 
animals' point of view ". 
After this philosophy of animal experience, I thought it is time to apply this philosophy 
to a concrete issue, namely animal feelings of good and poor welfare. At the end of chapter 
IX, I formulated four principles of an interpretative approach to animal welfare. In the 
previous chapter, two contemporary debates about animal welfare have been discussed. Now, 
at the end of this book, I will evaluate the four principles in light of these debates. This will 
show whether an interpretative view on animals can be fruitful for animal welfare research. 
1. The need for an interpretative view on animal welfare 
The first principle is that, if one sees animal welfare as a subjective experience, then an 
approach that conceptually and methodically holds onto this subjective character should be 
developed. This is needed in order to make ratural-scientific approaches theoretically and 
practically relevant. At the theoretical level, this need became clear in the discussion of the 
ethological animal welfare theories of Wiepkema, Toates and Dawkins. Toates very clearly 
said that his theory only explains animal behaviour as caused by positive or negative 
emotions, and that he assumes that these behaviours are emotional. This assumption refers 
to the argument from analogy that assumes that animals, like humans, have the capacity for 
experience. Also Wiepkema and Dawkins use this argument for saying that animals have 
subjective experiences. Many scientists criticize the argument from analogy. Tschanz, for 
example, criticizes it at two levels. The former concerns the existence of animal experiences; 
the latter the content of particular animal experiences. First he states that homologous 
structures in different organisms do not necessarily have the same function, in this case to 
generate experiences. The arms of humans and wings of birds are homologous structures but 
have different functions. Secondly he holds that similar processes in the neocortex caused by 
a pain stimulus certainly lead to various experiences of pain in humans, between humans and 
animals and between animals (Tschanz, 1997, p. 19). Philosophical arguments can make 
plausible the assumption that animals have the capacity to experience; an interpretative 
approach to animal behaviour can transform the assumption of particular animal experiences 
into a legitimate argument. 
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At the practical level, the need for a different view from the natural-scientific view on animal 
feelings became clear in the discussion about the indirect physical measurements of animal 
feelings of welfare. The inference from physical measurements to animal feelings is said to 
be legitimate because of an analogy between humans and animals with regard to feelings. 
This is a weak argument in light of the view which stresses the physical aspect of animal 
welfare. This last view uses the same physiological and behavioural measurements for saying 
that animals are in good or poor welfare, irrespective of associated feelings. In order to say 
that animal feelings of welfare are involved, one needs something other than physical 
parameters of good and poor welfare. 
Many ethologists see animal experiences as separated from animal behaviour, namely as 
causes of behaviour. I do not see them as separated from, and certainly not as causally 
related to, behaviour. I conceive of animal experiences as the expressed meaning of 
behaviour. An interpretative view on animal behaviour concerns this aspect. In another 
aspect, animal behaviour is a physical phenomenon that can be causally or functionally 
explained. Animal behaviour is what Merleau-Ponty, Plessner and Buytendijk call an 
"ambiguous phenomenon". 
Such a view is already implicitly present within animal ethology. For instance, the terms 
"foraging", "hunting" or "restless" behaviour used in the debate about farm mink are 
already interpretative terms. These terms say that the mink are doing something, that the 
behaviours of the mink have certain meanings. Even the scientists who stress a natural-
scientific approach to animal welfare do not contest the use of such words. The proposed 
method for interpreting animal behaviour can be seen as an explication and justification of 
this way of speaking about animals within ethology. I showed that Mason's work with farm 
mink already used such an interpretative method, undoubtedly unwillingly. Although Mason 
insists on causal explanations in order to identify stereotypic behaviour as abnormal and poor 
welfare, she herself does not identify in this way restless behaviour of mink before feeding 
time as abnormal behaviour. She sees some aspects of the form of this behaviour as 
expressing a meaning that she relates to hunting; other aspects of this form she sees as 
expressions of a meaning negatively related to hunting. 
2. Not from an animal 's point of view 
The second principle was that we have to give up the animal's point of view as the ideal of 
animal welfare science. We have to acknowledge that our interpretations of animal behaviour 
as good or poor welfare cannot but remain our human interpretations. 
"The animal's point of view" is a much quoted phrase within animal welfare science. 
This phrase means that the concept of animal welfare refers to a situation that the animals 
themselves experience as good or bad. Hence, the ideal of some animal welfare scientists is 
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to gain knowledge of the animal's view on their situation. As Dawkins, the original author 
of this phrase, says: "The aim throughout will be to attempt to understand how much of what 
happens to animals actually matters to the animals themselves" (Dawkins, 1990a, p.2). My 
concept of animal experience clearly implies an animal's view on their situation, namely a 
view from their own body conceived of as Leib, as experiencing body. Undoubtedly, the 
proposed interpretative method also intends to say something about animal experiences. It 
is impossible, however, to achieve this aim. Animals are not able to reflect upon their own 
experiences and to confirm their meaning as understood by us humans. The interpretation of 
animal behaviour as expressing experiences is necessarily a one-sided, solely human 
interpretation. 
This does not imply that these interpretations are entirely subjective in the sense of 
strictly personal. As shown repeatedly, most natural-scientific approaches to animal welfare 
already assume that animals in particular situations have feelings of good or poor welfare. 
Only against the implicit background of agreed interpretations of mink's behaviour, for 
instance, will the results of a preference test be accepted as proof or disproof that mink need 
swinmiing water. One can see this background as a coincidence of subjective, personal 
interpretations. I do not resign myself to this current view on interpretations. The aim of my 
method for understanding animal behaviour is to make this background explicit, systematic 
and argumentative so that it can become an intersubjectively agreed background. 
There is a further reason for not resigning oneself to a purely personal character for 
interpretations of animals. In the developed method of understanding, the animals themselves 
in a certain sense, are also one of the arguments for atlaining such an agreement. The 
interpretation of farm mink's quiet behaviour as apathetic, for example, shows that physical 
measurements such as their heart rate are also relevant in order to come to an agreement 
about the interpretation of this behaviour. Animals are not only an argument in the form of 
physical, observable beings: when we understand animal behaviour, we see this behaviour 
as meaningful. I see the difference between longitudinal and stationary restless behaviour of 
farm mink as belonging to such a view on animal behaviour. These forms of behaviour are 
not important because they point to different properties, but because Mason supposes they 
express different meanings. 
3 . The role of species-specific behaviour 
Within animal welfare science, the question of evaluating animal behaviour as indicative of 
good or poor welfare is often solved by species-specificity as a given standard. Species-
specific animal behaviour is considered as indicative of good welfare. Therefore, the 
argument goes, the performance of non-species-specific behaviour or the impossibility to 
exhibit species-specific behaviour are indicators of poor welfare. My third principle was that 
species-specific behaviour cannot function as a given standard for understanding animal 
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behaviour as good or poor welfare. In chapter LX.2, I analyzed the different meanings of 
'species-specific' and showed the problems of defining it. A descriptive definition raises the 
problems of detenriining which behaviours of which animals and in which environments can 
be said to be species-specific. 
In the debate about farm mink, various meanings of species-specific behaviour were 
mixed up. In the dispute about the mink's need for swimming water, the meaning of 'species-
specific behaviour' as behaviour in a natural environment was used. Wiepkema and Dunstone 
agreed that wild mink hunt along the waterside and on land as well. Wiepkema held that 
hunting on land is not indicative of poorer welfare than hunting along the waterside. 
Dunstone, by contrast, claimed that it may not be excluded that hunting on land is an 
expression of less welfare. The uselessness of natural behaviour as a standard to define 
'species-specific behaviour' also showed up in the discussion about restless behaviour of farm 
mink before feeding time. Wiepkema considered this behaviour as a variant and good 
substitute for foraging behaviour under natural conditions. His opponents, however, who 
certainly also see foraging behaviour of wild mink as species-specific, considered restless 
behaviour an expression of poor welfare and probably not as species-specific and natural. In 
this discussion, another meaning of 'species-specific behaviour' also showed up, namely that 
of normal behaviour (because stereotypic behaviour is mostly seen as a type of abnormal 
behaviour). Mason gave a number of examples that show how hard it is to determine whether 
the same behaviour is normal or abnormal. For example, at which moment does dustbathing 
by hens on a grid floor become abnormal? The various problems in these examples are: the 
definition of 'species-specific behaviour' (natural or normal behaviour), the identification of 
behaviour as species-specific or not (especially of behaviour under unnatural, farming 
circumstances), and the evaluation of species-specific and non-species-specific behaviour 
(whether they are always expressions of respectively good and poor welfare). 
My viewpoint is that the identification of a particular animal behaviour as species-specific 
is not a matter of descriptive properties but of interpretations of animal behaviour. In the 
debate about farm mink, we already found such interpretations, for example in the dispute 
about their restless behaviour before feeding time. Let us suppose that both Wiepkema and 
his critics are speaking about wild and farm mink perceiving their environment frequently. 
They differ in opinion about this behaviour regarding farm mink. Wiepkema sees this 
behaviour as a good substitute for foraging behaviour under natural circumstances. His critics 
see the behaviour of fram mink as an expression of the unfulfilled need for foraging 
behaviour. These different opinions do not depend on observations, because these are the 
same for both Wiepkema and his critics. Therefore, they are different evaluative 
interpretations of this behaviour of farm mink. I see the disputes about the various mink's 
behaviours, in the wild as well as on farms and in experiments, as disputes about different 
evaluative interpretations of these behaviours and, simultaneously, about the notion of what 
is species-specific for mink. 
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4. Return to natural-scientific views on animal welfare 
At the end of this philosophical exploration, I return to the ethological theories of animal 
welfare discussed at the beginning of this book. In Intermediate Reflections 1,1 concluded 
that these theories are unable to conceptualize animal welfare as subjective experience 
because they are natural-scientific theories, i.e., objectivating and causally and functionally 
explanatory. These theories explain animal behaviour as the effect of feelings of good or poor 
welfare based on the assumption that animal behaviour is emotional behaviour. In the debate 
about farm mink we saw that the same is assumed at the level of particular animal behaviour. 
An example is the identification of restless behaviour of farm mink before feeding time as 
normal or abnormal stereotypic behaviour. This turned out not to be a matter of the proven 
cause of particular, descriptive behavioural properties but of interpretations of this behaviour. 
Such interpretations are used to justify assumptions with regard to animal feelings of good 
or poor welfare. Therefore, I turned the usual argument upside down: only after having 
interpreted animal behaviour as an expression of good or poor welfare can this behaviour be 
explained by natural-scientific theories of animal welfare. 
This does not mean that natural-scientific theories of animal welfare can only confirm 
interpretations. Scientific theories reveal a truth against the background of agreed 
interpretations. Interpretations and explanations have to confirm each other. For instance, if 
one sees restless behaviour of farm mink before feeding time as abnormal hunting behaviour, 
then the theoretically deduced hypothesis that the mink will go hunting if given the 
opportunity has to be tested. If they do not start hunting, this interpretation is false. Yet, this 
does not need to imply that such restless behaviour of the mink is normal and thus an 
indication of good welfare. One can still see this behaviour as abnormal. But then one has 
to propose another interpretation of that same behaviour as abnormal, reconstruct the 
previous experimental result in light of the latter interpretation, and propose new 
experiments. The dispute about the mink's need for swimming water is an example of such 
a process. 
In chapter IX, I described three types of natural science of animals and their relationship to 
interpretations of animals. Some of these we can also find within animal welfare science. 
Only in a strict sense can one say that there are two competing paradigms within animal 
welfare science: one denying and one recognizing animal feelings as the subject matter. 
Although none of the animal welfare scientists discussed here denied subjective experiences 
of animals, not all of them recognized them as subject matter for animal welfare science. 
Broom, for instance, did not deny that animals have feelings. On the contrary, he even says 
that suffering, a subjective experience, is the most important element of poor animal welfare. 
But animal feelings cannot be studied scientifically, Broom and other animal welfare 
scientists said. Therefore, they consider it undesirable to define animal welfare in terms of 
feelings. This line of reasoning is similar to that of one type of behaviourism: some 
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behaviourists say that subjectivity cannot be studied scientifically; other behaviourists deny 
any subjectivity of ariirnals (see chapter IJJ.2.1). Other animal welfare scientists, by contrast, 
recognize animal experiences as subject matter for animal welfare science, whether directly 
(Duncan) or indirectly (Sanctere and Simonsen). 
In a less strict sense, these two views do not have to compete. Animal welfare scientists 
like Broom may say that they only study one aspect of animal welfare, namely its physical 
aspect, while other scientists study the animal feelings of welfare, if this is possible. For 
instance, they may say that a high adrenal activity concerns just one aspect of animal 
welfare. Similarly, a mechanical view on walking concerns just that aspect of walking, 
besides the fact that the way in which we walk is a personal expression as well. In this less 
strict sense, natural-scientific and interpretative views on animal welfare are not competing 
paradigms but complementary disciplines within animal welfare science. 
In the example of welfare of farm mink, however, we saw that viewing a high adrenal 
activity as an expression of poor welfare necessarily implies an evaluative meaning of this 
measurement. In the same way, one cannot say that someone is walking badly on the basis 
of only a mechanical description of his motions. Animal welfare scientists who see animal 
welfare as involving feelings, introduce this evaluative meaning of 'welfare'. I have argued 
that the assessment of high adrenal activity as an indicator of poor animal welfare depends 
on the evaluative interpretation as expressing feelings of poor welfare. Thus, the measurement 
of physical animal welfare is not complementary, in the sense of indifferent and equivalent, 
to the interpretation of animals as expressing welfare. Both assessments of animal welfare 
should be in coherence with each other. 
5. Coherence between interpretations and natural-scientific knowledge 
The process of bringing interpretations of different animal behaviours into a coherent whole 
is called "hermeneutical circle". The process of bringing interpretations of animals as being 
in good or poor welfare together with natural-scientific knowledge is a similar circle: going 
to and fro between both. The interpretation of quiet behaviour of farm mink as apathetic can 
be seen as an example of such a circle. The normal heart rate of quiet mink contradicts the 
assumed internal restlessness of these animals. This physiological measurement challenges 
the interpretation that these rnink are apathetic and in poor welfare. This does not need to 
imply automatically that quiet mink are in good welfare. As the researchers involved 
correctly say, quiet mink only seem to be in less poor welfare than restless mink. From an 
interpretative point of view, different replies to this challenge are possible. For example, one 
can change the meaning of 'poor welfare' in such a way that a new meaning does not 
contradict a normal heart rate, other physical measurements, and other interpretations that 
are supposed to be indicative of the mink's welfare. As said before, if animals are in poor 
welfare, this must be observable (although I would not restrict 'observable' to natural 
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scientifically observations). This change of the meaning 'poor welfare' is possible because 
poor welfare can be seen as an umbrella concept covering more situations than apathy alone. 
Bringing together interpretations and natural-scientific knowledge also implies that it 
must be possible that physical measurements falsify the interpretation that quiet mink are in 
poor welfare. Otherwise one can forever hold onto a dogmatic or personal interpretation. The 
moment at which an interpretation of poor welfare changes into one of welfare is not a 
matter of simple falsification by physiological and behavioural measurements. These 
measurements of poor animal welfare and their founding scientific theories are not sufficient 
for saying that particular animals are in poor welfare, just as interpretations alone are 
insufficient. The change of interpretation is a matter of consensus about interpretations as 
well as physical measurements, because both are assumed to refer to animal welfare. Within 
such a renewable coherent whole, interpretative and other judgements about the mink's 
welfare are and can be justified. Therefore, although natural-scientific theories and 
measurements are not sufficient, they are necessary in order to attain better interpretations 
of animal behaviours and bodies as expressions of good or poor welfare. 
SUMMARY 
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For many people, laypeople as well as animal scientists and philosophers, animal welfare 
involves animal feelings. Scientifically, however, animal feelings are problematic. In the 
concluding remarks of a conference about the welfare of domestic animals in 1994, for 
example, two questions for further research were proposed: (1) What is the nature of 
feelings? and (2) Why is it not possible to measure the occurrence of feelings in animals 
directly? This book intends to give a philosophical and scientific-theoretical answer to both 
questions. The two questions are transformed into the following: (1) How can we 
conceptualize animal experiences such as feelings or emotions in a philosophically and 
theoretically sound way? and (2) Which method is appropriate to gain knowledge of animal 
experiences? 
These questions are answered first by examining two etiological animal welfare theories, 
namely that of Wiepkema and Toates and that of Dawkins. These theories have animal 
feelings of welfare as their subject matter. My conclusion after examining these welfare 
theories is that they do not conceptualize and obtain scientific knowledge of animal feelings 
at all. These theories only study animal behaviour and physical aspects of animals and 
assume that these aspects refer to animal feelings of welfare. Because they are applications 
of animal ethology, these theories stick to the natural-scientific method of research. The use 
of this method leads to two different conceptualizations of animal welfare feelings. The 
theory developed by Wiepkema and Toates conceives of animal feelings as unobservable, 
internal causes of animal behaviour. In Dakwins' theory, seen as a logical-behaviouristic 
theory, "animal feelings" are names for particular forms of law-governed animal behaviour. 
My comment on both theories is that animal experiences are solely theoretical concepts or 
designations. These ethologists simply assume rather than demonstrate that particular animal 
behaviour is caused by or associated with animal experiences. 
Wiepkema, Toates and Dawkins also acknowledge this. In order to say that animal 
behaviour refers to subjective animal feelings, they use the argument from analogy that states 
that because there are similarities between human and vertebrate animal behaviour and 
(neuro)physiological processes, it is plausible mat animals have similar experiences as 
humans. However, like most animal welfare scientists, they correctly say that this is an 
unscientific argument. My final conclusion is that it is impossible to infer subjective animal 
experiences from objectively studied, physical and behavioural phenomena. 
This conclusion is in line with the main thesis of philosophical hermeneutics. This thesis 
states that subjects cannot be studied as such in a natural-scientific way because the concept 
of 'subject' demands a different, non-objectivating method of knowledge. Philosophical 
hermeneneutics can perhaps answer the question of a proper concept for subjective animal 
experience, although animals are not the explicit subject matter of this discipline. 
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Two founding fathers of 20th Century hermeneutics, namely Dilthey and Gadamer, are 
studied concerning the concepts of 'subject' and 'experience'. My conclusion is that the 
subject-philosophy of these two philosophers is primarily a philosophy for human subjects, 
thereby more or less excluding the possibility for animal subjectivity. Since Gadamer does 
not consider animals linguistic beings, he seems to exclude animal experience. However, he 
opens up the way to a philosophy about animal experiences as bodily experiences. Dilthey, 
in his later writings, follows the same line of reasoning as Gadamer emphasizing the 
common, cultural-historical meaning of experiences and their expression and understanding, 
which is typically human. In his early writings, however, Dilthey underlines the individual, 
subjective aspects of experiences in humans and higher animals. Although he later does not 
reject this psychological foundation of experience, he simply fails to ask: what about animal 
experience? thereby evading the question of how we as cultural and historical humans can 
understand non-cultural and non-historical animal experience. The line of reasoning these two 
philosophers have in common is that they say: if animals have experiences, then these 
experiences must be similar to human experiences. Actually, their subject-philosophy is a 
philosophy of human subjectivity which can hardly cover animal experiences. 
Rather than trying to find a philosophical concept of human experience that can cover 
animal experience, a third possibility between human experience and the absence of 
experience is looked for. The philosophies of the phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty and 
Plessner which emphasize the bodily character of human and animal experience offer this 
possibility. 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophical phenomenology seems to promise a conceptualization of 
bodily animal experiences. The conclusion of his analysis of human perceptions is that not 
the linguistic but the bodily way of human being is the foundation of human perceptions and 
experiences. He sees the human body as ambiguous: both physical and conscious (i.e., 
experiencing) and he assumes this philosophical analysis adequate to cover animal 
relationships with their environment. Inspired by the difference that Merleau-Ponty makes 
between the bodily comprehension of humans and the hermeneutic understanding of person, 
I propose the concept of the impersonal meaning of animal experience as an alternative of 
the personal, cultural and historical character of human experience. 
Because Merleau-Ponty repeatedly says that all living beings are intertwinings of physical 
body and consciousness, he seems to say that plants and micro-organisms are also 
experiencing beings, thereby making no distinction between animals and other non-human 
organisms. 
Plessner offers the required specification. He asserts that human as well as animal 
relationships to their environment are mediated by a self. To him, the human relationship to 
the environment is mediated by language, personality, culture and history. What Plessner 
calls a "double human self" - namely a bodily bound self and a reflective "I" - is the 
foundation of this relationship. He further states that human personality, culture and history 
give form to bodily experiences. Animals, by contrast, cannot distance themselves from their 
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own body and bodily-bound self. Animals do not have the capacity of reflective, linguistic, 
personal or cultural-historical experience; they have only bodily and environmentally tied, 
here-and-now experiences. Thereby, Plessner provides an elaborated, philosophical concept 
of animal experience that is not similar to the concept of human experience. 
Buytendijk, who worked as an animal psychologist around the middle of this century, 
can be seen as applying Plessner's concept of bodily and environmentally tied animal 
experience to research. He fully adopted Plessner's philosophy of animals and humans and 
in his own animal experiments and in discussions of those performed by others, he adopts 
the view that animal behaviour is an expression of their experiences which are bound to the 
present Umwelt and bodily possibilities of the animals involved. 
When comparing the method that Buytendijk used with the hermeneutical and 
phenomenological method of understanding human experiences, one can see that: 
(1) Unlike the meaning of human experiences, the meaning of animal experiences is not 
personal within a cultural-historical context. This is a vital, impersonal meaning that is 
bound to momentary bodily perceptions and actions in the present Umwelt. 
(2) We can understand this meaning within a species-specific context. 
(3) This species-specific context is not given beforehand as a standard for interpreting 
animal behaviour. We attain knowledge of this context by interpreting the meaning of 
expressions of particular animals of a species under various circumstances. 
(4) Because animals, contrary to humans, are not open to others, we cannot share with them 
our knowledge of the meaning of their experiences. 
The conclusion of these comparisons is that our interpretation of the meaning of animal 
expressions always remains, conceptually and methodically, our human interpretation. 
Whether our interpretations of the meaning of animal expressions are more or less adequate 
depends on whether they meet the usual standards of hermeneutical understanding: coherence 
between interpretations and accordance with biological knowledge of the animals involved. 
Finally, two contemporary animal welfare debates are discussed. The first (a conference 
about welfare of domestic animals in 1994) is a philosophical and theoretical debate about 
the concept of animal welfare and the method for measuring it. The two main issues at that 
conference were: are feelings a fundamental aspect of animal welfare? and how can we 
measure animal welfare? The second question turned out to be the most important. Some 
participants said that feelings, although important, should not belong to the scientific concept 
of animal welfare because they cannot be measured; physical indicators of welfare are 
sufficient for speaking of welfare. Other participants held that we can indirectly know 
feelings by measuring physical and behavioural indicators. However, most of these indicators 
are the same as those used by animal welfare scientists who claim that they measure only the 
physical aspects of animal welfare, irrespective of associated animal feelings. Animal welfare 
scientists who stress feelings of welfare simply add that these observations refer to the 
animals' feelings of poor welfare. One participant of the conference argued that physical 
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indicators of animal welfare cannot be used as indicators of feelings of welfare too; these 
feelings have to be demonstrated independently of physical indicators of welfare. 
In the second debate about welfare of farm mink, the validity of the argument that 
feelings have to be demonstrated independently has been exemplified. The question in this 
debate was whether some particular behaviour of farm mink, called "stereotypic behaviour", 
counted as expressions of poor welfare. All participants in this debate tried to demonstrate 
or contest this by means of natural-scientific experiments. A critical reading of this debate 
demonstrates that scientists only agree upon the designs and results of such experiments if 
they also agree upon the interpretation of the meaning of the animals' behaviour. Almost all 
the conclusions from experiments regarding mink's welfare can be contested from the point 
of view of another interpretation of the mink's behaviour. This debate shows the primacy of 
the interpretation of animal behaviour as an expression of experiences over results of natural-
scientific experiments. This primacy requires an explicit method for interpreting animal 
behaviour in order to reach an agreement about various interpretations. The type of research 
into welfare of farm mink as used by one of the participants in this debate is considered as 
containing elements of such an interpretative method. Contrary to her own intention, the 
researcher does not see the mink's behaviour only as a causal effect of fulfilled or unfulfilled 
needs, but primarily as meaningful behaviour. By carefully looking at and comparing the 
form of the behaviour of farm mink and wild mink, she tries to interpret their behaviour. The 
aim of these interpretations is not to look into the animals' heads in order to see experiences 
as causes of animal behaviours. I state that the aim is to attain a coherence between the 
assumed meanings of various animal behaviours. This coherence provides us with a 
background for natural-scientific explanations of these behaviours, experimental results and 
other physical data. 
At the end of this book, the four principles of animal welfare research as an integration 
of interpretative and natural-scientific research are evaluated: 
(1) In order to study animal welfare as subjective experience, a view is needed that 
conceptually and methodically maintains animal welfare as subjective experience. Saying 
that animal welfare is not only physical but primarily a matter of feelings, requires 
something other than physical measurements of welfare. The debate about farm mink 
shows that scientists studying animal welfare from a natural-scientific angle already take 
this view, albeit implicitly. The method developed above can make the interpretation of 
animal behaviour a matter on which ethologists and other animal scientists can attain an 
argumentative consensus. 
(2) Although the concept of animal welfare is about what matters to the animal, the animal's 
point of view should be abandoned as the criterion of knowledge of animal experiences 
of welfare. Animals are not able to agree upon interpretations of their behaviour. Hence, 
these interpretations always remain human interpretations. 
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(3) The species-specificity of animal behaviour cannot function as the criterion of animal 
welfare. Whether a particular animal behaviour is species-specific or not depends on 
one's interpretations of various behaviours of animals of a certain species. 
(4) Interpretations of animal behaviour as indications of good or poor animal welfare should 
not be in contradiction with natural-scientific research data that also refer to good or 
poor welfare. They should be brought into coherence with each other. Natural science 
studies the physical aspect and interpretative science the expressive aspect. These two 
types of research are not independent of each other; they both rely upon background 
knowledge regarding what counts as good or poor animal welfare. In some cases the 
results of both types of research can contradict and challenge each other. I argue that one 
cannot say beforehand which of these views is correct; this can only be decided upon by 
trying to attain a new consensus about interpretative and natural-scientific assessments 
of the animals' welfare. 
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